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The period with which this thesis isooncerned is one of vital 
importance in the history of the old Cape Colony and also ot 
very- real significance in the past and future development of the 
Union of South Africa. It was during this period that the Cape 
Cvloey made the tremendous decision to unite with the other South 
African colonies, and the results of that decision are still with 
us to-da;y, and some, i.Ddeed, have not been f'ully worked out even 
yet. 
It was the bad f ortum of the Cape Colony to enter Union at a time 
when she was slowly recovering from the effects of a severe de-
pression. At the time of Union the Colony had barely become solvent 
and this financial weakness had placed her in an extremely invidious 
position during the National Convention. Then too at the meetings 
ot that body she lacked the services of two of her most able poli-
ticians, J.H. Hofmeyr and W.P. Schreimr. 
There are a fair number of secondary 1V0rks which handle this period. 
The biographiesof the two men mentioned above are examples. But 
no secondary work has dealt with the period as a subject in itself. 
It has alwa;ys been related to a personality, and most of the secomary 
works are clouded by continual references of a personal nature, which 
make it extremely difficult for form a clear-cut impartial picture 
of the period. It is hoped that this thesis ma;,y in some small "fftq 
supply that need. 
As this thesis is. ccmcerned purely with politics in the Cape Coloey, 
no attempt has been made to give a comprehensive description ot 
Merrilllan'a administration or of the work of individual Government 
departments. For this reason press reports, private papers and 
biographies have been used, rather than official documents. The 
latter have, of course, been used to provide statistical ~ormation 
where auch proved necessary. 
I am greatly indebted to, and would like to take this opportunit7 
of thanking Mr-.Robinson and his assistants at the South African 
Public Libr8l"J" am also Dr. Venter and Mr. du Toit of the Archives 
, tor their invaluable assistance in helping me to SEfcure the source 
materials 'Which I needed. 
Note: For a list of abbreviations used in annotation throughout 
this thesis please see the bibliograpb;y. 
INTRODUCTION l. 
The politics of the Cape Cololl1' during 1907 showed a continued 
decline in this fortunes of the Jameson aonrment. Almost 
the whole year had been taken up by registration, which had been 
very protracted and very inefficiently done in the large centres. 
This registration was necessary because of the Re-distribution Bill 
of the previous year and also the re-enfranchisement of those Cape 
Colonists who had fought on the side of the Boers during the war. 
The latt~r naturally meant an increase in the political power of 
the Afrikaner Bond and also the South African Party, and Merriman 
himself had contributed five hUDdred pounds to party funds to be 
used for registration purposea.l 
On the parliamentary side the Government had intended the session 
to be little mor~ than a formality. It carried an Agricultural 
Bank Bill and proposed Bills dealing with Labour Colonies and 
Factories, but made no effort to proceed with them. Furthermore, 
it quickly dropped its Bill for establishing a Railwq Advisory 
Board, although, and possibly because, it was supported by the 
leader of the Opposition. The session was largely occupied in 
discussion about the Liquor Trade, the whole of which led to 
nothilJg beyond disclosing considerable difference of opinion in 
the ranks of both parties.2 
But the persistent criticism of the Government's financial policy, 
though carried on Dy- a small number of members, at l/ast had some 
effect. At J/ast it was only saved from defeat by a majority of 
one on the South African Party proposal to impose a mineral. tax, 
and having vowed that be would resign rather than surrender Jameson 
surrendered ani accepted the tax with various amendments dictated 
to him by private members. But it was generally felt that the 
country should be consulted on this procedure, especially in view 
of the caning Inter-Colonial Conference, and the Legislative Council 
used its constitutional power to fo.t·oe a dissolution. 
This came about through the intriguing of Logan with the South 
African Party. He managed to block the Appropji:ation Bill in the 
2. 
Legislative Council and on September 17th, in spite of' Jameson 
himself addressing the Council the Government was defeated and 
forced to go to the country.3 
Jameson now endeavoured to form a party which would combine both 
the Moderates and the Progressives. On September 26th a mani-
festo was issued stating that the Progressive Party had become 
the Unionist Party, with the development of South Africa, equal 
rights for all civilised men, the union of the European races, 
and the union of the British South African Colonies as its objects. 
In order to strengthen his forces he tried to get Schreiner to 
join him and even offered him the leadership of the party.4 
Schreiner however, refused, having had bitter experience of being 
the nominal head of a party that was not his own. This plan 
although it did not succeed altogether nevertheless had the effect 
of causing Schreiner to urge the Colony to forget the blunders 
Jameson had made in the past and to end all racial grievances in 
politics. This worried the Bond as there was the possibility of 
Schreiner draning off the support ot Moderates, who might other-
wise have supported the South African Party candidates. By the 
end of the year the election campaigns for the Isgislative Council 
were in full mi ng. 5 
Apart from purely party matters the year had seen certain happy 
auguries for co-operation between the two sections of the European 
population and for the nearer approach of Closer Union in South 
Africa. Hofmeyr' s conciliatory speech at Wellington in llq had 
been gladly lfelcomed by Jameson as a call to English and Dutch to 
f'orget their dif'ferences and 110rk together in the future. The 
publication of the correspondence between Janeson and Lord Selborne 
leading up to the faJDOus 'Memorandum' had been met with enthusiasm 
by Theron, the Chairman of the Bond, al.though Merriman was dis-
tinct]¥ cool. Later, in July 1 Malan 1 s resolution demanding prelim-
inary steps to a Union of British South Africa was secouied by 
Jameson an:i it became clear that both parties were now definitely 
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CHAPTER I 4. 
At the beginning of 1908 the Council Elections were entering 
their last phase and were being fought mainly on the question of 
the inefficiency of the late Government. Througrf,orit.the Colotl1' 
South African Party speake\.s railed at the over-optimistic and in-
competent £inal'lcial administration of Walton. At every opportunity 
Merriman declared that his first aim was to restore the colotl1''s 
finances; al.though he carefully refrained from giving atl1' exact idea 
of how he intended to do this. The Progressives in reply could 
only maintain that the· South African Party was completely ignoring 
the depression whose effects were being felt throughout South Africa 
as a whole. They also attacked Merriman on the groums that he 
. advanced no programme of his own and confined himself to purely des-
tructive criticism. To this he replied that Sound Finance aDd Closer 
Union were the two main planks in his platform and that he was not 
going to make any promises which he might not be able to fulfil later. 
lfJ;th Closer Union in mind Merriman knew that he could rely on 
support from the North. Both General Smuts and Steyn had written 
to him assuring him of their good wishes in the elections, and saying 
that a South African Party victory would make the time ripe for 
Union.l Jlalan had ad.opted the aim in the prev:iDus year when he 
had welcomed the publication of the Selborne memorandum, 2 and the 
Bond, Jl01f' that Bet Volk and De Unie had triumphed in the Transvaal 
and the Orange River Colo:rzy-, were enthusiastic in their expressions 
ot the need for Closer Union. Jameson's part in the movement was 
over-shadowed by the odium of his Government and although he came 
out strongly for Federation his thunder had been stolen by Merriman, 
who eJP ressed himself more vaguely in favour of some form of Union 
closer than Federation. 
In Cape Town a sharp battle was fought for the Coloured vote. 
Each side had a protagonist within the ranks of the Coloureds them-
selves. Mr. 11.s. Maurice assured his fellows of the sincerity 
of the South African Party can:J.idates with regard to their expres-
sions of devotion to the Coloured. interest,3 while for the 
5. 
Progressives, Dr. Abdurabman supported Jameson because he had 
said that he would not accept Federation it the Coloured Fran-
chise were lost. ~ also attacked the South African Part.y on 
the grounds that they wished to drown the Coloureds in brandy 
and were in f'avour ot low wages for Coloured labourers. 4 In 
reply Mal.an charged Abdurahman with inconsistency because he had 
supported a South African Party candidate a f e11 months be.tore at 
Ui tenhage, and vigorously denied that the ·south African Party 
wasprepared to sacrifice the Coloured franchise f'or union.5 He 
also advanced the specious argument that the Colouredfand the 
Natives should beware of the demand for the total prohibition 
o:t liquor for them, because it successful, it might later lead 
to a d9mand for a repeal. of their franchise, on the grounds that 
if unable to be trusted with liquor, they were unworthy of the 
vote. 6 At the close of the campaigns for both Houses the South 
African Party brought in Hof'meyr to give a final salvo, and 
assure the Coloureds of the sanctity of their franchise under 
that party's regime. 
South African Party candidates also applied themselves strongly 
to the winning of the Native vote. Merriman himself undertook 
a tour of the Eastern Province where he visited Native centres and 
made speeches confirming the sanctity of'. the Native franchise. 8 
Native opinion was s,ympathetic to the South African Party cause 
and a Convention held at Debe Flats in January passed a resolution 
urging all Natives to vote for the party candidates.9 As a 
result of this Schreiner au:l his ao-candidatej Sir Bisset Berry 
received a rude shock at a Native meeting at Driver's Drif't, Glen 
Grey in February, when they were severely heckled and a vote of 
no-confidence in them was passed, the meeting showing a strong 
inclination to support the South African Party candidates for that 
area. 10 
In order to gain the votes of the working class South African 
Party men attacked the retrenchment policy of the late Government. 
Although it was obvious that more retrenchment would have to take 
6. 
place if the finances were to be restored, nevertheless speakers 
declared theuelves ~against it, Merriman however, declared 
that he would "lop oft excrescences,".and the Progressives fastened 
on this u an admission of an intention to retrench. To this the 
South .African Party replied that retrenchment, if applied would be 
such as to atf eot the higher-salaried officials and not the 
ordinary working man. This fatuous argument worked so well that 
the ProgrusiTe candidates tor Woodstock am Salt River bad little 
11 success at their meetings and were compelled to bring in Jaaeson 
to exercise his personal inauence over the eleotors.12 
Throughout both oampaip:f.rogressive speakers warned the 
electorate of the danger of .. handing themselves over into the power 
of the Bond and did their best to show that the South African Party 
was really a facade hiding the real power of the Bond. This was 
denied by speakers of the latter party who said that the South 
African Party was not the Bond but was a party which had the 
interests ot South Africa at heart and as such hsd welcomed the 
Bond into the f old.1.3 The Bond its elf besides practioal.:cy reigning 
supreme in the countr;r districts, also threw its weight into the 
scale when ever there was doubt as to the chances of the South 
African Party• Thus it would support their candidates in Cape 
Town although it did not put up any- official cardidates of its 
own there.14 
Election da7 tor the Legislative Council was on the_ 2lBt of 
Januaey and the first result, that of t~ Western Circle, 
showed that the South .Atrican Party was on the lVlV" to achieving 
a decided victory. Pettersen and Graaf'! headed the poll b.r 
comfortable majorities from Cartwright and Faure, 15 and it soon 
became clear that the countr;r was voting almost solid South 
African Party. The final. results were South Af'rican Party 
16 seats, Progressives 6 a majority ot 10 in a house of 22, 
representing a gain ot tive seats. Tbe six Progressive 
candidates were returned by the Western Circle (2), the South 
Eastern Circle(2), Griqualand West (l), and the North Eastern 
Circle (1). 
1. 
They had been returned by the commercial. element in Cape Town, 
Port Elizabeth and East London, the mining interest in 'lG.mberl" 
and in the North Eastern Circle the personal popularity of 
Sir G.H.Stockenstroom had brought him home.16 
On learning the results of, the Council Elections Jameson 
waited ~ longer and tendered his resignation on the 31st or 
Janua:ey.17 The Governor, Sir_Walter Hely-Hutohinson, having 
sounded. F.S.Jlalan on the subject and :round that he was prepared 
to stand aside in favour of )(erriman,18 sent .tor the latter and 
appointed him Prime Minister. 1lerriman formed a cabinet and 
when this was published it was found to contain three members 
of the Bond; Sauer 'Who became Conaissioner, Malan Secretary for 
Agriculture and de Waal, Col.onial. Secretary. Kerri.man himself 
took the TreasllrY' and Native Affairs, Burton became Attorney-
Genera.1, while D.P.de Villiers Graaf'f and Currey were ministers 
1fi thout Portfolio.19 So three out of seven were from the Bond, 
while at the same time V.erriman could claim the same number as 
being Englishmen, thus showing the absence of racialism in the 
South .African Party. De Villiers Graaf'f was valuable in being 
persona grata with the commercial element in the towns. 20 
The Cabinet having been formed V.erriman am his 1lin1.sters 
played an active part in the elections for the .Assembly. 
The first of these took place in Grahamstown and Cape Town, 
and showed that these at least remained Progressive strongholds. 
Jaaeson and Fitchat were returned by the first and the complete 
tick.et of seven ProgE"essive candidates by the second. 21 The 
final results howeftr showed that the South African Party bad won 
69 seats of which 27 bad been unopposed. This represented a 
gain of 19 over their previous position. There were five 
IDdependents and the Progressives bad 11"9n 33 seats or llhich 
four bad been unopposed.. The Progressives had lost 17 seats 
ll of which had been in areas most affected by the 
re-entranchisment of the 11rebels. 11 22 
For 'the South African Party the victory had been complete 
and the problem nmr is to establish th e real reasons for it, 
8. 
as distinct from the superficial victories won in skirmishes 
during the election campaigns. Without doubt the main cause 
of the Progressive def eat was the discontent and dissatisfaction 
throughout the countey with the adm:i nistration of the late 
Government • The colo~ had been badly hit by the depression 
and to the average voter i~ appeared that the Government had 
taken no steps to check it. Walton bad raised loans on the 
U>ndon market and had increased the permanent debt, times wre 
hard and no relief in the future was perceptible. 
In the country districts the memory of the behaviour of the 
Progressives during, and shortly after the war persisted. 
The Jlod.erates remembered the Suspensionist movement and men 
who had !ought in the war on the Boer side still harboured the 
grudge of disfranchisement. Restoration of the vote had made 
thea only too aware of the chance to get rid of the party-which 
had opposed their interests in the past and still looked upon 
them with suspicion and distrust. A prominent feature of the 
elections was the v.ery high percentage of polling in the 
country constituencies, reaching a ma:ri 1DU1ll of 91. 52% in the 
Riversdal.e area.23 
The taint of racialism was still strong in the Progressive 
party. Whereas the South Af"rican Party appealed to men of all 
sections to join hands in building a united South Africa under 
the British flag, the Pro~ssive press too often expressed 
doubts as to the future of a South Africa united at a ti:m 
when the Het Volle and De unie parties were dominant in the 
North. The Eastern Province press was particularly concerned 
and outspoken in this respect24 and the -.a:ny- references to 
Britain as "home" only served to increase the dislike of the 
Dutch-speaking section for the Progressive party. 
Allied to this was the strong connection between that 
party and the mining interest. To the country voter tm 
part;y represented the coDDll8rcial element and the mining 
9. 
magnates, who in. his eyes thought more of profits and dividetds 
which went to swell purses overseas, than of the interests of 
South Africa as a country and a nation. Jameson's personal. 
magnetism could not.conceal the fact that he was the heir to 
Rhodes-and that his interests in De Beers and Rhodesia appeared 
to be of as great importance to him as his position as Prime 
llinister of the Colony. 
The Progressive party itself had suffered during Jameson's 
term of office by the emergence of conflicting interests within 
itself. The comnercial. element, due to the depression, had 
split on the rock of Protection. those 1'ho were trying to 
foster South African industry, such as Bmn., found themselves at 
variance with Free Traders like Jagger and Baxter, and the 
interests of East !Dndon and Port Elizabeth were not al.ways 
identical. with those of Cape Town or of each other. 25 
This together with Jameson's preoccupation with De Beers 
and Rhodesian matters had led to a breakdown in party organisation. 
Dr. Darley- Hartley, a foundation member and first president of 
the old South .African League complained that the leaders of the 
party bad deliberately' allowed party organisations to go to pieces 
and had failed to formulate any clear-cut set of principles for 
theguidance of members. Futhermore they had lacked the services 
of able men to organise an election campaign such as Colonel Crewe 
had done in 1904. 26 Jameson himself had realised the position, 
and. his attempt to force the leadership of the party on Schreiner 
shows that he knew batr little chance he had in the electiona. 27 
The party as a whole lacked confidence and showed it in its 
election campaigns. 
The South African Party on the other hand hai behind it the 
full force of the confident ani well-organised Bond. Hofmeyr 
was a power in the land and from bis .home in Cape Town he dir~~ted 
in utmost detatl the election campaigns of all Bond candidates. 
28 
The Kom:i.ssie van Toezi cht operated ef':f.'iciently and only in one 
10. 
or two cases did uno.f'ticial Bond candidates appear and divide 
107alties in their particular constituencies.29 It has bee 
seen how Hofmlp· was used to re-assure the Coloured Toters 
and his influence as a friend of the natives was a Ti tal part 
in South African Party Propoganda. 
In Kerriaan the party" had a man who throughout the ColOD;J" 
had an excellent reputation as a Jl8.Il with unriTalled ParliamentarJ' 
experience, and who was ~.titted to Undertake the tremendous 
task or restoring the finances of the cololJ1"• The stand be had 
taken during the war years, am his opposition to the Suspensionist 
movam.ent had made him acceptable to the country Toter3°, and he 
enhanced this b7 his constant attacks on the mining ani cOllD8rcial 
ele•nts, and b7 bis flattering references· to the land.~g 
class together with bis scorn of the working-class population 
or manufacturing tons. 
BQt in addition to Kerr1man the South At'rican Party had 
the added ad'f'antage of possessing three l.eading members of the 
Bond in the fore-front of its attack. 11alan led the Bond 
section in the I.egisl.atiTe Assembly, De Waal was Secretar7 of' 
31 
the Bond and Sauer a prominent member who also had ~ong 
Parliamentary experience and was an extremely shrewd debater. 
Furthermore in Burton the party had a man who ha:i done good 
work among the Natives in the Eastern ProTince and WfUI an 
extreaely able lawyer, well titted to hold the posi ti.on of 
Attornq-General. Thus in being able to draw men of abilit7 
from both sections or the population, the Cabinet itself was 
a good exampl.e of the absence of racialism in the party and 
was held up as such during the Assembly elections. 
In the Borth help was at hand as well. '!be victory of 
the Het Volle and De Unie parties in the TransTaal and Orange 
RiTer Colonies~ that General Botha and General Smuts, and 
Steyn and Fischer could b7 public pronouncements and priTate 
1etters encourage the South A.trican Party in its fight in the 
• 
ll. 
Cape Colony. The Wfl3' to a united South Africa, united froa 
withia, raow lat ahead, and Jlerr:imaD gi-asped the opportunity-
by inviting General Smuts to meet him at Port Elizabeth to 
32 
discuss the posaibili ty of Closer Union • Dutch-speaking 
South Africans felt that now the chance was at hand to build 
· their own nation and put upon it the impress of a truly South 
African character. 
~ 
But aew than an:ytb:lng else the elections went to show 
that it was the country vote llhich was the major factor in 
the South African Party victoey. The large towns, u has been 
seen, remained al.most whollJ" Progressive, earning for thea-
33 
selves the epithet of un-South .African as a result. In this 
respect Cape Town was the worst of tender. But in the country' 
the. man on the land, once more enfranchised, but still smarting 
under the wrongs of the past, organised am instructed b;y an 
efficient party machine, cast the deciding votes and swept the 
South Atrican Party into power with a bigger majority than had 
ever before been obtained in the history of the Cape Parliament. 
But although llerrl.man faced the Cape Parliament at its 
opening on the 22nd April 1908 with sixty-nine members out of 
a total of one hundred 8Ild seven on his side in the Isgislative 
Assembly, and si.Xteen out ot twen•two in the Council, never-
theless his term of of'fice was not to be one of plain sailing 
and of unchallenged party rule. He had ranged against him an 
Opposi ti.on, which although beaten at the polls, nevertheless 
still contained men of good parliamentary calibre. Although 
' 
Jaeson had lett far England before the opening of Parliament, 
called any for reasons of heal th and at fairs of the Chartered 
Company, the Progressifts wre ably led by Dr. Smartt, -.ho 
loved a good fight and had a habit ot 'dragging his coat-tails' 
in the House and daring ~one to step on them. He was 
supported b;y Walton and Jagger who could be relied upon to 
keep a close check on matters financial and be on the 'qui 
vive' for the slightest trace of mislll8Jl8.gement of the Coloey-' • 
r8'99nues. 
12. 
In no-man's lam, as it 118re, were a ~<if'ul or ~~rates 
led of course by Schreiner, who wu suapicious of llerrillan 
. ( '34 
because of his fatal facility of changing his opinions, am. waa 
ncnr detini tel.7 taking up the stand as champion of the lon-
Europeana in the Colony. With hi.a there 118re Stanford and 
Oronwrigh~chreiner, Sir Gordon Sprigg, and the two Searles 
who would fight to the last 8ff¥ mon to promote the salB of 
liquor, lib.ether to white or black •n. 
But these groups were factors which could be calculated 
in advance and from whom opposition could be expected as a 
matter of course. It was not from them that the greatest 
threat to JlerriJlan' s position was to co•, but from mal.contents 
in the ranks of the South African Party itself. The country 
~rs made up the majority of the party and the question wu 
to what extent 'WOuld. party discipline overcome the grievances 
which they 118re suffering under am which they were determine d 
to alleviate. Apart from the grumbling of the sheep farmers 
over the administration of the Scab Act, the principal danger 
came :f'rom the very large section representing tbe wine-producing 
districts, which were at that time suffering from tlle ettects 
of very severe depression and were indeed the hardest hit 
section of the whole comm.unity. Moreover they had a conveni-
ent scape-goat on which they could lay the blame for their 
sorrows, in the shape of the Excise on brand1' which had been 
imposed by the Jameson ministry and which they now loudl.7 · 
clamoured to be removed, holding 1 t to be the real reason for 
35 
the depression of their industry • 
Faced with the possibility of revolt from wi.thin his 
am party, :Merriman nevertheless bad important problems to 
solve aJld. vital issues to be worked out during his term. of 
office. He had taken office detenai.ned to see two things 
through, the restoration of the Colony's finames and Closer 
Union. Be bad been a late convert to tbe la"8r, but he had 
a fetish about sound financial administration. This was 
repeatedl.7 borne out during his election campaign. At 
13. 
Victoria West he referred to finance as the greatest probleJll 
and he never missed an opportunit7 to drive home the moral 
that hard work and economy wre the only wa:y- to improve the 
Colony-' s financial position. Al though he expressed himself 
in favour of moderate protection nevertheless he beliend that 
the Colony would never become a manufacturing country and 
36 
publicl.7 1 thanked God for that.' • 
. . Bis other main problem was or course that of Closer 
Union and this was brought nearer by the approach of the 
pending Customs Conference. He and General Smuts were in 
constant communication with each other and did in £act decide 
on the extenaion of the Customs Union for another year am. 
the expression of the need for a National Convention, before 
the Conference took pl.a.ce. 1lerriJDan' s correspondeooe shows 
that at this time his mind was much occupied with the probleDIS 
ot Union. He was an avid reader of works on other examples 
or unions of state, and he trequent.ly wrote to Professor 
Oold11JU-8mith in Canad.a tor information on the system as it 
37 
operated there. In his public utterances howver he limited 
himselt to the expression of the desirability for Union and 
onl.y comitted himselt at Victoria West to some form o£ Union 
closer than that of Federation. 
Another problem for Kerri.man was the necessity for· 
shortening. the period of elections in the Cape. Under the 
Colony's antiquated system the recent elections had occupied 
the major part o:f' six months, thus seriously~rejudicillg the 
c~se of good government during ·that period. He bad also 
at Port Elizabeth suggested the necessity for single-mmaber 
comtituencies to avoid the complete lack of 18.inority 
representation as had occurred in the large towns of the 
39 
ColoJl1'. A significant statement in the light of futun. 
other aspects of the Cape Co loll)"' s politics which 
needed reform were the Scab and F.duca.td.on Acts. The former 
needed mare sympathetic administration in order to avoid 
annoying the s~ep farmers, and yet its efficiency had 
somehow to ·be improwd. The latter need.ed reform· of the fi nan-
cial arrangements to satisfy the poorer section of the oountr;r 
40 
population. As far as Matin policy was concerned Kerri.mm 
ba:l stated that le held the Cape system to be the best in 
South Africa, but was alarmed at the spread of usury in the 
Territories and waa determined to check it. The Nati Tes 
theuel ves were advocating the retention of a larger amount 
ot local. Control in their own bands, and were upholding stron&l1' 
the restriction on the sale of liquor as laid down in the Innes 
Liquor Bill. These Merriman had publicly avowed to maintain 
and were to pra'lide om of tbe hardest fights of his term of 
la. 
office when later the Light Wines Licences Bill was brought in. 
So with all these problems to be faced Merriman met his 
parliament on the 22nd of April. It was to be an Emergency 
Session to regularise expenditure by an Additional. .Appropri-
ation Act. Later on, in June, was to come the "credit and 
debit" session which m had promised during the election 
campaign. It is now appropriate to consider this am. the 
next chapter will be devoted to a study of Merriman' s 
financial administration. 
---~---oOo-~~---
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Letter to the F.ditor. 
Report or a speech made at a meeting 
of the African Political. Organisation. 
Speech in District 6. 16.1.08. 
Speech at Paarl. 10.1.08. 
Speech. in Metropolitan Hall, cape 
Town 20.1.08. 
Speech in District 6 at meeting ror 
Benning, Oentlivres and Forsyth. 
Report from Kingwilliamstown. 
'The convention strongly opposed the 
farmers suggestiom that Natives should 
not be allowed to buy land in certain 
portions of the ColOJlY'• A resolution 
was also passed in favour or the main-
tenance of the restrictions of the Innes 
Liquor Bill, aDi their general enforce -
ment b)" legislation. It was declared by 
resolution that any scheme of .tederate.-11 
government should maintain the rights 
of the Natives unimpaired, and secure 
similar privileges for the Natives in 
other colonies. A further resolution 
urged all Natives to support the South 
African Part7's candidates at the 
forthcoming elections. The Convention 
also urged the Government to consider 
the question of retaining in the :ir am 
h8l1ds the treatment of Natives in 
Jlunicipal areas'. 
10. Ibid 20.2.08. 
ll. Ibid 1.1.08. 
12. L 0 J p.273. 
13. S A I 14.1.08. 
14. S A N 5.3.08. 
16. 
Faure, Cartwright, Powell and Wal. ten 
speak at a very rowdy meeting at Salt 
River. 
He was again on the political 
plat.form at Woodstock on Jlareh 30th. 
De Waal speaking at Steynsburg on 
9.1.08 said 'Let me here sq that the 
South African Part;r is not the lolld, 
and the people who say so are telling 
an untruth. The polic;r of the part;r 
• is based on t~principle. It knows 
no race, and our leader is an English-
speaking South African'. 
The Cape Town Branch of the Bond 
issued a circular urging its mebers 
to support; Benning, Centlivres and 
Forsyth. 
15. Ibid 23.1.08. Western Circle R.esult. Pettersen 171560 
de v. Graa.ff 13,lliO 
Cartwright 13,397 
FaUl"e 121 651 
16. Ibid 28.2.08. Borth East Circle. Jlichau s.A.P. 7,247 
Stockenstroom P. 7,211 
lfidland Circle. Weeber S. A. P. 1, 410 
Classens S.A.P. 1,331 
Joubert S.A.P. 7,251 
South East Circle~ Daverin S.A.P. 16,070 
Lombard S. A.P. 15 ,585 
Hurndall P. a, a:n 
Wilmot P. 8, l9 4 
North West Circle. Graaf.'£ S.A.P. 9,!t>5 
de Villiers S.A.P. 9,344 
v. Z;rl S. A.P. 91 062 
South West Circle -
Raubenheimer S.A.P. 11,474 
v. ~1 s.A.P. u,ns 
Dempers S.A.P. 10,891 
17. 
Eastern Circle De Wet. S.A..P. 15,b.97 
Schweizer S.A.P. 15,003 
Full.er P. 10,953 
Bayly P. 7 ,9.) 5 
Bechuanaland Kealey S.A.P. 
GriquaJ.and West Ross P. 
17. L 0 J p.270. 
18. F.S.:M. 
s A I 28.1.o8. A leading article ridiculed the idea 
suggested by the 'Times' that a deputa-
tion saw Hotmeyr to get him to use his 
influence to see that llalan and not 
llerriman becsne P .Jl. 
19. 0 T 4.2.08. 
20. s A N 3.2.os. 1Jlany believe that the goodwill of the 
opposite side is a gi-eat asset 1 and it 
is certain that Mr. Graaf'f 's appoint-
men.t. will be welcome to :many Progress-
ives not only on account of his 
engaging manners but also because he is 
very well known in business circles 1 • 
21. Ibid S A N l.4.3.08. In the Cape Town election the 
South .African Party candid.ates were at 
the bottom of the poll. 
22. L O J p.273. 
23. S.R. 1909. 
24. S A N io.1.08. Quoted from the 'Representative' at 
Queenstown 'The fact that the three 
Colonies will have Governments with the 
sae political sSDIPathies, and these 
sympathies only dubiously friendly to 
the Empire is regarded by many with 
the utmost concern and alarm.'. 
25. S A B lO.J.08. The 'Ins' featured two columns of 
contradictions from speeches by the 
seven Progressive candidates in Cape 
Town, on almost every subject f'rcm 
18. 
taxation, town and country interests to 
protection, all of which had been nll.ed. 
from the 1 Times 1 , and coDlllented suitably 
on them in a sub-leader. 
26. s A N 21.5.08. An address given at a meeting in Sea 
Point on the 20.5.oa. He concluded by 
looking f onrard to a newly re.-constructed 
party led by Jagger. 
27. L 0 J p.268. In a letter to his brotmr on the 20th 
November 1907 he wrote 'I JIB3" not ll:l.n • 
and again on the 29th January 1908 'We 
are having a real debacle. I shall 
probably resign on the Council elections 
without waiting for the Assemb~'. 
28. Ho.tmeyr Papers 1908. In the papers mq be seen oozens of 
files of letters comerning the organisation 
of election campaigns all o"f'er the Colony.-
29. S A 11 ,5.6.08. Reports discussion on •unofficial' 
candidates at the Bond Congi:"ess. A "f'ery 
severe View taken of them but no really' 
practical remedy' available. 
30. L 0 ll Chps. 11 and 12. 
Jl. S AN 17.2.08. Reported the resignation of De Waal as 
Secretacy- ot the Bond in favour ot J(ichau, 
because of his appointment as Colonial Secre-
tary. 
32. L 0 Jl p.2Q5. 
33. C T 4.3.08. Jlerriman speaking at Victoria West 
accused Cape Town of being anti-South 
Af'rican. 
34. S ·AN 27.1.08. At an election meeting in Queenstown 
Schreiner said be could not be certain of 
Jlerriman who hai 1 a fatal facility of 
changing his opinions 1 • 
35. S A N 29.1.08. At the 2nd Annual Congress of the Wine 
Farmers and Jlerohants Association resolutions 
1181'9 adopted asking for Cheap Wine Licences, 
the Abolition of the Excise, an increased 
36. C T 4. 3.08. 
37. J x Jl 1908. 
19. 
duty on imported spirits, and .freedom. f'rom 
Government competition. 
38. C T 11.3.08. Kerri.man said in a speech on the loth that 
he was determined to bring in a Bill to 
shorten the time of elections. 
39. S A I 30.3.oa. Speech at Port Elizabeth on the 27'th. 
40. Ibid b.3.08. Speech at Victoria West on tbe 3rd. 
lal. Ibid 24.3.o8. In a speech at Lovedale to the students. 
NOTE: The elections revealed the division which existed 
between town and country in the Colony. Of the 
sixty-nine South African Party seats in the 
Assembly only one, that represented by Adv. Greer 
was a purely urban area. On the other hand out 
or twenty~Hftll Progressives only five pepresented 
country constituencies. Hearly six-sevenths of 
the Progressive Party represented Eut IDndon, 
Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, Grahamatown and the 
Cape Peninsula. 
Note S.R. The total Electorate of the Colony numbered 152,121 
1907. 
Europeans 129,337 Non-Europeans 22,784. 
NOTE: The following figures of' the voting in tbe elections 
for tbe Legislative Council since 1898 will give 
some idea of the gradual growth in the political 
strength of the South African Party in the ten 
years prior to 1908. The figures given are those 
o:t the number of voters who supported the major 
parties. 
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These are not al.l the figures for the wbole o~ the 
Colony but they are sufficient to prove the. point. The 
figures for the Assembly Elections are too comprehensive 
and lengthy to perm:i. t them being used in this thesis. 
------oOo-----
CHAPTER 2 21. 
There ia no doubt that the problem. of the financial state 
of the Colony was the most urgent question which occupied the 
minds of its inhabitants during the opening months of 1908. 
Every- section ot the population had been attected b7 the 
severe and protracted depression. This had resulted in 
the expression of conf'licttng opinions on how to overcome 
this state or affairs. The conaercial. element was divided on 
the question of Protection. Jagger in a speech to the 
Commercial. Travellers Association in cape Town on Old Year's 
Eve had arped against it as operating to raise the price of 
the necessaries of lite,1 and the poorer classes in the large 
tcnms tended. to agree 111 th him. On the other hand the Cape 
Town Chamber of Commerce on the 27th of January adopted the 
report of its cOJDDdltila:recom.endi.Dg an all-round increase in 
the customs tariff, Stuttaf'ord pl.¢ng a leading role in this 
decision.2 
Sir Walter Hely-Hutchimon on two occasions in Janu8Z'1' 
when speaking on the state of business in the Colony had 
recOJD11ended the protection of growing industries, and had 
coull88lled hard work and a cheerful optimism as the remedies 
for the depression, which he cal.led a temporary set-back and 
one which should not be allowed to destroy confidence in 
future of the Colony) Kerri.man, however, privately 
deplored protection, and was convinced that hard work and 
thritt were the only remedies worth considering. 4 
Nevertheless in public during the elections he supported a 
policy of moderate protection and refused to commit himself 
as to what steps he would take to restore the Colony's finances. 
He guardedly referred to the «lopping ott of excrescences," 
for as he said to Steyn in a letter dated 12th or Karch, 
"it a crisis is to be arrested we shall have to use very 
drastic methods, unfortunately election times are not those 
when even the best of Governments can take up the pruning 
knife." 5 
.As far as taxation went however, he gave no indication 
22. 
as to his intentions and in the light or future events it is 
interesting to note that the South African News in Karch 
criticised the Progressives for starting a rumour that tlle 
South African Party 110uld introduce a DeW Income Tax. It lfent 
on to say that the only party which hai declared itself in 
favour of increased taxation was the Progressive party and 
tha~ ~his was a strange way to appeal for votes and th.at voters 
should remember this on election day. 6 
Vfi th the elections safely over Merriman met Parliament on 
the 22nd of' April f'or the Emergency- Session and "began to ld.eld 
the" axe forthwith." 1 As far as taxation lfent, in the short 
session he could do nothing, but he immediately set in motion 
the machinery of retrenchment. In the Assembly he outlined 
~ 
the position and"Parliaaent to legalize expenditure which bad 
already taken place and llbich would take place until June, 
when he would put a more detailed picture before the House. 
At the same time he would give details of' how he intended to 
meet the deficiency wbi°"he anticipated 1t0uld be £965 ,ooo. 
He was attacked by Walton, who naturally felt this I. slur on 
his work most strongly, for making such a statement of the 
finances, on the ground that it would be damaging to the credit 
of the Coloey.8 Sauer came to the support and .from the other 
side of the House Jagger added his voice in f nour of facing 
the situation fairly ar.d squarely. As a result tbe Estimates 
passed both Houses rapidly, the Opposition being loth to discuss 
so distasteful a subject as the shortcomings of the late 
Government. 
As regards retrenchment, Sauer in the RailW8i1S and de WaaJ. 
and Currey in the Civil Service began to take steps to reduce 
the number of men employed, and 1n the cue of the former, the 
munber of services and concessions granted. These steps taken 
by Sauer made theJ11Selves felt soonest and within 't short wblle 
protest.a. began to come in from ·the groups and. persons most 
affected. Early in June a meeting was held in Kimberley to 
protest against the proposal to retrench certain railway 
officials and to reduce the amount of money allotted for 
maintenance of equipment. The "Diamond Fields Advertiser" 
commenting on this criticised Sauer for his action and 
recommended him rather to initiate bold reforms and to steer 
clear of false and dangerous economies.9 In Cape Town the 
"Times" reported ill-feeling at the drastic reductions on 
the suburban railways by which services had been cut and 
concessions withdrawn. Before June was out two deputations 
of Cape Town residents bad called on Sauer to protest at the 
treatment they were receiving. To t~se Sauer was polite 
but adamant pointing out that in its hour of need the 
23. 
Government had no alternative but to endeavour in every way to 
increase revenue and reduce expenditure.10 The outcry against 
the early measures seemed so strong as to arouse alarm in the 
breasts of Jlerriman's friends in the :North and General Slim.ts 
wrote to him not to try to recover the Cape financial]J" in 
one year but rather to spread it over a number.11 The Prime 
Jlinister however h..Ad more shocks in store for the public and 
meamrhil.e was setting an example to public servants of frugality 
and thrift even to the point of parsimony as far as his om use 
of public monies was concerned.12 
On the 19th of June the ncredit and Debit" session commenced 
and Jlerriman laid on the table of the House a copy of the 
estimates of expenditure to be defrayed during the year ending on 
June 3oth 1909. The totals of these nre as follows:-
General £5, 758,903 , Railways £2,321,678 as compared 1d th those 
of the previous financial.year:- General £5,653,989, 
Rail~ £2, 708,608 and in practically every department showed 
comsiderable reductions of statr.13 
There followed almost immediately a battle over the 
Government rs retrenchment scheme. On the 23rd of June Smartt 
24. 
vigorously attacked Greer and Graaf'f for their election speeches 
in which they had de~ed the possibility of retrenchment. This 
however was weakened by the fact that Smartt hilllself had in the 
P revious year proposed to deprive Ci"lil Servants of the right 
to fixity of tenure subject to the consent of Parliament to 
their dismissaJ..14 Similarly the whole of the Opposition's 
attack on retrenchment was rendered ineffective by the fact 
that the GoverDDSnt was endeavouring to rectify a s;i. tuation 
into which the late Ministry had brought the ColoDY'• The 
Opposition were on firmer ground when the Prime Jlinister 
introduced his first budget on the 3oth of June. He 
revealed that the actual deficit was £991,8S4 of which no less 
than £660,5h6 bad accrued in the last five months of the financial 
year.15 This huge deficiency he attributed mainly to the dropping 
of Railwq revenue. For the forthcoming year be estimated a 
deficiency of £901, 76land outlined his proposals to meet this.16 
There was to be an Income Tax of ten shillings on incomes oYer 
£50 per annum, £1 on incomes of £100-£300 per annuDL am over that 
lim1 t a flat rate of S% was to be levied. Estate and Trans.f'er 
Duties were to be increased, there was to be a Stamp Duty on 
Patent and Proprietary medicines (for 'Which Merriman had a 
healtey- contempt), the S:i nld ng Fund was to be suspended and he 
proposed to introduce a Special Retrenchment Bill to reduce the 
salaries o f all Ci"dl Servants up to the rank of Minister by 
5%. l 7 Judges and His Excellency the Governor were excluded 
from the last by virtue of a protective act. The amounts which 
he hoped to raise by these expedients were as follows:- Income 
Tax £3001 000 ; Transfer Duty £701 000 ; Stanps am Licences 
£10,000 ; Civ:U Servants Salaries £150,000 ; the suspension of 
the Sinking Fund £215,ooo giving a total of £905,ooo. Thus 
18 
he actu~ anticipated a small surplus of£), 239. These were 
optimistic figures, especially 'Where the estimate of revenue was 
concerned, as was later to become apparant. 
25. 
The Opposition based their attacks on the proposal to tax 
the poor man; illdeed that proposal was assailed in au the towns 
and cities of the Colony wherever there existed a poor working 
class, as apart from t~ poor farmer. In Cape Town there were 
two large meetings; one held by the Socialists on the Parade on 
the 5th of Jul.yl9 and another in the Cit7 Hall under the chairman-
ship of the Mayor on the 2oth. At the latter Schreiner, Jagger 
and Thorne were on the platform and at both resolutions were 
passed.denouncing the taxation proposals as inequitable and 
demanding the raising of the taxable income level to £300 per 
amn:ua.20 Similar resolutions were passed at meetings in Hope-
town, Kimberley, Grahamstown, Hopefield. and Fort Beaufort.21 
The "Herald" at Port Elizabeth called the Government's 
financial expedients "clumsy, unjust and inhuman"22 while the 
11Jlercury" at Kingwilliamstown gloomily foreQast more EIDigration 
from the ColQny, less inco.ing revenue, and still heavier 
taxation as a result.23 
In the .Assembly the attacks were led mainly- by Walton and 
Jagger and concentrated at first on the Income Tax proposals. 
Bringing the limit down so low would mean severe hardship to 
working men in the towns, and the taxation was said to be 
deliberately severe on the townsmen in order to spare the 
country-dwellers. 24 Furthermore • reduction of the salaries 
of civil servants was denounced as a betrayal of trust and a 
repudation of liabillties. 25 The debate on t.his Special 
Retrenchment Bill led to decreased majorities due to certain 
of the Jiinisterialists feeling that the Government •&$ being 
too bard on the lesser paid civil servants. The majority fell 
as 1ow as thirteen on more than one occasion, an omen or what was 
to come later in the debate on the Llgh,t Wine Licence Bill.. 26 
In more constructive vein the Opposition suggested that 
momy should be raised b)" an E:xcise on Cigarettes and 11.atches, 
26. 
a tax on incomes made outside the Colony, a land tax and a gun 
tax, and an increase of the hut tax.27 To these proposals 
Merriman replied that it was impossible to increase revenue 
through the Customs Tarif'.i' and al.so to tax cigarettes without 
consulting the other colonies. He re.fused to raise the Hut 
tax, but said that he would introduce a new method o.i' taxing 
farmers ' incomes. 28 On the 23rd of July i: t was officially 
announced that De Beers would close down as from the end of 
that month, 29 which Merriman in the Assembly described as 
" a strong blow to the prosperity of this country n and said 
that he could see no improvement at all in the country's 
finances. 30 Nevertheless the pressure exerted on h:im caused 
him to moclifT his income tax scheme. The Government would 
take power to exempt from taxation poor men who through 
hardship were quite unable to pay. Income tax payers were 
al.lowed to deduct from their incomes amounts paid in insurance 
up to a substantial amount. In the case of an employee who 
had not paid, the employer was to a.et as the Government's agent. 
Further an extra £5 was levied on incomes over £1000 per anrmm 
and on those over £3000 the rate was increased by threepence 
in the pound. Farmers' inco•s were to be assessed at 6% of 
the capital valne of the property as assessed by the Divisiom.1. 
Council, less the amount of any registed mortgage.31 The 
Opposition to this from the South .Af'riean Party i tsel.f' can be 
gauged by the fact that during the debate the majority fell to 
nine. 
Although the last was not severe 32 enough to satisfy the 
Opposition, the modification of the Income Tax proposals and 
the dropping of Estate Duties 1 the revenue from which was to be 
made up by increasing Succession Duties, 33 made the budget more 
acceptable to them. The De Beers announcement had had a sobering 
e!fect on the more responsible members or the party, as it would 
mean not only a loss of revenue but also a decline in the trade 
and general prosperity of the Colo?lY'.34 So although the 
suspension of the Sinking Fund was attacked on technical grounds 
by Walton, and the Stamps and Licences Act by certain of the 
cOJ11111.ercial element,35 the Budget was passed almost unaltered. 
28. 
Schuur said in an interview w.i. th the 'Cape Times", "the diamond 
iDdustry- is slowly recovering itself, but the recovery is sure 
to be exaggerated. It will take some time to get to normal 
conditions, but the future is alright.n 42 
Meanwhile the process of retrenchment continued am as 
expenditure was reduced so the revenue began to show a slight 
tendency to rise. On the 6th o:t November De Waa1 at a dinner 
for the officers of' the Cruiser Squadron visiting Cape Town at 
the time, gave some figures ot improving revenue and said 
''I think it 1.s only fair to ourselves to say that these 
October figures give us hope,· and i.t maintained during November, 
will go far to lead us to the belief that we a.re slowly 
returning tO the improvement which we all desire." 43 
So throughout the SUJ'Jlller of 08/CYi the process of gradual. 
improvement went on hand in hand with the continual. endeavour 
to reduce expenditure to a 11in1nn1111. 44 In December the share-
holders meeting of De Beers revealed how ba:lly the corporation 
had been hit by the slump in the diamond market. The profits 
for the year ending June Joth 1908 had fallen to £908,619 as 
against £21 725,000 in the previous year.45 The policy of 
restricting production to meet the demand was to be continued 
8lld this decision was approved by both parties in the Colony.46 
The tide was definitely turning, however, and in March 19CYi 
at Kingwilliamstown Merriman said that there was improvement 
and he hoped that by the end of the calemar year there would 
be financia1 equilibrium. 47 In the same month he wrote to 
General Botha saying 11 AS regards next year it is pretty 
certain that our revenue is on the upgrade and I shall not 
relax the retrenchment policy." 4B This was in answer to 
a request from the latter for figures of the revenue returns 
of the cape Colony which were needed for the calculation of 
the finances of the Union which would come into being in 1910. 
When Parliament re-opened in June Jlerriman backed up his words 
by giving figures of the reduction of the deficit up to May.49 
29. 
The session having passed the revised Draf't Act of Union 
Merri.man departed for England as a member of the Cape delegation, 
leaving Currey to tend to the finances in his absence. 
Currey's letters to Merriman during this period are full 
of optimism and he kept the Prime Minister supplied with figures 
ot the revenue coming in each month. In his last letter before 
Merr:i.man1s return he expressed the opinion that if the Cape could 
budget tor the period ending 31st Xq 1910 1 t would be possible 
for it to enter Union with a balance on the right side.50 
The work of the delegation in Englam being done, Merriman 
lmrried back to Cape Town to meet the threat of revolt .from the 
Wine farmers against the Brandy" Excise. Parliament re-opened 
on the 23rd of September and foreseeing that he might have to 
give way to the demands made on him, he cast about for some way 
to make good the revenue which would be lost by a reduction of 
the Excise. He now thought of a Cigarette Tax and telegraphed 
to General Smuts on the 27th of September to ask if the Trans-
vaal. Government would assent to the imposition of a i penny 
tax on cigarettes to meet the possible remission of the Excise.51 
General Smuts replied that there would be no objection but 
doubted if the tax would increase the revenue.52 This Merriman 
was prepared to risk and on the 5th or October he introduced 
his last Budget. 
Tb.is now revealed a deficit of £364,684 which was extremely 
disappointing, especially' as the revenue, bad included a sum of 
arrear revenue due to the old Netherlands Railways aJJX>unting to 
£82,299.53 The optim#or the Treasurer's estimate of revenue 
in 1908 was now revealed by a shortfall of £659, 706. To meet 
this situation Merriman carried his 11 financial. expedients 11 
over for another year. He had been forced to reduce the Excise 
on Wine Bt'a.ndy from 6/- to 3/- per gallon and it was estimated 
that this would lose the Colo~ about £35,000 in reveme. 
In order to make up for this a Cigarette tax or a! penny was 
imposed llbich, it was hoped, 1t0uld yield £40,ooo, and the 
method or tm ng f'armers • inco•s was now adjusted so that they 
wuld pay on the same basis as other members of the coDllDJJli ty • 
• 
Jo. 
From this a further £30,000 was expected. Changes were also 
made in the School Bond .Amendment Act to deal 'With school 
finances more satisfactoril.J'".54 This budget met with opposition 
on the old ground of taxing the poor man too heavily,55 but 
Parliament had been much impressed with the improvement in the 
Colony• s financial position and the attack soon switched to 
the Light Wine Licences Amendment Bill, which gave rise to a 
battle royal in the Assembly. 
The ColOJ>1" was now in a po1Jition to compliment itself and 
Merriman on the impro-rement in its finances 19hich would enable 
it to enter Union llith a credit balanee. In January 1910 the 
South African News in commenting on the figures for 1909 
compared the export figures of the Transvaal, apart .from gold 
and diamonds, unfavourably 'With those of the cape and said 
"It is becoming increasingly clear that this co lOIJ1' far from 
being a source of weakness to the Union, is going to be a 
source of eno rmous strength. 11 56 
Jlerriman himself now became perturbed about the arrange-
ments for the finance of the Union. In December 1909 Fischer 
bad written to hill sqing that the Capitalist interest on the 
Rand had approved of Hull as Treasurer-General for the Union.57 
Jlerriman did not have a high opinion of Hull as a financier 
and asked the Auditor-General of the Cape to prepare a 
memorandum. on the financial arrangements necessary ·for the 
Cape's entry into Union. This was submitted on January 31st.58 
Early in Febrv.&l"Y' Moor wrote to Jferriman suggesting a meeting 
of the Heads of Treasuries and the Auditors-General to discuss 
financial ques~ionsarising out of the Constitution Act. To 
this Merriman quickly agreed and suggested that the conference 
should be held in Karch. Fischer al.so agreed to this but 
General Botha preferred to del.q until the middle of April. 
Merriman against his 'Will consented to this bit was now 
tho»oughl.y disturbed about the JD&tter and pointed out that 
the machinery of finance must actually start running on June 
lst as all existing arrangements would fall away on that date. 59 
• 
31. 
He was by now thoroughly- suspicioua of the Transvaal. as the recent 
action of its .Assembly in UDConstitutional.JJr granting itsel.t a 
full years aJ.lowance for an ex\iremely short session showed that 
its outlook towards finance was definitely not the same as his. 
Nevertheless as f'ar as the Cape was concerned hw could be 
well satisfied. He had restored the Colony's finances to a 
sound position and as a final gesture was ahl.e to restore to the 
civil servantfi the reduction be had made in their salaries. 
This was done by a special sitting of' Parliament on April 9th.6o 
In spite of this the Colony atill had a cash balance of 
~
£172,000 , and all its interestl'were provided for, 'When it 
entered Uni.on on 31st May 1910.61 
Right to the end although the Progressive Press gave 
Kerri.man due credit for his work it nevertheless still maintained 
that the economies Utected by the Jameson ministry and the 
general increase in prosperity throughout South Africa must be 
given full credit too.62 Thus after the publication of 
Merriman' s final. memorandum on the finances of the Colony, in 
which he gave a thQ.rough and comprehensive view of his financial 
administration, the ncape Times" commenting on this in a leader 
said 11 on the whole it mq be said tD&t we owe our return to 
preaperity rather to the general forvrard movement which has 
enabled all the other colonies to balance their accounts, than 
to &rIJ" special .financial genius on the part of' the present 
Gove~nt." 63 To this attitude Merriman replied in an 
election ad.dress at Victoria West in June 1910. He said 
n I take this opportunity of correcting the impression that 
this result is only due to some extra-ordinary improvement in 
trade or revenue - a very brief glance at the figures will 
dispell this illusion. For the twelve months ending April 
30th 1908 the revenue amounted to £7, 481, 834 whl.le despite 
very heavy increase in taxation the revenue for the twelve 
months ending .April 30th 1910 was only £7, 457 ,612. In the 
formr period the colony had a deficieey exceeding £500,000 
and in the latter a surplus of over £100,000." 64 This 
32. 
This statement was completely justifiable as is shown by the 
figures in a note at the end of this chapter.· Merri.man's 
financial administration had been a complete ·success and al-
though it had caused a certain amount of hardship am suffering 
amongst certain classes, particularly the poorer retrencmd 
Civil servants, it had nevertheless been a thorough vindication 
of his election policy. Umoubtedly had it not been for his 
firm policy and bis determination in its execution the Colony 
would have been very much worse off when it entered Union. 
-------oOo-------
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nyesterday afternoon a well attended mass 
meeting was held on the Grand Parade 1 at 
which the new taxation proposals were 
vigorously denounced." 
21. C. T 25.7.08, 29.7.08 







Extract from the "Herald!' 
Extract from the 1'1lercury11 ; •There is 
no guarantee that the new taxation will 
prevail for only one year. The pro-
bability is that twelve months hence the 
number of European adults in the country 
will have decreased, Oovemment depart-
ments will show still less .favourable 
returns, and taxation, instead of being 
lowered, will have to be still further 
increased." 
24. CT 4. 7.08, 14.7.08 
25. S AN 4.8.o8 Extract :from the 'Herald' ,Tarkastad: 
26. C T 
24. 7.08 
27. SAN 27.7.08 
26. Ibid 14.7.06 
~. CT 23.7.08 
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"A more bare-faced breach of faith and 
repudiation of liabilities has probably 
seldom been attempted by any GoverDDent 
in modern tiaes. " Other extr acis :from the 
'Jlail', Grahamstown, the Oolesberg ',l<iver-
tiser', repeat these sentiments. 
Cro:mrright-Schreiner 1s amendment exempting 
the salaries of married men, rl th depen-
dents, tslow £150 defeated by 13 votes in 
a House of 91. 
Dr. Smartts r motion to go into Committee 
rejected by 50 votes to 37. 
The •s.A.News• supported the lam tax and 
the gun tax but disapproved of iroreasing 
native taxation. 
Asked in the Assembly whether the GovemD1mt 
was prepared to enforce the working of the 
Kimberley mines, Merriman refused sqing that 
it was merely the action of prudent cwners. 
• 
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confidential would your Government give their 
assent to our imposing half-penny st,!jllp on 
consumption cigarettes to meet possible re-
mission of part of excise you are aware of 
embarrassing position." 
General Smuts to Merriman 28.9.09 
Me100randwn on finances of Colony. 
6.10.09 Figures for ~ Revenue 
Expen:ii ture 
Deficit 




C T 2.11.09 
S AN 27.1.10 
J I JI Fischer to Merriman 6.12.09 
January 1910. J I ll 
J I )( Correspomence b~tween the four Prima Ministers 
in February 1910. 
37. 
6o. SAN 7.4.10 This was announced by Merriman during the 
speai.al Eeting of Parliament to elect 
the senators for the Cape on the 6th of 
April. 
61. LOM p.256 
62. CT 2.4.10 
63. Ibid 20.5.10 
64. S AN 6.6.10 
NOTE: '!'he following are some figures showing the decline in the 
prosperity of the Cape Colony from the boom years of the 
post-war period to the time of the premiership o£ Jlerriman. 
All these figures are taken !ran the Statistical Register 
for 1909. The figures for 1910 are not available. 
Rai.lwq Earnings Total Value of Diamond Exports 
1903 £5,329,868 1903 £4,988,069* 
1904 4,144,319 1904 5,336,982 
1905 4,047,065 1905 4,8,50,660 
1906 3,112,110 1906 6,834,369 
1907 3,469,936 1907 5,916,531 
1908 2,850,139 1908 3,191,582 
1909 3,129,054 1909 5,510,642
1 
Revenue from CustolBS Revenue .from Taxation 
1902-03 £3,.503,479 1902-03 £4,398,846 
1903-04 2,396,583! 1903-04 3,335,543 
1904-5 1,925,879 1904-0.5 3,214,283 
1905-06 1,870,956 1905-06 3,135,882 
• 1906--07 1,763,400 1906-07 2,964,600 
1907-o8 1,543,088 1907-08 2,8.53,179 
1908-09 1,253,051 1908-09 2, 787,956 
Total Expenditure Total ,Revenue 
under Votes 
1?03-04 £10,8627866 1902-03 £11,701,150 
1904-0.5 9,149,498 1903-04 9,913,85.5 
1905-06 8,231,719 1904-05 8,472,302 
1906-o7 6,349, 719 1905...06 8,236,880 
1907-08 7,973,727 1906-07 7,701,192 
1908-09 1,681,305 1907-08 6,981,873 
1908-09 7,312,ll2 
















Figures shoring reduction 





NO'IE: Figures ot staff reductions in the Posta and Telegraphs 
and Railwqs departments during JleITiman' s term of office: 
Post & Telegraphs. No.of .Sta.ft 
15.2.08 2912 
30.4.10 2572 







Reduction - 1,538 
These .figures are frcm the Jlemorandum on the Colony-' s 
finances in the llerriman Papers. 
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39. 
CH APTER Ill 
Attention must now be turned to the other legislation, ap~ ... 
from financial, which occupied the time of 1:he Cape Parliament during 
the years 1908 am 1909. This chapter will be devoted to the study 
of such legislation as was not primarLcy" intended for the purpose of 
raising revenue and which was fought out for the main part on purely 
party grounds. The first session of 1908, a short one, was concerned 
mainly with the authorisation o£ additional expenditure am no violent . 
party issues a.rose, nevertheless it will at this stage be fitting to 
take a quick glance at the state of the parties before £:Ping on to a 
consideration of the 1r0rk of the second session. 
In numbers the South African Party was by far the stronger body. 
In the lower house out of a total of one hun:ired and seven seats the 
Government held sixty-nine, giving an overall majority of thirty-one. 
In the Isgislative Council the South A.trican. Party held sixteen seats out 
of a total of twenty-two. Two-thirds of all the Government menbers 
were also members of the Bond and this large contingent was itself' made 
up of elements representing the wine farmers, the sheep .fa:rlll3rs and 
the country towns. The Opposition party, the Progressives or unionists, 
to give them the new name adopted by Jameson in 1907 had th:lrty-three 
members in the Legislative Assembly, the leadership of whom had fallen 
on Dr.Smartt, Jameson having left for England on the 15th of A.pril.l 
In the Council the Progressives had six members. The diverse eleDBnlis 
amongst the Progressives have been d:iscussed and it will suffice to 
sq that this diversity was aggravated by party discipline far weaker 
than that of the South African Party. Of_ the five Indepe~ents in 
the Assembl.1' the main figure was Schreiner, of whom De Waal, in writing 
to llerriman during the elections in 1907, had said 11I would rather 
see him f'all altogether in the outstretched arms of the ..tameson lot". 2 
This was an understandable view for a strong party man to adopt, 
because Schreiner was a man of' far too strong principles to support 
any action rlth which he did not agree, out of personal friendship or 
because of' party discipliDe. 
However, there were no vital issues raised in tba first session, 
and the South African News was quite justified, when commenting on it, 
in sqing: "The number of Progressives who really occupy the 
position of an ordinary opposition is not large aid includes 
few men of weight. Sir Gordon Sprigg is evidently dis inc lined 
to act the part of an Opposition Leader, Mr.Schreiner is a critic, 
but not at present a hostile critic. The members for Kingwilliams-
town and many others are much more in a mood for helping the Govern-
ment in its constructive work than for thwarting it. In f'act, 
at the present moment there can hardly be said to be an Opposition 
part7, and it would have been very difficult to have brought to-
gether twenty-five men to vote against the Government in the la.st 
few dqs."3 
But although the above was true of the· first session it could 
hardly be said of the seconi. When it commenced on June 19th, 
the speech from the throne dealt with the procedure for tl'B National 
Convention, the nacessity for restoring the finances, legislation 
to improve electoral arrangements, to send the School Board Act, 
to check Usury in the Native Territories, the adulteration of wine 
and other liquors, and to anend the Animal Diseases Act to provide 
adminjstrative machinery to deal with East Coast Fever.4 Apart 
from the finances am. the School Board moat of the legislation was 
of a non-contentious nature and as such did not have much trouble 
in passing through both Houses. Burton, the Attorney-General., 
introduced the Electoral. Reform Bill which was to shorten the tim 
between the promulgation of the first proclamation and election from 
five months to five weeks.5 The Usury Bill was a straightforward 
measure insisting that 'When there were written agreements between 
borrower and lender they must be clearly ani definitely stated, 
fixlng 12~ as the max:l•n.m rate, both for future ani far current 
loans, prohibiting attempts to impose on borrowers and allowing 
counts to investigate accounts between borrowers and leniers, ao 
that tbi latter might not exact more than their 12%.6 This Act 
was procla.lled in force in the Transkei, East Griqualand, Port St. 
Johns am. Pondoland in October.7 In July a Scab Act Ame:Mment 
Bill went through which abolished the grant of free dip and would 
save the Government £5,000. The sheep farmers tried to iDiuce the 
41.. 
Government to do away with the unpopular inspectors, but without 
success. 8 An interesting example of Hof'meyr' s influence in 
Parliament was seen during the debate on a Private Bill introduced 
by Jfr. Pohl. This was a measure designed. to compel Judges to 
allo1" the use of Dutch in Court proceedings.9 It had been 
attacked by members of the Opposition on the grounds that it was 
unncessary aJXl that the decision whether or not to use Dutch could 
safely be left to the JOO.ges themselves. On the 22nd J~, after 
Alexander had attacked the measure, Malan was le.ft to answer for the 
Government. The •cape Times' reported as follows: "Leaning back 
in his seat Jfr .Malan' s eye wandered to the Distinguished Strangers 
Gallery, and rested upon the face of Onse Jan. There is much virtue 
in a nod. Mr.Ho.tmeyr nodded and up sprang' Mr.Malan to rep~ to 
the member for Cape Town.10 The Bill was safely piloted "through 
both Houses by' Ur.Pohl and passed through the Council in August. 
The first half of 1908 saw an a:t:.tempt by the Wine Farmers to com-
pel the Government to repeal or at least reduce the Excise on Bran.dy.11 
During this attempt Merriman was fortunate in having the support of 
Ho.tmeyr,in opposing it. As long ago as Mq 1907 Hoflll9yr bad told 
h:1a in a letter that he had never stated that one of th9 f :irst planks 
in the Bond pla~f ors was the repeal at the Excise Bill. If I bad 
deJ.ivered myself of such a statement I would have said 'the 'thing 
that is not ••• ' 12 Hof•yr wu iDieed an ally worth having for the 
position of the wine farmers was ~ute. During 1907 there ha.d been 
an immense increase in production and only a mo:ierate increase in tm 
sale of wine bra.My, while there had been a drop in the sale of •dop' 
brandy, and in the use of brandy for fortification and methylation 
and among the wine farmers themselves. The result had been great 
over-production a.Di consequent lorr pr.Lces.13 
This was obvious to all experts but nevertheless the farmers 
held that the Excise was the cause of their misery am at the Bond 
Congress at Robertson in June it was strongly attacked. Kalan, 
De Waal. and Theron, the President of the Bond, ~pealed to the 
h2. 
to the Bondsmen to take a wider view ot atf'airs now that their 
party was in power. They begged them to reme:n:ber that the 
Ministry was now responsible tor the whole colony and asked them 
to give it their .tull support am not to think only of their own 
interests.lh Nevertheless the Committee, which the Bond had 
appointed to look into the liquor question, recommeDied a resolu-
tion calling tor legl.slat:l.on, as soon as the Government considered 
it possible, with regard to the issue o.r licences :for tie sale of 
light wine, further advames on brlilldy, and the disposal o.r tbs 
accumulated stores. o.r brandy under advances in foreign markets, and 
asking the Government to consider seriously tlB total removal, or 
reduction, o.r the Excise as soon as the finances or the country 
permitted.15 The issue of liceooes for tie sale o.r lif?P.t wine 
had been reconmended in the minority reJX>rt or the Select Committee 
on the Sale of Liquor in 1907, and that. minority report bad been 
signed by both llalan and De waai.16 The Bond was thus only 
asld.ng for what their leaders had recommended in that respect. 
Office, however, brings responsibilities as well as power and now 
De Waal. had tD point out· that it was impossible to redooe the Excise 
because o:r the state of the finances ani that llalan was sending 
small stocks of brandy overseas to try to find markets. Neverthe-
less, due to the influence and fiery eloquence of de Jager, one of 
the Bond mmbers of the Assembly, who demanded the Abolition or the 
Excise and the removal or accumulated stocks or brandy, even by 
burning it, the CODIJlittee• s resolution was carried by fcrty-seven 
votes to three.17 
The demand for the repeal of the E.xCise contined to gr01r, with 
meetings in Worcester, Stellenbosch, Paarf8and the Fruit Growers' 
Congress ·in Cape Town, all passing resolutions in favour of repeaJ..19 
On the first day of the second session de Beer gave notice to move that 
the House was of the opinion that the scab inspectors be retrenched 
Ell.d the £20,000 so saved be used for rel:iar of tlB brandy farmers in 
respect of Excise. 20 This was followed on the 23rd June by a 
resolution passed by the Agricultural Union calling' for tm abolition 
of the Excis•.21 The culmination o.r all this pressure was a huge 
LJ. 
deputation or farners, merchants and others interested in the 
wine and brandy irrlustry, representative or all wine aid brandy pro-
ducing districts of the Colony, which met tbe Prime Minister aid 
Malan in Cape Town on the morning of Saturday, 27th of June. The 
deputation asked for the removal or substantial red:oo ti.on of the 
Excise, ani the abolition of certain restrictions on the sale of 
Colonial liquor. Merriman, however, was act.•1"'•nt in refusing to 
reduce the Excise, bit promised relief in the Government taking 
over superfluous stocks and finding new markets.22 The result 
was the appointment of a Select Committee to take stock in regard 
to the Bi:-andy- Advances. With that, for the tine being, the Wine 
Industry had to be conlient.23 
The next important event in the session was the introduction 
of De W&al of a Bill to amend the Education Act of 1905. This was 
also due to the discontent of the country constituencies who com-
plained that the burden of the cost ot Education fell too heav.tly 
on the shoulders of the land-owning classes. Umer the system 
as it existed the Government paid half the expenses and also half 
of any defic:i,ts incurred. The other halt was met by the School 
Boards through school. fees and a School. Tax. This tax took the 
form of a rate levied on property and naturally in the country 
imposed agreater burden on the farmer than on the village or town-
dweller. 24 Opinion in the co'lintry was strong against. this and 
the Bond Congress and the Agricultural Union had both passed reso-
lutions to the sane effect. 25 
De Waal now proposed to change the system to one by which the 
t01f118 could retain the old method, but in the oountry the Jllll.Dicipal. 
school boards and the divisional councils could choose between a 
house tax and the existing system. The taxation was to be done 
by these councils and not b)" the School Boards. Furthermore, the 
Government would no longer pay off half the deficit if one should 
be imurred.26 At the same time new language regulations wre 
introduced and the medium of instruction above Staidard III was 
to be English. 
To the latter Ho.tmeyr, the chanpion of equal language rights, 
took ottell8e. He wrote to De Waal strongly urging him to withdraw 
all reference to the medium of instruction, and tc l:ring up a 
new Bill in the following year. 27 The upshot of this was tlB t 
De Waal moved that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee.28 
This was done and the Committee returned a unanimous report re-
conunen:iing the financial arrangements outlined above, ald al.so 
that the Government should pay its share of the dticits accrued 
in the first halt of the cal.endar year. As far as the language 
clause was concerned the committee recommended that up to Stan~d 
llI the medium of instruction should be the home language, above 
that it should be English, but that two subjects should be al.land 
to be taught in Dutch. 29 When De Waal re-introduced the Bill 
for the second reading it was foum that it follo.ved the lim s of 
the Select Committee Report as far as the financial. clauses were 
concerned. but that the language clause had been dropped altogether. 
De Waal. ex;plail»ld that though he favoured equal language rights 
the Government had decided to drop the language cp.estion far a year. 30 
Arter a slight tussle with Bill went through its various stages 
smoothly enough and became law; it was to have48.rious consequences 
for the Ministr,. in the next year. 
But the real battle of the session was now at hand. On the 
19th August the Prime Minister, while speaking on the Viticultural 
Vote, announced that he waa going to introduce a Bill to promote the 
sale of Light Wines.31 On the 2~h the details of the Bill were 
published and immediately the storm broke. The Bill was obviously 
designed as a sop to the wine farmers and as such was vigorously 
attacked by everyone whose interests did not coireide with theirs. 
The Progressive press throughout the Colony cdenounced the Bill 
as legislation favouring one section or the community.32 Tm church 
and women's 'organisations attacked it fran tba standpoint of temperance.33 
The towns and ullages attacked it sqing that it would lead to drunk-
enness aid violence in oommmU:ties.J4 In thllt Eastern Province it was 
attacked as being a means to circUJB9nt. the restr:ictions on the sale 
of liquor to the natives3$ and even the licensed detuallers •re 
against it because in their opinion the licences were too eas7 to obtai.n.36 
"'· 
With all this in mind it is interesting to read a letter written 
in 1907 to Jl~rr:baan by a gentlmun who signed himself' H.A.Bam 
asking hia to try to use his intluence to get Dr. Beck•s 
resolution re light wine licences excluded from a petition to 
Jameson from the Wine Farmers an d Merchants Association on the 
grounds that it would alienate the U.cenaed Victuallers• Vote, 
the Eastern Province Vote and several members, and. containing 
the significant sentence 11 It also gives our Opposition the 
means, or a lever, wherewith to ruin the object for which we 
really are working, that is the removal of the restrictions on 
the sale ot .· wine to the natives. 11 37 
In reply to the attacks the Goverm.ent stated that the 
measure would not increue drunkenness but would rather lead 
to moderation in drinking by naning people away trom strong. 
spirits to healthy light wi:nes.38 The Liquor trade was 
being hypocritica11in that during the debate on the Wines am 
Spirits .Adulteration Act it.a represen~atives had fought tor 
impoi:Jted "WiJJes and spirits and were now opposing the home 
product. Furthermore the bill lft>ul.d bring • large measure 
of relief to a depressed and desel"Y'ing section of the 
cOJlllll.Unity.39 Nevertheless in view of the strong opposition 
to the bill in Parliament Kerri.man de•ed it wise to allow the 
proviso of the principle of loct)l option holding good for the 
renewal of a l:inoence, previously not given, to be i.Dcluded and 
the Bill thus passed its second reading by a majority of seven. 40 
In the Committee stage when a division was taken on an amendment 
moved by Searle, that all the regulations relating to liquor 
licences should hold good for light wine licences, the Bill was 
only saved by the casting vote of the chairman.41. llerriman's 
amendment to provide local option was passed by a majority of 
nine on the 7th of September,42 after the debate had incl.uded 
an all night sitting on the 4th. 43 The next dq after another 
•mr concession by the Govarment the third reading was passed 
by a majority of seven.1'4 The opposition to the bill outside 
46. 
Parli•ent still continued45 and when it reached the Iag:Uative 
Council it caJDe up against a set of rec8J.&1 tr ant south African 
Party aembers led by Daverin, a member for:.:' the South Eastern 
Circle. He moved an amendment that the Bill be read that da;r 
three months. Thia was defeated by nineteen votes to four, but 
the Govermnent felt that in order to get the BUl through the 
Council it would be wise to al.low the principle or local option 
to hold good for the issue ot licences. This was done in the 
Committee stage and the Bill was piissed and became law in the 
closing hours of the session • h6 It had been a hard fight and 
had in fact been a moral. victoq for the Progressives and their 
temporary al.lies, the llod.erates. llerrimaa himself when 
originally opposing the local option proviso had said that it 
would render the Bill worthless. Sir Gordon Sprigg on the 
last day of the session dryly suggested that now that loca1 
option had been conceded, Jlerrilllan should tear up the Bill. 47 
One result of the measure was to cause a split between the 
wine-merchants and the !armers. All the merchants in Cape 
Town who were on the Executive of the Association, seven out 
ot a total. of tit'teen mem.bers resigned. They gave as their 
reasqn that u it had been patent for some time past that the 
wine !armers section of the Association do not desire to act 
mutually with ua for the general advantage of the whole 
indutey.n 48 
Throughout 1908 organised labour bad been loud in condemning 
Kerri.man for bis treatment of the poorer classes and his lack 
of understanding and interest in the working aan. There bad. 
been deputations of unemployed to both him and Sauer ~ch 
although receiving a modicum of sympathy were promised no help 
on the grounds or the poor financial state of the Colony.49 
Unfortunately Labour bad at that time no representatives in 
Parliament and was thus unable to make itselt heard in the only 
place where it might have achieved something. At the end of 
the session50 Ierriman had earned praise for his resolutiOn 
with regard to the finances but much criticism due to his 
handling of the lchool Board Aaendaent Act and the Light 
Wine Licences B.Ul.51 Hotmeyr hal paid him a tribute in 
47. 
the first respect at the dinner given tor the C1"11iser Squadron 
in Bovember.52 The Progressives had seen the power ot the 
Bond in action and their press was now accusing it of keeping 
racialism. ali:ve in politics.53 
With the new ;rear the demand tor the repeal or the Excise 
once more began to grow. lleetings were frequently held which 
passed resolutions condeJlning the Excise.54 In February- the 
Draft Act of the Constitution was published and soon the Excise 
began to be linked with it. At Paarl on the 27th Kobler and 
de Jager spoka on the subject and resolutions were passed that 
the last session of the Convention should be informed of the 
bad state of the wine industry- due to the Excise, and that 
section ll7of the Draft Act should be amended so that the 
Excise could be abolished iaediate1,.. Also ·that section 15 
o f the schedule to the Draft Act should be deleted and the 
problem le.ft to the Union GoV'ernDlent to settie.55 This 
interference by- the wine tamers might have grown to serious 
proportions and on the 2nd of )(arch Sauer was at Paarl to 
explain to the industry- how much they would beneti t under 
Union, and how dangerous it would be to try' to tamper with 
the Aet or to iay down conditions to the other colonies.56 
Later in the month the Chief Justice Lord de Villiers spokB 
in the same place and impressed on his audience the vastness 
and the supreme :importance of the work mich the National 
Convention had done.57 
To this Kohler reacted with an open letter to the Wine 
Industry-, published in the press on the 20th of )(arch, urging 
an all out campaign for relief and a big meeting in Cape Town 
during the first half of AprilS.8 There followed a spate of 
meetings throughout the wine-producing districts59 and on 
lpril 14th a vast arJlli1 of wine farmers descended on Cape Town. 
Special trains were run from Worcester, Stellenbosch and 
Wellington to bring them to the capital. Ahuge meeting was 
hB. 
held in the City Hall and was addressed by the M.qor, Kohler 
and Hofmeyr. The last named, al.though against the Excise in 
principle, nevertheless ad.opted a moderate tone and pointed out 
various other reasons for the depression of the industry. 
He urged the farmers not to expect a long-range improvement if 
the Excise were removed, but recolllllended. the production of 
better wine as a real and lasting remedy. After the meeting 
a deputation waited on the Prime M.inister who in the course 
of his reply said " I am going to 1'*ke a thorough inquiry into 
the case, but I shall not move for the repeal of the Excise." 
When this a:mnrer was made known to the general body of the 
gathering it led to an excited demonstration outside the 
Houses of Parliament. There it took the combined efforts of 
De Waal, M.erriman and Kalan to pacify the crowd am persuade 
them to behave sensibly and trust the Government to do its 
best for the industry. 60 The outcome of the &ff air was that 
o n the 19th it was announced that a collllision composed of 
Retief, Rabie and Ind.wig Wiener was to be appointed almost 
imediately to inquire into the state of the industry.61 
The wine farmers were not to be bought off with a mere 
coDlldllmion however, and a deputation of four headed by Kohler 
was sent to Bloemfontein to put the industry's case before the 
last session of the Convention. There they met lli th sympathy 
but no imnediate help, and so the campaign continued.62 
More meetings were held63 and when Parliament re-opened on the 
lst of June the question was 'Whether the wine farmers "ftOuld 
put up a fight and obstruct the passing of the revised Draft 
Act in order to achieve their ends. The night after the opening 
day a caucus meeting was held at the Royal Hotel, Cape Town to 
decide. No resolutions were ta.ken and the press was excluded 
from the meeting. 64 However it appeared almost certain that 
they were persuaded not to embarrass the Government by the 
promise of a scheme to get rid of the accUD1Ulated stocks of 
Brandy. This had been mentioned in the speech from the 
49. 
65 ' 
throne and on the 8th of June Merriman introduced a motion 
aut;horising the Government to take over all securities against 
which advances had been made under the Acts of previous sessions, 
and expressing the opinion that the stocks ot brandy should be 
disposed of to the best advantage, so as not to come into 
consuptionwithin the limits of the Union in a potable state. 
This motion was carried unaJ. tered,. 66 
The publication of a report by Lord ~' an English 
expert brought out by the Government some months previously 
to examine the state of the industry, threw 110 new light on 
the subject, 67 but the new scheme improved the situation 
68 . 
slightly, both Dr. Beek and Currey writing to Jlerriman in 
July to say that the market had improved samewhat and that 
the wine farmers seemed a little less dissatisfied. 69 
There followed none the l.ess in July and September deputations 
to Kalan and de Waal on the subject. Malan was especially 
sympathetic promising Government aid as soon as the COlllllission 
had made its report. 70 De Waal was more cautious warning that 
if the Excise were removed some other tax:ation would have to 
follow to :make up for the loss of revenue which woul.d result. 7l 
On the 23rd of: September Parliament re-opened am the 
next dq theWine Commission published its report making a 
number of recommendations. The most important of these 
were the reduction of the Excise on Wine Brandy and the freeing 
of wine from the restrictions which it had shared with spirits. 72 
The very next day Kalan wrote to the Prime Jlinister expressing 
his own views. He pointed out bow the wine f a.rmers had helped 
to win the election, and how through previous sessions-the;y 
had loyally stood by the GovermEnt, and only now were becoming 
hostile. He himself would have liked to see the total 
abolition of the Excise but he was prepared to fall in llith 
any scheme which would materially assist the industry. 73 
The situation now became extemel.y tense; on the 28th 
Merriman wrote in a letter to General Smuts with regard 
5o. 
to Excise " I have to face great pressure." 7 4 On the 30th 
he was asbd in the Assembly whether the Government intended 
to introduce legislation w:l. th a view to ameliorating the 
condition of the wine industry, and if' so, in what form. 
His reply was n Well, sir, I do not intend to give way and 
I can intorm the honourable member that I do not think it is 
possible in the interests of this country-, am above all, in 
the interests of the wine farmers to remove the· Excise at the 
present moment. 11 However he promised to give a .full account 
in a few days on what steps the Government intended to take in 
the WfI¥ of liquor legislation. 75 The situation was now critical.. 
Caucus meetings were held b7 the wine farmers on the 6th, 7th 
and the 8th of October on the question whether to fight the 
Government or not but no d.e&ision was reached. 76 11erriman 
b7 this time was tboroughl7 disgusted by the whole a.tfair and 
on the loth wrote to bis mother saying " I have to deal with 
these squalid intrigues that centre roUDd the brandy cask. 
The Opposition are behaving very well,possibly they see that 
it is no use fighting a man or a party who are bent on suicide. n 77 
He had however to give way somewmre and like a true poll tician 
he sought a compromise and on the 13th he announced that the 
Government would try to remove the Local Option clauses in the 
Light Wine Licences Act.78 This immediately led to the fiercest 
battle in the life of that Parliamnt; but this will be dealt 
with later. When it was all over, however, 11erriman 
introduced a Bill to reduce the Excise on Wine Brandy from six 
shillings to three shillings a gallon, and this met with l.ittle 
resistance passing through both Houses with comparative peace 
and quiet. 79 
At the same time as the Excise crisis was c_omi.ng to a head 
steps bad to be taken to repair the damage that the School 
Board .AJDendment Act of the previous year had caused. Tlie 
Act bad been criticised from the start by tbe Progressive 
press as destroying the good work done by the Act ofi905 and 
driving a wedge between town and country. 80 This was now 
51. 
confirmed and it was al.so alleged to have had an even more 
serious effect, that of causing a general decline in the 
standard of Education. The first effect was caused by the 
natural tendency of the rural divisional councils to adopt 
the new house tax as the means of raising the revenue, md 
the second by the refusal. of the Government to pq half the 
deficits accrued. This had led the councils to ensure that 
there would be no deficits by limiting eJ!Penditure to the point 
of parsimoDY.i which neant a deterioration in facilities, build-
ings and teaehers.81 At the Bond Congress held in Karch 
there had been thirty-six resolutions handed in demnding the 
repeal. of the Act and bitter s:t:eeches bad been made against it. 82 
The position was emphasized by a motion passed at a specially 
conYened meeting of the Cape School Board, which cal.led for in-
creased . money for Cape Education and early steps tOW'at'ds a 
Mtional system of education. 83 The snag here was that agree-
ment had been reached between the colonias at the Convention not 
to permit any appreciable increase in taxation, and that it bad 
been laid down that a:Cter Union monies 'Wluld be grmted for 
Provincial Education on the basis of t.be amount allotted by 
each colony at tm time of the agreement. 
In July 1909 the situation seemed serious enough to Currey, 
le.ft in the Cape in charge of financi&l. a.f'.fa1rs, far h1Jn to keep 
in constant gloomy correspon:ience with Merriman in England. He 
pointed out the general unpopularity in ~ rural districts of 
a.r.c. 
the local WE and said that the people were no longer prepared to 
bear the burden of the whole deficit. The agitation against 
the Act was being led by c. Searle~ Frema.ntle and H.S.van Zyl 
and Currey suggested the borrowing of £100,000 to meet the 
def'ici ts, providing that the other coloni2 s would agree• H• 
was alarmed at the prospect of the educationalists allied with 
the wine r armers and thought that they could only be defeated 
with the help of the Opposition, which he felt was not a cmer-
ful prospect. He criticised De WaaJ. and lll"Ote 11De Waal produces 
a new scheme with every llOmlings 1 s sun",. aIJd later referred to 
the impossibility ot a Cabinet discussion 11more particularly 
52. 
(s~ictly entre nous) when the tinister in charge of' the subject 
baa no convictions whatever in reference thereto and is quite 
prepared. to accept any scheme which he can carry with his friends 
sitting behind h1m~ 84 In this respect De Waal felt the need to 
jusity himself' to Merriman and in August wrote to him SBl'ing 
11I do not anticipate th.at we shall have to go out on Education"• 
But there is not the slightest doubt that unless we do something 
•ducational advamemen't is out of the qiestion11 am 11 I can ha~ 
'te c'naTged. ld.th a desire to le~alate on political lims when I 
am doing all I can to practical~ prevent ~ legislation llhatae-
ever. 1185 • However, with the return of Merriman steps were soon 
taken to remedy the situation; on the 6th of October De Waal 
introduced another Amendment Act which embodied new financial 
propos.als. By this the Government levied through the Divisional 
and Municipal. Councils a school tax of one-eighth of a pebny in 
the pound on the registered value of property in the school dis-
~ 
trict and took over the 'Whole def'iciemy. Re!"e were also 
provisions to ensure a closer supervision by the Auditor-Ge:rsral 
of' School Board finances. 86 This although criticised by the 
Progressive press as only undoing the harm done by the A.ct of the · 
previous year was gersrally welcomed as tending to improve matters 
in the country. 87 As such it was an effective answer to a minor 
crisis. In January as a final step before Union De Waal announced 
the appointment of a Commission to enqpire into tba systelll of 
Education in the Cape Colony in all schools other than those for 
aborigines. 88 
But, as mentiored before,. the fiercest battle of the session 
was fought over the Bill to anend the Light Wine Licemes Act of 
19o8. This had been foreshadowed as early as Kay 1909, when 
Malan in addressing his· constituents at Malmesbury had pointed out 
the doing array with of the. Local Option principle as a means of 
helping the wine industry.89 Before Kerri.man announced the intro-
duction of the Amending Bill90 its principle had been condemned 
by the Progressive press, especially in the Eastern Provime, 
'Where th~ extension of liquor facilities to the natives· was re-
garded with horror.91 On the Prime Minister's announcement the 
-
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Opposi ti.on girded its loins for battle, and a battle it W&SJ 
one llhich deserves a place in the history of the old Cape Parlia-
ment. 
The Bill was introduced in the legislative Council on the 
21st. of October and its fate there was doubtful. The South 
African News commented "It is freely stated that certain JEmbers 
of the South African Party in the Council, who voted in favour 
of the clause (local option) last year waited on the Prime Minister 
this morning (19th October) and intimated that they will adhere 
to their attitude when the amending bill comes up. n92 When it 
did come up for its second reading Merriman made a fighting speech 
attacking its opposers as an alliance 1of publicans, bishops and 
political party managers. ,93 That evening at a meeting in the 
City Hall to protest against the Bill the speakers included the 
Archbishop, Schreiner, Jagger and T.Searle.94 Two deys later 
the Bill passed the second reading in the Council by a majority 
of two, and the next d.q the third reading by the sane nmd:>er of 
votes. 95 It then went to the Assembly and was read a secon:i tine 
by :U:eITiman who inmediately moved for its discharge.96 It was 
re-introduced on the 8th of November by Sauer am now contained 
an amendment allowing municipal cour.c ils to is sue licences im tead 
of the licensing courts. Dr. Smartt in reply declared that the 
Opposition had no wish to del• the business of the House but that 
they were determined to impede an:i prevent the passage of the . 
measure 'by every means which Parliamentary procedure al.lows us'. 91 
This they proceeded to do and on Thursday the 11th of November 
there took place an all-night sitting which lasted till 5.15 a.m. 
on the 12th. The debate had then lasted some fifteen hourse and 
not a single member of. the Ministerial party had spoken, excep'f; 
by way of interjection. When t:te final division was taken on 
the second. reading then it was passed by sixty-three votes to 
thirty-two. Such en evell~ did not pass unnoticed. by the press. 
- - --
The 1 cape Times ' held.. it up as. an unprecedented exanple of power 
the party caucus end contempt of the criticism of an official. 
Opposition.98 The 'South African News' on the other hand con-
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damned the Opposition's tactics as being purely obstructi'Rist.99 
But the worst was yet to come. On Koniq the 15th of November 
at 2 p.m. the Committee Stage was reached. b Opposition, how-
ever, dragged on the motion to go into Comm:l ttee right through the 
afternoon and well into the evening, until at 10 p.m. the Speaker 
applied the closure. Smartt asked far pennission to move a motion 
to report progress, which Kerri.man refused. Schreiner endeavoured 
to mediate and the Prime Minister consented to adjourn it the 
Opposition would pass the Committee stage the next dq after a full 
day's discussion. To this Smartt would not agree unless the 
Government would accept an amendment for the provision of elective 
boards to issue licences. At 11 p.m. Smartt•s motion to report 
progress was divided on and was defeated by sixty-one votes to 
thirty-three, and the House then settled down for another all-
night session which went on till 12.30 p.m. the next day. During 
the all-night session the closure had again been applied, this 
time by the Chairman of Conmittees on the f:irst clause of the 
Bili.100 The Opposition refmed tD accept his ruling and called 
in the Speaker, who refused to interfere with his decision. 
Finally- the Government accepted an amendment by Colonel Crewe 
prohibiting the issue of licences in native locations. The 
third reading was passed on the 19th of November in spite of the 
'Cape Times• meanwhile publishing telegrams from municipalities 
in all parts of the Colony protesting against the Bill. The 
'Times' also pointed out that the population of tl'e mmd.f&jpaJ.iti.es 
igainst the Bill numbered 319,468 while that of those in favour 
of it anountedto 13,Qoc>.lOl The Legislative Council accepted 
the amendments passed in the .Assembly by sixteen votes to six on 
the ·23rd of November and the Bill became law.102 Later an 
ironic sidelight was thrown on the Act when in Karch 1910 an appli-
cation was made in Paarl for a Light Wine Licence and was opposed 
by the Farmers' Association tmre on the grounds that it would 
lead to violence due to drunkennessJl03 
During the session there had been an attempt in November to 
have the Scab Act modified in :favour of the farmers. This bad 
been cut off sharply by the Cabinet who voted with tls Opposition. 
55. 
in order to do so.104 Although the Bond Congress at Dordrecht 
in March had favoured moditication or the Act aid Malan bad been 
sympathetic,105 the report of tm Chief Inspector had shown that 
in 1908 the percentage of infected sheep had risen.106 The 
sheep farming 'bloc• was not powerful enough to farce its desires 
upon the Ministry and as a result no con~ssions were obtained. 
The death of Hotmeyr in London on the 16th of October had 
wvoked many tributes to him in Parliament and both Houses had 
adjourned as a mark of respect.107 H1a position as Chairman 
of the Komid.ssee van Toezicht had been filled by De Waal.108 
Parlianent rose on the 3rd of December am. two dqs before that 
Jlerriman bad sunmed up the effect of the session in a letter to 
Sir Somerset French in London as f ollaws: "The session has not 
I think weakened the Government but it has damaged the Colony 
to a certain extent and bas very prejudie ially affected Jff3' own 
position vis-a-vis union, which was in some neasure the a1m of' 
sone our wine peopie.rrl.09 In the new year with the prospect of 
Union looming rapidly into view Cepe politics as such slmrly faded 
wt becoming absorbed into the wider sphere of Union politics. 
----oOo----
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Ibid 28.8.o8 On the 27.8.08 the Bill passed its third 
reading in the Iagislative Council. 
10. C T 23.7.08 
ll. L 0 H p.630 
NOTE -
12. J x )[ 
13. S .R.1909 
14. C T 5.6.08 
S AN $.6.08 
15. Ibid 9.6.08 
"One of the means, by which the Jameson 
Cabinet had attempted to ecpalize revenue 
and expenditure, had been the imposition 
of an Excise •••• i1 
This Excise had been at the rate of 6/-
per gallon on Wine and 'Dop' Brandy, by 
which was me ant Bran:iy distilled from the 
husks. The Excise also served 1X> prevent 
illegal sales of brandy to natives, because 
it entailed the registration of all brandy 
produced and passing between farmers and 
merchants. 
Ho.tmayr to 1lerriman 13.5.07 
Figures of production and use of Colonial 
spirits, in gallons. 
Year Prodoo tion ~nsu.mpt;ion 
1905 £1,!60,591.0.0 £1,144,841.0.0 
1906 1,384,703.0.0 i,301,165.o.o 
1907 i,788,317.0.0 1,253,361.0.0 
1908 1,476,133.0.0 1,227,033.0.0 
1909 i,205,326.0.0 1,274,119.0.0 
16. Appeadix to Votes and Proceedings of Parliament 1907. 
51. 
17. S AN 9.6.08 
18. Ibid 15.6.08 J.A.C.Gra.aff' at Worcester meeting 
pointed out that the Governn:ent could 
not reduce the Excise in 1908, but said 
that he would fight fer tee reduction in 
18. C T 20.6.08 
20. C T 20.6.08 
21. Ibid 25.6.08 
22. S A N 29.6.08 





24. :U:alherbe p.127 
25. G T 23.6.08 
1909. 
The Congress also passed resolutions in 
favour of Protection for South African 
fruit and Lower rai.lw"ay rates. 
The supertluous stocks referred to were 
stocks of brandy held under tee scheme 
of bran:ly aivar.ces. This was a scheme 
s:tarted 'by Jameson in 1904 to mitigate 
the effects of the Excise. The Govern-
ment ad.van:: ed the farmers fJ..0 a leaguer 
for tl:Bir brandy which was tllm stored 
until it could be put on the mar let. 
An exanple or tie power of tie wine 
farmers was seen in August when Dr.Beck, 
one of their leaders in the Assembly, 
opposed an ame rximent to tle Wire and 
Spirits Adulteration Bill which al.lowed 
Gape brewers to use 25% of sugar in the 
manufacturing process. When a division 
was taken on the anendnsnt it was defeated 
by l.i2 votes to 33. The members of the 
Cabinet, with one or two other Ministeria-
lists voted with tte minority, the majority 
being composed of tle rank and file of th e 
S.A.P. 
Resolution passed by a neeting of the 
Agricultural in cape Town on 22.6.08 
"That the Educ at.ion Act be so amended 





















S A N 25.8.08 
33. C T 28.8.08 




35. S AN 
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that the burden of the taxation far the 
half share in deficits in School Boards 
does not fall exclusively on the land-
owner." 
The Bill was attacked by the ~Times' on 
the grounds that it threw the financial 
burden on to the house-occupier. 
The S. A. News welcomed md ~proved of the 
Bill. 
Reports vigorous campaign being planned 
in Port Elizabeth agaimt the Bill. Also 
a J12eting of protests of the Observatory 
Baptist Church. 
On the 27 .8.08 two deputations one from 
the Wonsns• Temperance Canpaign and one 
from the various Christian bodies of the 
Peninsula saw Merriman to protest against 
the Bill. 
Meetings in Kimberley and Grahamstown to 
protest agsins t the Bill. 
Meeting in City Hall denounced Bill. 
Meetings in Vryburg, Alilval North, Gath-
cart. 
Meetings in Paar 1, IG.ngwil 11 amatown, 
Beau.tort West ar.d P ort Elizabeth. all 
passed resolutions protesting against tl:s 
Bill. 
Meetings at Do:rdrecht and Uitenhage passed 
resolutions ~a.inst the Bill. 
Extract from the Ui tenhage 'Times' 
36. CT 29.8.08 
"The Light Wine Licences Bill is a 
legislative outrage." 
Deputation to the Prime Minister from 
the Licensed Victuallers of the Pend.n-
su1a. 
37 • J X M H.A. Baa to Merriman 8.6.07 
38. S A N 27 .8.08 
39. S AN 7.9.09 
!,o. S A N 27 .8.08 
C T 
SAN 
41.. S AN 
42. Ibid 
43. S AN 
C T 
44. S AN 
1.9.08 
The Bill was introduced for its second 
reading by llerr:i.m.an on 26.8.08. 
Reports a S. A. P. caucus meeting on the 
morning of the 31. 7 .08 "It is understood 
that after a careful review of the situa-
tion, and a ratffir stormy neeting, the 
Ministry realised that if the Bill were 
present to the House in its present form, 
it would be defeated by a narrow majority. 
It was decided that rather than imperil 
the Bill, the pri:r.c iple of local option 
should, as Mr.Sauer annoumed during the 
afternoon, be con::eded. 
Debate in .Assembly. Strong Opposition 
attack by Oliver, Green, Kuhn, Jagger, 
Thorne, Sear1e and Smartt. Sauer, Tod 
and Merriman defended the Bill. Secom 
reading passed by a majority of 7. 
Quoted a speech from Hansard made by 
Merriman in 1891..fmploring :ur. Hotm.eyr 
to gt"ant the prim iple of local option 
to householders. 
Tllit concession made tha Licence depen-
dent on the approval of the Licensing 
Court as a Court not upon the consent 
or ind1vidua1 members. 
45. CT 
Ibid 
46. C T ll.9.08 
NOTE -
47. SAN 12.9.08 
6o. 
Report or a meeting held in the City Hall 
to demand tlla prim iple of local option. 
Reports a document sent to the Prime 
Minister from t lB prim ipal ministers of 
the Dutch Reformd Church in the Peninsula 
protesting against the Bill. 
Principles of tra Light Wine Licences Bill. 
The main principle_s of tte Bill as origilr 
ally introdooed were 
1. Licences to sell Light Wine could be 
obtained far tb3 p~t of a mcxle-
rate sum. 
2. These licences were to be issued by 
Licensing Courts. 
3. The principle of local option was not 
to apply to Light Wine Licences. 







51. fll T 
S AN 7.10.08 
G.T.Pow.:ls, J.F.V. Clark, R.T.Kramer, 
G.Gerber and one other. 
Labour Petition to Merriman. 
-
'Times' criticises :Merriman for his treat-
ment or the deputation. 
Report or a meeting in Stal Pl.sin on the 
13th which denoumed Merriman as a poli ti-
c al b}l:pocri te and a c api talist. 
Report or a meeting at "the lletropoli tan 
Hall at which resolutions were passed 
criticising :Merriman and demanding fae"to17 
legislation. 
Deputation to Sauer of unemployed asking 
Government to pt'Ovide 110rk. 
Session ended ll.9.08 
Colonel Crewe and Hellier speaking to 
constituents at East London criticised the 
work or tlla Government in the session. 
52. CT 
53. S AN 
54. Ibid 
C T 
55. C T 
56. Ibid 









Extract from report of Hofmeyr' s speech 
"They hoo a lingering feeling, a modi-
cum of admiration and approval for the 
dogged, determined, persistent obstinacy 
in which Mr. MeITiman and his colleagues 
had tried to make both ends of our f'i-
nances meet. 11 
Extract from t:te Kimberley 'Advertiser' -
"There must alJrsys be a risk of racialisa 
in our poll tics so long as tm Bond con-
stitutes a solid racial 'bloc' as at 
present. 11 
Meeting at Stellmlx> sch declm-ed the 
E::mise respomible .f'or the corrlition of 
the 'Wine irdustry and requested the Govern-
ment to abolish it. Called on all 
M. P. 's to act in accordance with the 
wishes of their constituents. 
Meeting at Montagu demanded the abolition 
of the Excise aid called on DBmbers of 
Parliament to do all in their power to 
obtain it. 
Note: Section ll.7 of the Draft Act dealt 
with the revenues o.f' the colonies. 
Section 15 of tm Schedule dealt with 
pi'Ohibi tion of the sale o.f' liquor to 
natives in the teITitories, and the res-
triction on the introduction of liquor 
into those areas. 
Reports meetings in support of the wine-
f armers demonstration in Robertson,Paarl, 
Piquetberg, Tulbagh, Riebeek Kasteel, 
Durban.ville and Graa.tf-Reimt. 
6o. Ibid 
61. S AN 19.4.09 















Fran the 1 Clp e Times 1 report. 
Some of the reasons lfr.Hofmeyr gave 
for the depression of the wine iniustcy 
were, a decrease in th! consumption 
of alcoholic liquors altogether, the 
bad effect of the depression on the 
purchase of luxuries, tl:B almost com-
plete disappearance or the native market 
in the Eastern Provime. 
The Vigilance committee which had been 
formed at Paarl to keep the campaign 
going arranged meet.in.gs. 
Extract: 11The Excise must go 11 was the 
cry raised at t·J:B meetings of wine 
farmers held throughout the lline making 
districts on Saturdq. · 
Reports meetings held at Stellenbosch, 
Paarl, Worcester, Robertson, Caledoh, 
Swellendan and Constantia urging their 
representatives in Parlianent, m.d the 
Government to take steps to aid the in-
dustry and to repeal the Excise. 
Recomm.endatl.ons contaired in J;.ord Blyth' s 
Report: 
1. Pay more attention to the llo~ market. 
2. Increase the underground cellf,rage. 
3. Export only very good quali tyN'w:i.ne 1P 
Britain. 
4. The Government of the Union should 
make red and white wine available on 
the railways at fixed low prices. 
5. Pa.v attention to the possibility of 
exporting raisins. 
6. The 00st of a merchants licence should 
be in proportion to bis trade. 
Beck to Merriman 12.7.09 
Currey 1x> Merriman 21. 7 .09 
70. C T 
71. CT 
72. Ibid 
73. J X M 







The deputation saw Malan on the 14th 
and on the 22nd publismd a letter 
giving the answer received from him. 
t11. The aims of the deputation had his 
fullest approval. 
2. That he 110uld try as soon as the 
Wine Commission J:ad franed its re-
port to make it public as speedily 
as poesible, 'Which would probably 
be done within a month. 
3. That he would use his influeooe to 
have the Transvaal Liquor Commission 
also sit in the South-Western Dis-
tricts, .for the purpose o.f giving 
those interested there an opportunity 
of giving evidence before it. 
4. That if tba Wine Conmi.s si. on made any-
reconma ndatt ons which .~re in agree-
ment with the aims which the deputati>n 
had in view, the GOV'emnent, togetbe r 
with tba wire fanners of the South-
Western Districts, "WOuld try to give 
effect tmreto; aid in the event of 
such not appearing to be ttie case, 
the Government would ~willing to 
give moral md f inaroial assistaree, 
so that the puzpose which the deputa-
tion had in view mitjlt be realised." 
RecommendatioM of the Wire Commissions• 
Report. 
1. Reduced railway rates on wine. 
2. Depots umer Govemnent control in 
the principal centres for ttie sale 
of South African wines. 
3. Better advertising for South African 
wines. 
4. The encouragement of vinegar production 
by including all acetates wt th Aceti. c 
acid in the Customs Tariff or by im-
posing an Excise on all vinegar nG>t 
made from 111.ne. 
5. Strict administration of the Wine,Beer 
and Spirits Adul.terati.on Acts. 
6. An easier method of getting licences 
under the Light Wine Licences Act. 
Suggestions: 
1. The reduction of the Ecise on wine 
brandy. 
2. The freeing of wine from the restrio-
ti. ons which it at rresent shared with 
spirits. 
Malan to Merriman 25.9.09 
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Currey to Merriman 21. 7 .09 
Currey to Merriman 27.7.09 
Currey to Merriman 4.8.09 
De Waal to Kerriman 16. 7 .09 
De Waal to Merriman 4.8.09 
1.10.09 Extract from the East London 'Despatch' 
"It is the people in this portion of 
the Colony, not those in the West, who 
have to live among, or near to, the 
natives, and it is they who will suffer 
the disastrous consequences if the res-
trictions are taken away." 
20.10.09 
26.10.09 
Daverin a.gain voted agai.m t tre repeal. 
of Local Option, but Lombard, Rauben-
heimer ani Pretorius li'l.o defienled U>cal 
Option in 19o8 now voted for repeal. 
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So far only the internal politics of the Cape Colony have 
been dealt with and these matters although they were of vital 
importance to the Cape were essentially of secorrlary :importance 
to South Africa as a whoJ.e. This chapter 111.11 deal with th9 
growth of the Closer Union movement in the Colony end the part 
plcqed by the Cape in the National Conventlon. 
The movenent bad received its first big stimulus from the 
request of the Jameson Ministry to Lord Selborne for an exposi-
tion of the problem of railway and customs policies throughout 
South Africa. The memorandum which was t:ts resp om e to that 
request had brought the necessity for some form of Union into 
the public eye an:l had stimulated country-wide discussion of itt 
The political leaders of the Transvaal. and the Orange River 
Colony had been fully aware of this recessity am had discussed 
it in their corresporrlence with Merriman, but bad been of the 
opinion that Union would have 1x> wait until responsible govern-
ment was firmly establismd in their respective colonies and the 
South African Party had gained control of the Cape. 2 
In the Colony itself early in 1907 Hofmeyr had ma.de a 
speech at We_,_lington in which he had advocated Federation aid 
co-operation bet-ween the two European races in South Africa.3 
Jameson had accepted this gesture gladly and replied to it in a 
speech in Cape Town in June sqing "Since reading the speech, 
Federation is infinitely nearer than it ever was before •••• ". 4 
Shortly after this came the opining of Parlianent followed by 
the publication of the correspomence between Jameson and Lord 
Selborne, which had led to the Selborne llemorandUlll. The pro-
posals contai:ried in the Meioorandum were welcomed by Theron, the 
President of the Bond, as a step towards Closer Union, but 
:MeITiman, always on guard against British interference, bad been 
less f'avourably disposed towards them. Confirm ti.on of the Bom• s 
desire for 1'Gieration came in the next month with Malan' s motion 
of a resolution dE111arding prelimina.:ry steps towards a union of 
Bri tisb South Africa and this was wannly secorded by Jameson.S 
Merriman again remained cool and took no part in the debate, 
which caused General Smuts to write to him warning him against 
impatience with :Malan and counselling sympathy and wisdom in 
handling him, assuring Merriman that he would be a.~l.oy:al lieute-
nant in time of need. 6 
Shortly after this came the co-lapse of tlB Jaueson Ministry 
followed by the elections. Merriman fought them on the twin 
planks of Finance and Union while James:> n chose a Federation pro-
gramm which could not check the South African Party landslide 
which resulted. On publication of tre results of the election 
for the Legislative Council Janeson realised that he had no hope 
ot victory and expressed the opinion that the South .African Party 
would remain in power for a pariod of eighteen months to two years. 
"In the mantime" he wrote 11Federation will have 1X> wait". 7 
Throughout the elections :Merriman bad not definitely outlined his 
ideas on Closer Union but had been content to sq that te favoured 
a form closer than Federation. 
During this period however his private corresporrlence shows 
that he was constantly exer~ised in his mind as to tm form end 
shape which Union should take, and the manner in vilioh it might be 
achieved. 8 Thus· on the 24th of February he sent General Smuts a 
draft of his ideas on Union. In this he agreed on the need for 
quick action aIX1. stated that he was even prepared to force it 
through without Natal. He acknowledged the f' orces war king against 
Union, among them being isol.ationism in the Transvaal, jealousy 
and fear of •annexation' in tre Cape and ttB dread of a 'Dutch' 
majority in England. He wanted Generals Botha :flld Smuts to visi. t 
Port Elizabeth during the Agricultural Show tl'ere ar.d though such 
a visit 1'0uld have a very good effect in the Cape. As far as the 
form of Union was o:>ncerned he wanted one as close as possi bl.e1 1d th 
possibly, one Central. Parliament, ulrl.er wh:ich ll)Uld be Provimes 
having their own provincial councils un:ier a chief executive officer. 
The Central Parliament would be the law-giving body aid would be 
responsible for all admin:is tration not e:xpressly delegated to the 
Provinces. In order to prevent the Cape Colony beiD.g too unwieldy 
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for a provincial council it might be possible to split it up into 
two or more provinces. The greatest difficulty 110uld be the 
franchise and here he thought that members should be allocated on 
the basis of European population only, leaving tm question of the 
franchise to the individual colonies l'lith the provision that the 
local franchise should not be altered except by .a majority of two--
thirds of the voters in the province, to be ascerta:i.md by a 
plebiscite of registered voters in it. He preferred a single-
chamber legislature but admitted t!E weight of opposition to it, 
and thought that if tlEre were to be a Second Chaui>er 1 t would be 
best if it were elected by too Provincial Councils. As to the 
question of tlE capital of tlE Union m was indi.fferent, and he 
thought that Debts, Railways, Defence, Native Af'fa:i.rs an:i Higher 
Courts should all be taken over by tm Central Parliament. He 
recommended the study of the SWiss federation to General Smuts 
and concluded by sqing "We must depend in the matn on the senti-
~ of tm South African Party, always recollecting that the 
defeme of prejudice and self-interest always tends to be far 
stronger than attack."9 
General Smuts however disagreed with tre idea of achieving 
Union by a 'coup de Main'. He thought that the procedure to· be 
adopted should be very carefully worked out as it might well prove 
of vital importance to the project, ani. considered that the forth-
coming Inter-Colonial Customs Conference at Pretoria should discuss 
and lay down this procedure. He wrote as much to Merriman and 
requested him to study the problem of preparing a Comtitn.tion 
and of obtaining its acceptame by the country. To this Merriman 
replied that while he thought that the Cont"erence should discuss 
fully the main points of tm nature of Union, such as whether it 
should be a federated or a unified s~tem, the powers of the pro-
viDcial governments atrl the question of tm franchise, reverthel.ess 
it should not go further than, after adopting a resolution in 
favour of the primiple of Union, to lq darn tm basic steps to 
be followed in attaining that Union. These should be that "the 
several. Parliaments should nominate delegates to a Convention, 
such delegates to be on the basis of the European poptj.lation in 
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in ~h state, and to be chosen as each Parlianent mijlt pre-
scribe. The Convention so chosen should proceed to draw up 
the Constitution, which instrument should be subnitted to the 
several Parliaments for acceptance or anendment. That such 
amended Constitution should be again considered by. a Convention 
and then sul:mitted for ratification to a plebiscite of the 
States." He then pointed out the ex~les a: tre other 
Dominions am. raised the point of whetrer tm Constitution should 
be a Parliamentary Comtitution or not an act of the various 
states approved by the Crown. He estimated that the steps he 
had described should not take more tran twelve mnths end that 
the Constitution could be submitted to tre various Parlianents 
in 1909.10 
Merriman sent copies of thiB coITespomence to Chief Jus.tice 
Lord de Villiers11 who thought that it opened up a practical way 
to Union. He t.ho~owever that ea.oh Colony should have equal 
representation at the Convention and pointed out the only Consti-
tutional wq in 'Which Union could be achieved, show:ing that an 
Imperial. Act w:>uld be necessary.12 Witti this latter Merriman 
had i:srforce to agree but neither he nor General Smuts was willing 
to agree with the tormer suggestion. Merriman now wrote to 
Steyn asking him to use his influeroe in the Orange Rivet'Colony 
to promote the cause of Union and outlining his ideas as to the 
procedure to be followed. He also expressed tre opinion that 
both Steyn and Lord de Villiers should have seats on t:r.e Conven-
tion.13 
Merriman met General Smuts at Port Elizabeth during the 
fo:nner's tour ot the Eastern Province am there they came to gen-
eral agE"8Ellllent as 'to procedure axd the basis of representation 
and then was soon back in Cape Town where re received Lard de 
Villiers' criticism of his ideas for Union. He wrote to Ge:mral 
Smuts regarding this, saying "criticism from such a source is 
valuable" but refused to give up proportional representation for 
the Convention. He pointed out that at the Convention there were 
three elements in the Cape Colony which should be represented: 
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the Government and tm Opposition; the Agricultural and tts 
Conmercial elements; and the East am West. He wanted at 
all costs to "avoid the idea that t:te Convention is to be a 
mere hole-and-corner eeting or a revr politicians. nl4 At 
the Emergency Session of the Cape Parliament in April he 
annoureed that he and tllO of his ministers were to be the 
delegates to the Customs Conference and, at the sane time, 
gae vent to bis dislike of the method of fixing a customs 
tariff by such a Conference. He looked upon it as an in-
fringeioont or Parliamentary supremacy in that the delegates 
returned with a tariff which they presented to Parliament w.i..th 
the alternative of either accepting it or l:reaking up the 
Customs Convention. · He read a statement of the policy which 
would guide him at the forthcoming Conference, which maintained 
"that it was desirable that tm Colony should be at liberty 
to impose duties in excess of the Convention duties on imported 
commodities consuned w1 tbin its borders in order to secure a 
more reasonable protection for the products of the EK>il and for 
colonial manufactures, and that, in lieu of differential rail-
way rates in favour of colonial produce, additional dut.ies 
should be levied at the ports, thus equalising the burden on 
coastal and interior-dwelling taxpqers.15 
On the 4th of May the Conference ioot at Pretoria and its 
course followed in all essential that planned by General Smuts 
arrl lleITiman. The Natal and Orange River Colony manbers put 
up a fight for equal representation arrl voting by states in the 
Convention but this was defeated by tis combined oppoStion of 
the Cape am the Transvaal. Six resolutioM were i:assed mapping 
out the procedure to be followed in achieving Union and the re-
mainder of the time was spent in trying to reach agreement on 
customs and ri:l.lwq policies.16 This was not attained am the 
Conference adjourned to meet again in Cape Town on tle 26th of 
Kay where the Pretoria resolutions were conf'irned md tlB Customs 
COIIV"ention extemed to the 30th of Jure, 1909, subject tD minor 
modifications.17 It was agreed that the National conventton 
should meet in Durban. The res~lutions regarding Union were 
vigorously attacked in Natail8 and by the Progressive press in 
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the Cape, mainly on the grounda that proportional representation 
11> uld be contrary to the interests of the smaller states and that 
it would benefit the Dutch section or the population at the cost 
of the interests of the English. The South African Party press 
defended them however, pointing out that even as it was the Cape 
was under-represented if population were taken into accoun.t.19 
In the interval between the two sessions of the Conference 
Verriman had seen Steyn and urged him ver;r strongly to accept a 
seat on the Convention. He did this not only because he telt 
that Steyn•s presence woul.d make sure of the loyalty of the 
Orange Riwr Col.ony, but also because it woul.d offset the 
opposition to unification which was sure to be present in the 
Cape delegation due to the influence of Hofmeyr. Steyn was 
reluctant to join at first, but a.ft.er being thoroughly assured 
by both Merriman and General Botha that they w<W.d tight for the 
equality of both races and languages ,, he consented. 20 
Merriman was now faced with the problem of choosing the 
delegates to the National. Convention. This he did with generous 
statesmanship, £or of a delegation of twelve members he chose five 
.from the Opposition. 21 Hofmeyr refused a seat on the grounds of 
ill-health, 22 but he also felt that the Convention would be a 
failure and wished to remain a tree agent so that he coul.d 
continue to attack unification :f'roDl outside the Convention. 23 
He had endeavoured to persuade Merriman to alter the representation 
of the Cape but with no success. 24 There can be no doubt that 
his main reason for this was that he feared that the other 
colonies would swamp the Cape delegation as far as the native 
.franchise was concerned am 1n this respect his fears were qiite 
justified. 
Merriman honever thought to ensure protection of the non-
European franchise by including Schreiner, their new champion. 
He had been urged to do this by Dr. Smartt, 25 and Schr$iner, 
having first offered to stand back in favour of HofJlleyr, had 
accepted gladly when informed or the latter's refusal. 26 
On the 22nd of June Kerri.man annaa.nced the names of the delegation 
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and introduced the motion to cotirm the resolutions of the CustClms 
Conference. He was supported by Sauer, Malan, de Waal, Smartt 
and others and the motion W'8.8 carried unanimously on the 24th.27 
His choice of delegates met with approval throughout the whole 
Colony and the inclusion of so large a number of the Opposition 
members, al.though slightly surprising the South Africa Party 
press,28 was a major tactor in ensuring the loyal support of the 
Cape Progressives during the Convention. In September, unfortunately, 
came the shock or Schreiner•s resignation from the delegation in 
order to defend Dini-zulu. This was due to the long-drawn-out 
preliminary exam:!nation of the accused which had completely 
upset Schreiner's arrangements. He felt however, committed on 
principle to carry on the defence which he had undertaken, and 
unfortunately bis tactless wa:y of announcing it in Parliament 
w1 thout informing Merriman before hand earned him a reproach from 
the latter for lack of courtesy. 29 He wrote in answer a rather 
clumsy note of apology and assured the Prime Minister that he had 
not been consulting the Opposition, but that the Natal Govermnent 
would not postpone the trial • .30 
While al1 this negotiatory and ParliamentAry work was being 
carried out, the population of the Cape Colony and indeed of the 
whole of South Africa was being thoroughly indoctrinated with the 
idea of the necessity for Closer Union, 'Whether federative or 
unified in principle. The question had been brought to the 
notice of the Colonists during the recent elections but the excite-
ment and tension of these had prevented attention being focussed 
on Union as a subject in itself. It was only towards the middl.e 
of the year that public, as opposed to Parliamentary, interest 
really becane thoroughly arousedand one of the first symptoms 
of this was the formation of a Closer Union Society in Cape 
Town under the presidency of Schreiner. This society was made 
up of indiY.i.dual.s representative of al.l parties and wa.s organised 
on a non-party basis. Its objects were to encourage the 
:f'ormation of similar societies throughout Cape Colony and South 
Africa and to disseminate information on all aspects and Q'.B~ms 
of closer Union.31 
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There followed during the next few months a good crop of 
Closer Union Societies throughout the Colony. AB the societies 
were formed so there came a veritable spate of speeches and talks 
on all aspects of Closer Union. Anyone who had the slightest 
pretension to lmowledge of some branch of the subject, whether 
it was the history of the Swiss Confederation or the benefits 
which Union would bring to Cape Commerce felt capable of making 
a speech and usually did. 
The press took up the cause with a will and newspapers in 
all parts of the Colony tried to mold public opinion to the:' 
viewsheld by them or by their principaJ.s. In Cape Town the 
"South African News" and the 11Cape Times11 championed Unification 
while the "Argus" and 110ns Land" cal.le<?. tor federation. 
The periodical 11The Cape" took the former view. In Port 
Elizabeth the "Herald" agreed with this while in Grahamstown 
the "Journal" went so far as to attack Lord de Villiers as a 
choice for chairman of the Convention on the grounds that he had 
already spokJ9n in favour of Unification. This paper also 
demanded the separation of the Eastern Province, and its own 
legislature with strong domestic powers.32 
lleamrhile behind the scenes the leading figures continued to 
thrash out the main principles on which they hoped to reach 
agreement before the Convention commenced. On the 6th of 
August General Botha wrote to )(erriman for his opinion on the 
principle of one vote, one value in representation for the 
Union. He expressed the belief that certain parties were 
prepared to go to any lengths for it in the Convention and feared 
the result it would have in Natal and the Cape Colony if allowed 
to be adopted.33 M.errima.n in his reply said that he was opposed 
to the system and believed in a high franchise with no exclusion 
on racial grounds or anyone who could reach it. He believed 
that the balance of power should be in t1- hands of the landed 
interest and attributed the financial ruin of the Cape to 
goverment by the floating population of the towns. He expressed 
the view that Capitalist influence was behind the one vote, one 
value agitation, and that while the Cape and the Orange River 
colony were safe, Na1!al was hopeless.34 
14. ~ 
- Late in August,, 1908 Lord de Villiers arrived back f'rom a 
visit to Canada where he had been representing South Africa at 
the Tercentenary Celebrations of the foundation of Quebec. 
What he had seen and heard there had convinced him of the evils • 
of Federation and the need for Uni.fication to solve the problems 
o.r South Af'rica.35 A ta dqs later he and Steyn received copies 
of Merr:l.man's repl.y to General Smut's memorandum containing the 
latter's ideas on Union and asking for criticism. 36 1lerriman ts 
reply was a verY full exposition or bis own ideas37 and ·:u,,rd de 
Villiers threw his weight in.CO the scale too in a long letter 
to General Smuts giving his views.38 Rumours of this higb-
leve:j. discussion were beginning to leak out and in September 
General Smuts found 1 t necessary to issue a public denial. of 
what had been going on. In his statement he said that no 
Dratt Constitution was being prepared by the Transvaal delegates, 
and that the other delegates had not been approached.39 Four 
~s later he and fleneral Botha accompanied by the Transvaal 
Treasurer,Hull,were in m.oemrontein to confer with Fischer and 
the W,nistry of the Orange River Colony: it was announced in the 
press that the conference was on railwq matters. 40 
It was now time for the Cape delegates to leave for Durban 
and on the 2nd of October leading Cape figures had a chance for 
final utterences on the subject of Union. This was at a dinner 
given for the delegates in Cape Town before they left, at which 
Schreiner took the chair. He pointed out that the fundamental 
problem was that of the Non-Europeans and warned the delegates 
that if the principle of right and freedom. and justice to the 
people of the country, no matter what their colour, was not 
vindicated, the work o.f' the Convention would be in vain. 
Ho:f'meyr said that he wanted the best system of Closer Union, 
which might be federation but would certainly not be unification. 
He hoped however that it might ultimately grow into a n most 
perfect form ot Unification without any sudden violent jerks 
of the State machinery, and without e:n:y political smashes of 
any kind. n Both )(erriman and Smartt spoke against .federation. 
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The form.er pointed to the exanples of previous unsatisfactory 
systems in other countries and the latter calling for an amal-
gamation of the English and Dutch sections into one South 
African Nation. U This speech by Smartt augured well for the 
'WOrk of the Cape delegation at the Convention and this was 
strengthened by a letter to Mer.riman from Sir Walter Hely-
Hutchinson who met Col. Crewe at East London who had said that 
he would accept the principle of Unification with safeguards. 
The Govenor added that he understood that strong efforts bad 
been made to convert Jameson from the federationist position 
"not without hope of success." 42 
The Convention assembled at Durban on the 12th of October 
and immediately decided to carry out its work in secrecy. 
Throughout the session Merriman was supported solidly by his 
delegation and the behaviour of Janeson and his Progressives 
was a pleasant surprise to him. When the question of the 
Non-European franchise came up for discussion he hai to deal 
with Col. Stanford and Sauer who appealed for a franchise with 
no colour bar but they were overwhelmed by the weight of opposition 
against them. 43 Lord de Villiers had helped by his correspondence 
with Lord Sel.bourne to explain the attitude of the British 
Government44 and eventually the Cape had.to be satisfied with 
the compromise of a colour bar for the Union Parliament in 
return for the entrenchment of the Cape Native Franchise. 
Jameson was well pleased with the outcome am expressed his 
admiration and respect for Steyn and General Botha whom he 
considered " the two factors for a decent British settlement. 1145 
Hofm.eyr had tried to in:fluence the Convention in favour of equal 
rights and Federation not knowing that both cpestions had been 
sett.led almost unanimously. The adjournment of the Convention 
to Cape Town w-.s almost directly due to considerations of the 
health of IDrd de Villiers who was held in enormous respect by 
the whole Convention. 
Daring the interval Sir Walter He1y-Hutchinson expressed the 
view that he would have preferred a three-quarters majority for 
the entrenched clauses, yet he considered that the arrangement 
11'&8 as reasonabl.IJ as could be expected. li6 The delegates took 
advantage of the break to make speeches re-assuring the Sout.h 
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African public that all was going well at the Convention. 
Merriman had to correct a misinterpreted Reuter telegram which 
had made him appear despondent or success. 47 The Convention 
reswaed its work in Cape Town in November and after a break for 
the Christmas season finally adjourned on the: :4th of February. 
Its decisions were to be published on the 9th of that month. 
Throughout this~ period the whole of South Africa had been 
without accurate information of the decisions of the Conventi~ 
Consequentlyrumours were numerous and the press continued to 
campaign strongly for objectives 'Which it hoped to attain. 
In the Eastern Province the"Dispatch" and the "Journal" fought 
on for federation supported by the 11Argus 11 in Cape Town", where 
they were opposed by the "Times" and the "South African News"• 
Throughout the ColoDT men of both parties demanded equal rights, 
with the South African Party representatives slightly more 
vehement in favour of equality or both languages. As far as 
representation was concerned the Progressive organs plumped for 
one vote, one value, equal constituencies, and automatic re-
distribution. The "Cape Times" threw its heart into a canpaign 
for proportional representation and for the submission of the 
Constitution to a referendum. Some papers attacked the secrecy 
of the Convention but on the whole it was .felt that it lf'8B far 
better for the working of that body than the full glare of 
publicity would be. Ho.t:meyr continued to air his v.Lews and 
when the controversy over the choice of the capital arose drew 
criticism as having given the impression that the Cape was preparee 
to sacrifice Union for it. On this question the general opinion 
in the ColODT was that Cape Town should be the Capital but it 
should not be made a vital issue. Altogether in all parts of 
the ColoJV' men aired their views on all aspects of the Convention's 
work without having the slightest knowledge o:r what was really 
going on. The whole ColoDT, towards the end of the second sessioa 
seemed to be keyed up to a high pitch of expectation as to what 
the publicatio n of the Convention's report would reveal. 
Once that happened the floodgates of praise or criticism woald 
be opened. 
---o0o..------
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Schreiner to Merriman 4/9/08. 
In January 1909 the Society commenced 
to publish a monthly periodical called 
"The State" in order to give expression 
to its views. 
Extracted . .from the u Journal". 
General Bo~ha to Merriman 6/8/08 
Merriman to General Botha 17/8/08 
Gen. Smuts to Merriman 29/8/08 
These ideas wre as follows:-
1. He was in favour of Unification due to 
the need for economy o.:f' Administration. 
. .L 
There should be one Central Legiswatiire 
which would be supreme over Local Bodies 
and the Courts. 
2. For local administration there should· be 
Provincial Councils under executive officers. 
There would be either Presidents or 
Secretaries but there should be no 
Lt. Governors with Ministers. The ~ers 
of the Provincial. Councils should be strictly 
defined and subject to the veto of the 
Central Govermnent. 
3. For the Central Legislati:re Merriman would 
personally have preferred a single Chanber 
and a restricted referendum but realised 
that there would probably have to be a 
bi-cameral Parliament. He agreed with 
Gen. Smuts on the number:, of seats 1 feeling 
that the Cape could afford some sacrifice. 
4. He agreed to the division of the Cape Colony 
but not to the annexation of Griqual.and 
to the Orange River Colony or of 
Bechuanal.and to the Transvaal. 
5. The members for the Senate shOuld be elected 
by the Provincial Councils and certain 
official. elements should have ex officio 
states. 
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6. For the distribution of seats in the 
Assembly sane rule of thumb method llOUld 
have to ?Je adopted. He thought automatic 
redistribution implied a failure to obtain 
a unified people. 
1. Each Province should retain its own franchise. 
He disliked manhood suffrage but realised 
that others felt the ssne about the 
• native vote. 
8. In native affairs Parliament must be 
supreme and thought it unwise to lay down 
any hard and fast rule in the Constitution 
to contro1 the actions of Parliament. 
9. There should be one Supreme Court, one 
Appeal Court and no appeal to any Privy 
Council. 
10. He was indifferent to the question ofthe 
Capital but thought it would be advisable 
to fix it in the Constitution to avoid 
dissention. 
His ideas were substantialzy" in agreement 
'With :Merr:lman's but he disagreed with the 
division of the Cape Colony. 
Sir Walter Bely-Hutchinson to :Merriman 
13/10/08 
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On the 9th ot February 1909 the Draft Act of the Constitution 
was published for all to read, study and criticise. A few days 
before this the compromise ovar the choice of a capital had been 
announced and criticism in the press had already begun. In cape 
Town the "South African News" accused the Transvaa1 delegates or 
having come to the Convention determined on getting the Capital and 
of not being frank enough to say so.1 It now criticised the Dratt 
Act on the grounds of under-representation of the Cape, referred to 
the colour bar in Parliament as a retrogressive step and called for 
stronger safeguards of the Non-European .franchise. However it 
welcomed Proportional Representation and equal language rights but 
maintained that the Constitution should be submitted to the people 
for approva1. 2 The "Times" a1so approved of Proportional. 
Representation and one vote, one value, but disapproved of the colour 
bar and thought that the representation ot the Cape might be 
imprbved .3 The main grievances of "0ns Land" were Proportional 
Representation, 1;he uriderrepresentation of the Cape and the 
vagueness of the language equality clause. 
In the Eastern Province the press was ve17 favourably disposed 
towards the Dratt Act. In East !Dndon the "Dispatch11 welcomed the 
spirit of compromise and warned against attempts to amend the Draft 
Act, advising that it could be safely left in the hands of the .,en 
who had framed it. 4 Later it criticised Schreiner as a "w.recker11 
or Union and said that South Africans would have no doubt as to 
which to choose.5 In Port Elizabeth the 11Heral.d.11 also expressed 
satisfaction with the Dr&ft Act6 and criticised Ho.tmeyr for not 
having joined in the Convention, rather than attempting now to 
alter its work. 7 The Grahamstovm "Journal11 was not so receptive 
and accused the Witwatersrand or bar ing engineered the whole 
Closer Union movement in order to obtain control or South Africa's 
finances, habours am. railwqs. 8 "lmv011 the native newspaper 
in the Eastern Province, while than1dng the C8Je delegates tor 
their work yet felt that the Cape had sacrificed its native 
81. 
policy to the other colonies.9 In Kimberley the "Advertiser" 
expressed satisfaction with the Draft Act, but called for a referendum 
on it after it had been finalJy accepted by the Parliaments. Later 
it criticised the attempt to alter the electoral clauses because or 
the Bond's dissatisfaction with them and pointed out the danger or 
doing so in the face of Transvaal opposition.10 In Jlateld.ng and 
Veyburg disappointment was expressed at the fact that Bechuanalaad 
had not been annexed to the Transvaal. ll 
Meanwhile throughout the Colony meetings were being held and 
addressed by members of Parliament and prominent si;eakers. The 
different aspects or the Draft Act were thoroughly discussed and 
resolutions adopted regarding it. In Cape Town the Chamber of 
Com.erce expressed complete satisfaction, 12 while at a meeting 
addressed by Greer, Hewat and Long tbay were given a tree hand 
to urge amendments. 13 Kimberley approved of the Draft. Act, at 
Mossel Bq Currey and 5earle were given a mandate to urge its 
14 
adoption as published. In the country districts tba feeling 1J8S 
almost universally in favour of ad.option of the Draft. In most 
places local members nre given a free hand to urge amendments but 
were asked not to press them to the point of 1'I'ecking Union.15 
Non-European opinion throughout the Colony was imam mous in 
opposing clausing clauses 35 and 44. At meetings in Cape Town, 
Kimberley and the Territories resolutions were passed condemning 
theml6 and at Kingwilliamstown in April a native conference was 
held to discuss the Draft Act. Tengo Jabavu, the Editor of 
"I.mvo" was elected president and the conference passed twelve 
resolutiens in lbich it confined itself to the particular clauses 
which ,affected the natives, approved of the principle or Union, 
called for the deletion of the offending clauses, thanked the main 
personalities ~o nre defending their rights am decided to send 
a petition to the Cape Parliament calling ror redress of. their 
17 grievances. 
The time between the publication of \be Draft Act and the 
opening of the Cape Parliament on Karch 30th was spent by members 
in explaining the Act to their constituents and airing their own 
62. 
views on it. llerriman backed up by his Cabinet and the members 
of the Cape delegation did his best to get the Colony to accept 
the Act aa a whole. Nevertheless even they had certain points 
1d th 'Which they disagreed. Merriman himself was opposed to 
Proportional Representation aDi approved of the Bond's resolution 
18 
against it in a speech at Cape Town in February. After that he 
left on a tour of the Eastern Province to promote full acceptance 
19 
there. Sauer while on tour in the Northern districts declared 
20 
his opposition to one vote, one value and De Waal expressed 
21 
regret that Education had not been placed on a national basis. 
The most ardent 'whole-boggers' were Jagger, who made a record 
number of speeches in a1Xi around Cape Town in favour of adoption 
22 
of the Act as a whole, Indwig Wiener, an:l Jameson who went as far 
23 
as to speak against Federation in Grahamstown. Malan also {when 
speaking in public) could find no cause to amend the Act. 
As far as the ordinary members were concerned there was a 
feeling that, while not wishing to wreck Union, the Act could 
nevertheless be improved by amendment on certain major points. 
Chief amongst these was the under-representation of the Cape 
in the Union Parliament. On this issue Progressives joined 
with South .African Party men to declare that the Cape had been 
unjustly treated. The most powerful opposition cane from 
Ho.f'meyr' s section of the Bond which also led the attack on the 
Capital compromise. In the latter it was joined by the 
Progressive members for Cape To1'1'1. A number of South African 
Party members representing the country constituencies, chief 
among them Sauer, Burton, J. A. C. Gras.ff and Fremantle attacked 
t.he one virte, one value principle as operating unfairly against . 
24 
the rural voter. :Most members accepted the clause relating to 
the Non-European franchise with good grace, but. their chief 
opponent, W.P.ScJreiner, received support in his condemnation 
of them from Cartwright and long in Cape Town, as well as from . 25 
T. Schreiner, D.P. Faure and J.M. Stephen. Apart from t.mse 
main point.a there were one or two complaints about t.be haste 
wit.h which the Act was being handled and a call from Weeber 
26 
and D.P. Faure for a referendum. But as will now be shown 
83. 
the most dangerous opposition came :trca Hot.yr and his followers 
in the Bond supported by Schreiner and the opponents of racial 
discrimination in politics. 
As soon as the Draft Act was published Hofmeyr was up in 
arms against it and on the 11th of' February he was quoted in 
'Ons Lam' as being of the opinion that the Cape should have 
received better representation, that Union should be Federative 
and that the move•nt to get the Act passed without amemments 
27 
was unjustifiable. He expressed these views that night at a 
meeting or the Cape Town branch or the Bond when he was supported 
by van der Horst. This led on the 17th to the passage by the 
branch of a number or resolutions, the most important of which 
referred to the unt'air representation or the Cape, recommended 
that the two-third.a majority in re"90t to the Cape naUw 
franchise should include a majority of the Cape members, protested 
against the introduction of the colour bar in Parliament, urged 
that the proviso in Section 39 should be general am ~bligatory 
to thinly populated districts am warned of the danger or 
introducing Proportional Representation with no experience 
28 
thereof'. These resolat.1.oawere the work of Hofmeyr himself' 
and their outcane was to show tha.t he was still a force to be 
reckoned llith in Cape PoliUcs. The immediate result of the 
resolutions was the criticism was levelled at him from all 
sides except his own particular section and the frie?Xis of the 
Non-Europeans. A special meeting of the Stellenbosch branch 
or the Bond passed t1'0 resolutions, one accepting the Draft Act 
am. the second regretting the resolutions of the Cape Town branch 
29 
as being undesirable and possibly harmful. '!mvo' however 
complimented the Cape Town branch as coming forward and boldly 
and openl1' denouncing 'the new, wicked and bad principle (in 
regard to native political rights) which it is being tried to 
,30 
implant in the British system. 
The scene now shifted to the Bond. Congress which opened 
at Dordrecht on the 4th or March 1909. Here the questions 
raised by the Cape Tmm branch were resolved to be discussed 
in cOJJlnittee of the whole Congress. Ministers who were members 
were allowed to be present and to speak but not to vote. 
84. 
Furthermore the deliberations were held in camera. The result ot 
these deliberations was that the Congress passed eleven resul.utions 
on the subject of the Draft Act~ The most important or these 
agreed with those of the Cape Town branch but the Congress left 
Bondsmen 'Who were members of Parliament free to vote in Parliament 
as they wished, and expressed the sentiment that it did not want 
31 
to have ·Union wrecked on any of the resolutions. This sentiment 
was confirmed by a statement by A.a.A. van Rooy, at Steynsburg on 
the 17th of March, who explained the action of the Bond Congress 
and said that it was fel.t that it was better to urge amemments 
32 
then than to tamper with the C~nstitution after its final adoption. 
This resulted in a special meeting of the Cape Town branch at 'Which 
van der Horst vigorously attacked the 'Cape Times 1 and the Capitalist 
press in general for its criticiSlll of Hotmeyr and himself and 
reiterated the principal points or the resalutions passed in Cape 
Town. At this meeting Hof'meyr merely said that the Act should not 
be passed until certain defects had been removed but declared 
33 
himself in favour of it as a whole. 
Hofmeyr in his opposition to the· clauses relating to the 
poll tical rights of the Non-Europeans had found an ally in Schreiner. 
Walker in bis biography o:t the latter says that their common vie'Wpoint 
34 
had effected a temporary reconciliation between the two but Jameson 
at the time referred, in a letter, to Schreiner as 'hating Hofmeyr 
35 
but having to run nth him against the rest or us.' Be that as it 
mq it was the combination of their forces which caused the battle 
in the Cape Parliament over the adoption of the Draft Act. Schreiner 
expressed his views early in February when he stated that he considered 
' . 
that the natives had not been fairly treated nor had their franchise 
been adequately safeguarded. Furthermore the government of the 
Union was too top-heavy and woul.d lead to degenaration ot 't.be 
Provincial Councils. He was also of the opinion that it was not 
enough to pass the Draft Act through the various Parliaments but 
that there should be either a special election on the issue or it 
36 
should be subni tted to a referemum. He had realised that the 
only Y&y: to safeguard the liberal native policy of the Cape was 
to form U:ni.on on a base more federative than unified. · These views 
he expressed at Queenstown where he was supported by C. Searle 
37 
85. 
mi Brown, am. later at Cape Town w1 th Cartwright atd Upington on 
36 
the same platform. He received but meagre support from Col. 
Stanf'ord who disapproved of' the relevant clauses but was prepared 
39 
nevertheless to accept the Constitution in spite of them. 
Schreiner was assailed throughout the Colony by the Evopean 
press who called him a '"Wrecker', and said that he was allowing 
his sympathy f'or the natives to blind him to the 6Jrea'ter object 
of' um.on. The natives were asBUrttlof' the safety of their franchise 
and warned of the danger of ag1 tation for more than the Draft Act 
granted in that it might stir up feeling against them. The folly 
of' attempting to gain more from the other colonies was pointed out 
and they were told that Schreiner's efforts would do more harm than 
good. Burton atter bis tour of the Territories stated in July that 
the feeling amongst the natives had been grossly exaggerated and 
40 
that there was little, it a:ny, agitation on the point. 
Nevertheless native .. am coloured opinion which could express 
itself was solidly behitd Schreiner. :Meetings in East IDndon, 
. 41 
Graa:f.f' Reinet, and the conference in the Transkei attacked the 
clauses am. thanked and supported Schreiner. The seventh annual 
Congress ot tb,e African Political Organisation which met in Cape 
Town in April and was addressed by Schreiner, passed resolutions 
protesting and expressing disappointment at the relevant clauses, 
and praying that they be deleted from the Act. It was also agreed 
that the resolutions be f orvrarded to the Prime Ministers of the 
various Colonies, the High Commissioner, and the Secretary of 
42 
State for the Colonies. 
Jleamrhil.e behind the scenes the principals were giving 
expression in their private correspondence to their real feelings 
w1 th regard to the Draft .Act. Kerri.man in February wrote to Sir 
Somerset French telling of his misgivings about getting the Act 
accepted in Parliament and of his disappointment at the outcome 
43 
of the Corwention. Burton too felt 'that the cause of good, 
44 
soun:i, just policy am. government has sutf'ered. 1 Jameson was 
the only one who appeared satisfied and confident that there would 
be no trouble in getting the .Act through, feeling sure that 
86. 
45 
Hofmeyr would give wrq in the end. As tar as the latter was 
concerned both Steyn and General Smuts felt sorrow and disappoint-
46 
ment at his actions while Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson wondered 
47 
whether the Bond would accept Hofmeyr 1 s amendments. 
To General Botha Kerri.man expressed the hope that 1 t might 
be possible to avoid amendments in the Cape Parliament, and his 
48 
doubt as to the importance of the Bond proposals. Both he and 
Jameson urged the General to put pressure on Moor to resist the 
49 
opposition to the Act in Natal. General Botha in turn mentioned 
the apparent haste of the Progressives to push Union through 8D:l 
50 
wondered what was behind it. He received a shock 'When Gra.aff 
showed him figures proving that Proportional Representation would 
51 
mean a victory to the Progressives in the Cape. These figures 
had been supplied by v.d. Horst and on examination by Generals 
Botha and SJp.uts proved to be misleading, their calculations 
showing that the South African Party would get thirtywone seats 
52 
and the Progressives twenty, which caused vast relief. Merriman 
in reply said that although he personally felt that Proportional 
Representation was a •:new-fangled device' yet he thought it would 
be dangerous to attack it in the Convention, and informed Gt-aa:ff 
53 
of his opinion. He al so expressed his opposition to a ref erend.m, 
and said that he had not considered the effects of Proportional 
Representation on parties, since he held that the most competent 
party would dominate the Union Parliament. It was now well into 
11arch aDi llerriman bee ame perturbed at the possibility of a long 
delq in the final accomplishment of Union due to delays in Natal. 
At the same time he regarded with horror a suggestion by Lord 
Selborne that the Imperial Parliament should not be approached 
until February 1910 and that 'in the meantime His llajesty' s 
GoverDDent should be. asked to pass a short enabling Act to set 
up the Commission of Judges, provided for in the Draft, for the 
54 
delimitation of constituencies • ' He therefore arranged a 
meeting of the four Prime llinisters in Bloemfontein on the 24th 
of llarchwhere the matter was thrashed out am a definite time-
55 
table laid down for the final steps in the process of Unification. 
But now Merriman had to .race the problem of getting the 
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88. 
the ~gislative Council where after having adopted the anendments 
made b7 the Assembly, and also two moved by the President in regard 
to constitutional and judicial matters and one by J.A.C. Graaff 
calling for clarification of the language equality clause, it was 
64 
finally passed. 
So Schreiner and his supporters had lost the battle while 
Hotmeyr and the Bo1¥!. had achieved at least some of their objectives. 
lrhe interests of the rural section had been safeguarded, which had 
really been their basic object. But this victory still had to be 
confU.d by the final session of the Convention which assembled 
at Bloemfontein on the 3rd of 11.ay. The issue soon provided the 
most serious crisis of the Convention for the Transvaal was solidly 
against a:n:y attack on the one vote, one value system. Eventuall)" 
a compromise was reached through l.Drd de Villiers putt1{!~ forward. 
a mot.ion which be and Merriman had worked out together. This was 
that there should be single member constituencies throughout the 
Union but that town and country should have equal treatment within 
the boundaries of the provinces to the best of the Distribution 
66 
CoJllllission's ability. Thus Blaine's amendment fell away. This 
saved the day and Merriman was delighted, not only with what had 
67 
been achieved but also with the behaviour of the Cape delegates. 
During the struggle against one vote, one value he had privately 
expressed the vin that Lord Selborne was behind all the trouble 
68 
and that it was a case of' South Africa versus the Rand. However 
he was well satisfied with the outcome as he felt that only Sauer 
69 
and lla.lan among his ministers had really been in favour of Union. 
For this reason be bad not kept his other ministers informed of 
events at Bloemfontein as be .f'elt that Hofmeyr would have been 
notified or them aM. Yrould have stirred up opposi ti.on among his 
70 
delegates. Jameson too was pleased with the result and had 
proposed as a final friendly gesture the re-naming of the Orange 
71 
River Colony as the Orange Free State. 
The revised ConBti tution now had to be accepted by the 
Parliaments which met on the lst of June tor that purpose. An. 
awkward situation had arisen due to a badly reported speech by 
Col. Seely in London which seemed to impl.y that the Imperial 
Government would amend the Constitution. Merr:llnan had denied 
89. 
this so indignantly as to give ottence in Britain am. to cause 
alarm and confusion both there and in South Africa. However 
assurances from both Merriman and Lord de Villiers satisfied all 
72 
parties and harmoll1' was restored. In Cape Town Hof'meyr was 
still critical ot the Convention's final report and in Mq the 
local branch of the Bond um.er his leadership issued a statement 
73 
of resolutions regretting certain aspects of the Constitution. 
When Parli811lent re-opened Schreiner once more attacked, moving 
that the Act be approved subject to modifications of the franchise 
74 
safeguards. In this he was secomed by- Upington but Fremantle 
and Greer had deserted him. Fremantle was welcomed back into the 
fold by- Sauer, but Greer refused the outstretched arms still 
disapproving of the ~?°rary alliance bet•en Merr:iJn.an and 
Jameson in Parliament • Schreiner's motion was rejected and on 
the 3rd of June the Assembly accepted. the Draft Constitution by 
76 
96 votes to 2. The two lonel.y opposers were Schreiner and Sir 
Gordon Sprigg who thus showed his disapproval of the rertuction 
77 
of the poll tic al rights of the loll-Europeans. By- the end of 
June the Constitution had been accepted by all the colonies, 
Natal's referendum having been an overwhelming success, and navr 
it remained only to have the British Parliament ·gi.ve its formal 
approval. 
The se1ection of the delegates from the Cape provided a 
final proof of Hof'meyr 1s strength as a political force. The 
resolutions .tor which he had been responsible in Mey- had in 
78 
Merri.man's opinion definitely- put Hotmeyr out of court and the 
. 19 
Governor also advised against choosing him. Nevertheless so 
mch pressure was exerted on Merriman by- the Dutch section of the 
80 
population that he had to give wq and ask Hofmeyr to join the ' 
81 
delegation. The latter at first re.fused but on consideration 
decided to join on certain coDiitions. On being assured of these 
82 
he joined with pleasure. The selection when announced met with 
a certain amount of criticism from Progressive quarters 'Where it 
was felt that a certain party- nature had been given to the delegation. 
Union was now close at hand but a :final threat had still to 
be met in the shape of an appeal on behalf of the natives and 
coloureds, led by- Schreiner, to the British Parli811lent. Schreiner 
90. 
and SOJlle influential 'supporters in Cape Town bad drawn up an 
appeal and this had been supplement.a. by petitions from the 
natives in the Territories and Basutoland and also by a delegation 
from the African Poli ti.cal Organisation. Schreiner was now to 
lead a deputation to England to try to influence the British 
84 
Parliament to modify" the Constitution. 
Merriman was greatl7 perturbed about this and wrote to Sir 
Walter Hel.7-Hutchinson pointing out the dangers of Schreiner•s 
appeal and giving a detailed defence of the compromise over the 
natin franchise necessary for the accomplishment of Union, and 
urged him to use bis influence on His J(ajesty' s Government to 
85 
give Schreiner no encouragement whatsoever. The press thrOughout 
the Coloey, with the exception of •I.mvo' heaped criticism on 
Schreiner u being a wrecker of the Constitution, a polit.1.oal 
agitator, and for seeking to cause Imperial interference into 
South Attic• attairs. 
The appeal however was a failure. The British Governmant 
accepted no amendments in principle, nor indeed would the dele-
gation have done if it had, and the Act was passed with onl\r 
86 
Jli.nor modifications in form and beca.ne law in September. While 
Sauer then went off to France, and other members of the Cape 
delegation dallied in England, Merriman had to hurry back to 
Cape Town to deal. with matters there. Aa far as Union politics 
were concerned the stage was now set for the final question, 
that of who would be appointed the first Prime lfinister of the 









































Extract from the "Dispatch n. "Folt oarselves, 
. 
we mq well set off equal voting values and 
automatic distribation against the language 
compromise and the election of the Senate 
!or ten years by the existing Parliament 
majorities.~· 
Extract from the "Dispatch. " "The mm in 
the street has confidence in the men who 
framed the Constitution and is <1!ite 
content to leave the settlement of the 
whole matter to them." 
Extract .f'rom the "Dispatch." 
Extract from the "Herald. 11 
Extract from the "Herald." 
Extract from the 11 Journal. " 11Federation 
should come but it should not be Fusion." 
Extract from the "Journal. 11 11The whole 
mystery of the agitation for unification 
now comes out with tolerable clearness. 
The movement has been engineered by 
Witwatersrand, in order to obtain control 
of South Africa's finance, harbours and 
Extracts from the 11DiamoJJd Fields Advertiser.• 
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1$. C T llarch 1909. 
S A N llarch 1909. 
16. C T 6.3.09. Coloured meeting in City Hall, addressed by 
Dr. Abdurahman, the 1layor, the Rev. R. Balm.forth 
and Kr. Alexander ll.L.A. 
S A N 8.3.09. Veeting or Firgo electors at Nquamakwe addressed 
by Mr. lBY7 ¥•'i..A. 
C T 8.3.09. Jleeting of Natives, Indians, Malays and Coloureds 
at Kimberley. 
S AN 13.3.09. Col. J.svey held large meetings at Cofim.vibu, 
Southeyville and .Askerton. 
C T 20.3.09. Coloured meeting at Claremont addressed by 
Cartwright., Withinshaw, Jlaurice am Abdurahman. 
P.Jl.O. 46.09. Jleetings at Cradock and Piquetberg. At all. 
the above meetings opposition was shewn to 
the clauses dealing ldth the native franchise 
and the colour bar i.e. Clauses 35 am. 44, and 
at most resolutions were passed calling for 
their del.etion of or alteration. 
17. Imvo. April. 1909. 
S AN 12.4.09. 
18. C T 23.2.09. 
19. S A N 18.2.09. 11inisters on tour. Jlerriman to go to King-
williamstown, Sauer to Kimberley and Allwal 
North, Jlalan was al.rea.<:\Y on tour in the South 
Western districts. 
20. SAN 10.3.09. 
21. Ibid 12.2.09. 
22. CT Feb. , M.a.roh 1909. 
SAN Feb., Jlarch 1909. 
23. CT 16.2.09. 
24. Ibid 21.2.09. 








26. Ibid 15.2.09. 
Ibid 2.3.09 
27. S AB 12.2.09 
28. C T 17.2.09 
29. S A N 22.2.09 
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30. I.mvo 118.rch 1909. 
31. C T 9.3.09. 
32. S A N 18.3.09. 
33. C T 19.3.09. 
34. w. P.s. p.31S. 
3.5. L 0 J p.284. 
36. W.P.S. p.314. 
37. C T 25.3.09 • 
.38. Ibid 27.3.09. 
39. S A N 5.3.09. 
40. Ibid 18.7.09 
La.. Ibid 25.3.09 
42. CT 17.4.09. 
h.3. J I JI 19.09. Merriman to Sir Somerset Frendl..10.2.09. •As far 
as can be judged the proposals will be accepted. 
Not indeed, without any misgivings for, except 
in mere finance, we in the Cape lose everything. 
It is a supreme misfortune that the ruinous 
extravagance of past years has brought p to 
this pitch. ' 
44. J I 11 20.09. 
Q5. L O J p.283. 
46. J I 11 24.09. 
J x )( 25.09. 
47. J x 11 26.09. 
l.iB. J x 11 29.09. 
49. L 0 J p.284. 
50. J I 11 39.09. 
51. J I 1l 44.09. 
Burton to 11erriman. u.2.09. 
James:> n to S. JameS> n. 13. 2. 09. 
Gen. Smuts to llerriman. 19.2.09. 
M. T. Steyn to Merriman 26. 2. 09. 
Sir Walter Rely-Hutchinson to Merriman 6.3.09. 
V.rriman to Gen. Botha l0.3.09. 
Jaraes:>n to s. Jameson 1,5.3.09. 'Have just been 
up to Pretoria to get Botha to squeeze Moor, 
which he will try to do. ' 
Gen. Botha to :Merriman 16.3.09. 
Gen. Botha to llerr:i.man 17.3.09. 'Yesterday 
however Graaf'f was here ani put certain figures 
before me feeling very uncomfortable indeed.. 
He pointed out to me that the proportional 
52. J x • 70.09. 
53. L 0 ll p.p.296,7. 
54. Ibid p.297. 
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voting in the Catie Coloey would result in 
the Progressives getting 27 seats and your 
party only 24. ' 
Gen. Botha to Merriman 19.3.09. 
55 • J X 1l Karch 1909. The points settled at Bloemfontein were: 
1. Dates : 3. 5. 09. Convention to re-assemble 
at Bloemf ontei.n. 
56. Vil: P. 1909. 
57. S AN 9.4.09. 
58. C T 9.4.09. 
59. S A N 12.4.09. 
31.5.09. Referendum in Natal. 
1.6.09. Parliaments to re-assemble 
and give notice to vote 
address next d.q. 
9.6.09. Delegations from each Colon;y' 
:.to leave for England. 
2. At the sessions commencing or{ 30.3.09 no 
amendments, but only recommemations were 
to be made to the Draft Act. 
60. C T 3.4.09. Jameson in the Assembly had said on the 2.4.0J 
1! look upon nzyself as the lieutenant of the 
Prime Minister in this matter. 1 
61. C T 13.4.09. 
62. v • p 1909. 
63. C T 16.4.09. 
64. S AN 17.4.09. 
65J L 0 11 p.303. Merriman to Mrs. Merriman 5.5.09. 
66. L D V p.476. 
67. J X 1l 172.09. llerriman to Mrs. Merriman: 1 All our men are solid 
Jameson has behaved very well. 1 
68J J X 1l 174.09. Merriman to Mrs. Merriman 6.5.09. 
69. J I 11 172.09. Merriman to ».rs • .Merriman 5..5.09. 'However one 
feels that not one of our colleagues except 
Sauer and Malan are real.4'" in ravour of Union 
at all.' 
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J X 14 18 3. 09. Kerrim.a.n to llrs. Merriman ' You must 
al.ways discount Harry-'s (Currey) opinions 
10. J x 14 184.09. 
71. L 0 J p.285. 
72. L 0 14 p.305. 
L D V p.479. 
as he has never been an Unionist nor 
Burton, nor de Waa1, nor Graaff.' 
Merriman to Mrs. Merriman 'Ky reason for 
not wiring before was that I knew 
contents would be sent to Hofmeyr who 
would affect and direct operations here.• 
Col. Seely, Under-Secretary for the Colonies. 
J x 14 259, 261, 
263, 264.09. A series of telegrans clearing up the 
73. C T 19.$.09. 
situation. 
Resolutions of' the Cape Town branch of' the 
Bond. 
1. T~ meeting regrets that while the National 
Convention has, on the one haJXi, 1Vi thout 
pressure from a single Colonial Parliament, 
(a) Opened the door wider for "outside 
interference with the internal concerns of 
South Africa11 • 
(b) Increased the allowance of every member 
of the Union Parliament from %.300 to %400 
per annum, thereby- weakening the argument 
in favour of Union based on economy. 
It has on the other hand, rejected the 
most important recommendations of our 
Parliament in regard to amendments of the 
Draft Act. 
2. The meeting, however 1 is glad that by abolishing 
the transferable vote in conjunction with t he 
large electoral devisions, each returning 
three members, the Convention has removed 
weight objections as far as regards the 
country districts. 
3. The meeting hopes -
(a) That when the Draft .Act is accepted this 
will be done by a resolution ref erring to 
74. Vil:P 
75. C T 
76. SAN 
11. W.P.S. 
78. J x v: 
79. J x )( 








the minutes of the Convention and to 
speeches of the delegates in evidence 
of tre wide construction placed by our 
Parliament on the language Clause 138. 
(b) That unforeseen alterations will not be 
made in the draft in England w1 thout the 
concurrence or our Parliaments. 
llerriman to Gen. Botha 20.5.09. 
Sir Walter Rely-Hutchinson to Merriman 18.5.09. 
Merriman to Gen. Botha 25.5.09. 'The selection 
of Ho.f'meyr as extra delegate is being strongly 
pressed on me by Dutch section uur party. I 
do not like it for reasons given but perhaps 
it is lesser evil as it will pledge him to 
policy union and fusion. ' 
81. J X 11 217.09. Merriman to Hofmeyr. 27.5.09. 
82. L O H p.p.32,3. Ho.f'meyr to Merriman. May 1909; 
'Dear llr. Merriman, - Thinking over our 
conversation of Saturdq, it appears to me, 
that we are in thorough agreenmt on the 
following points:-
l. That no amendments whatever shall be 
made in the Draft Act of Union, which 
involve alterations in principle or change 
in the intent or meaning of any clause or 
provision. 
2. That should the Cape delegates to Englan d 
not be unanimous regarding any proposed 
· amendments, including even those of a merely 
formal character, th& Act will be submitted 
to the Cape Parliament for approval. 
3.. That failing such approval, the Proclamation 
of Union shall not apply to the said Colo:ny. 
83. C T 3.6.09. 
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4. That these points will be clearly !!et 
forth in the resolutions agreeing to 
the Draft A.et Government are about to 
move in our Parliament. If I interpret 
your views correctly as •e given, I 
agree to accept an appointment to confer 
with the Sec. of State for the Colonies 
in reference to the passage of the 
Draft Act through the British Parliament. 1 
Delegates: Jameson, Sauer, Loid de Villiers, 
Merriman and Hofmeyr. 1It is un-
questionable that the selection or the 
delegates named by Mr. Merriman gives 
just a flavour or party which might 
well have been avoided.' 
Ibid 16. 6. 09. Extract from the •Despatch'. 1 The excessive 
nominal strength of one poll tic al party 
84. W.P.S. p.322. 
is probably more accidental than 
intentional, but it is illustrative 
of the fact that the more the party d. 
which the Bond organisation is typical 
receives the more it demands. ' 
85. J X M 245.09. Merriman to Sir Walter Rely-Hutchinson. 
86. L 0 K. p.310. 
--oOo---
CHAPTER VI 97. 
The question of the first premiership of the Union, although 
it came to a climax only shortl.7 before the date of Union, i.e. 
Jlst of May, 19101 nevertheless had its begirmings in the early 
days of 1909. This was when the work of the National Convention 
appeared likely to be successful., and men began to think of who 
would be the man to lead the first Union Goverment. In 
December l9<>e the "Cape Times" had pointed out the danger of 
maintaining old party l.oyalties after Union, and on the 5th ot 
January Kerriman wrote to General Botha agreeing with him on the 
undesirability of a coalition government and discussing the possibility 
of an amalgamation 9£ Het Volk, de Unie and the South African Party.1 
Janeson realised. the nttch section in South Africa would be 
in power at the beginning of Union but thought that there was a 
possibility of the first Goirer:ment being a Coalition.2 In Cape 
Town, however, the 11South African NeW'8 11 disAJ>proved of the idea, 
which hid already been mooted by the press in the Eastern Province 
and began to suspect the Progressives' attempt to whitewash their 
record, but at the same time hoped that parties would not be formed 
on racial. lines.3 The "Times" felt that :Merriman was sure to be 
asked to form the Govermnent,4 and Merriman himself was eager to 
prevent domination by the Transvaal, being assured by Burton that 
Fischer was with him in that respect and determined to eliminate 
Selbourne •s influence in the matter.5 
WhiJ.e the del,egates were in England the specul.ation in South 
Africa grew and the 11South African News 11 came out de.finately 
against Coalition. 6 In this it was strengthened by Gen. Botha's 
remarkll in an interview 11ith the 11Manohester Guardian" in 'Which he 
said that he preferred a strcmg Goverment nth a strong Opposition.7 
He repeated these sentiments in a talk eith Hofmeyr, giving as his 
reason the tact that the Opposition a wanted at least five out of 
ten seats in the Cabinet,. and to have men like :Merriman and Hull 
as representative or the South African Party. Hofmeyr gained the 
impression from this talk that General Botha was more willing to 
become Premier himself than to serve under anybody else. 
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It was Ho£mey's own opinion that the most acceptabJ.e man to aJ.l 
parties would be Steyn, but that he would not be availabl.e due 
to ill-health. He thought, however, that n he (Steyn) and the 
Free Staters would support Merriman' s claim if the latter could 
be sure oit. the entire support or the South .African Party in the 
Cape Colony. The Natali.ans would have no objection to either 
:Merriman or General Botha, provided they were adequately 
represented in the Cabinet themselves.118 
Meanwhile the Transvaal delegates had won the tussle as to 
the date of Union. By delaying it until the 31st or Mq 1910 
they were enabled to complete their financial year and arrange 
their budget with an eye to the future. Gr:'eat disappointment 
was felt at this in the Cape9 and :Merriman felt that it was 
another sign of the Transvaal's intention to dominate Union. 
A letter from Ind.wig Wiener describing the atmosphere on the 
Rand served to strengthen thi s suspicion.10 The South 
African Party press in the Cape continued to regard the movement 
for Coalition as emanating from the Rand, this belief being 
aggravated by the report of a referendum held by the 11Sundq 
Times" resulting in a majority for Coalition with Janeson 
heading the poll for Premier.11 The Progressive organs 
feeling the growing opposition to Coalition began to talk of 
a strong Opposition under Jameson; and DrummoDi-Chaplin, acting 
leader or the Progressive Party on the Rand made a strong anti-
12 
Coalition speech early in August. 
In September 1909 Ho.fmeyr, realising how General Botha felt 
about Coalition, came out in public against it himsel.f. At the 
same time he wrote to a friend in South Africa emphasizing the 
tact that in the event of a government being formed on party lines 
6Very Botha-, aJ¥i. every :Merriman-man must support the ministry 
no matter Which of the two became Prime Jlinister. If 
malcontests were to stand out the Ministry would not be able to 
accomplish anything worthwhile. It seemed that General Botha 
was the coming man and although he was a little too friendly 
with the Rand forcthe liking of the Bond nevertheless it would 
be better tor him to depend on solid South African Party 
support than to have to fall back ·on the Rand interests due to 
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squabbles and divisions in the Cape.13 
But now Jameson began to pla;y a determined hand for Coalition. 
On September 30th he met General Botha at Balm.oral, and there 
mooted his idea of a "Best-11en11 Government. The reception which 
the latter gave to this encouraged Jameson and in November he 
hurried back to Sout.h Africa to help 11eITiman 1il o was fighting 
the losing battle against the wine farmers at the tillle.14 
Ho~yr's death in the interval had removed a potent force from 
the political field. Soon after Jameson's return to the Cape 
he set off on a tour of South Africa to promote his scheme, with, 
however, inner doubts as to its success. But he still received • 
encouragement .from. General Botha who had not apparently divulged 
his real opinions to him. l.5 
Merriman still expected to be associated with General Botha16 
although he was WOITied about the intrigue that was going on. 
He was perturbed too, about the absence of administrative machinery 
for Union and set about the task of remedying this.17 It was a 
relief for him. therefore to receive a letter from General Botha 
late in December ass'llring him of his continued distaste for 
Coalition and mooting plans for an amalgamation of Het. Volk, 
De Unie and t.he South Afriean Party. He asked for MeITiman's 
opinion of a programme which he had drawn up to express the 
principles of such an amalgamated party.18 :Merriman received 
confirmation of his soundness on the last day of the year in a 
wire from Ora.at!" assure him that the rumours ab:mt Coalition 
were groundless.19 Nevertheless Jameson's visit to the 
Transvaal and his talks there with General Botha started these 
rumours flying once more. The "Cape Times" did its utmost to 
promote the cause o&. a 11Best :Men" Govermnent and 'While the 
"South African News" tried to kill the rumours as having no 
authority, it was extremely perturbed by a report from 
Johannesburg that tailing Coalition General Botha would break 
with Het Volk and form a third party. One of the leading 
Transvaal Progressives,, Sir George Farrar,in an interview 
admitted the possibility of such a third party springing up 
among the Progressives. Furthermore extended buying on the 
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the market by leading financiers and politicians added colour to 
this. 20 
Merriman, however, reassured by General Botha 1 s letter wrote 
back to him. discussing his idea of an amalgamated party. By 
this he understood the drawing closer together of Het Volk, 
De Unie and the South African Par:tJ"1 pointing out the impossibility 
of destroying these organisations. He suggested the name 11South 
African Party« for the new party 1 which would persuade the English 
section to join as they had in the Cape,. It 1V0u1d be vital to 
have the Bond as the country districts woul.d not come in without 
it, and it had been most reasonable in Parliament. Being a more 
experienced politician than General Botha he disapproved of the 
idea of a written programme. He felt that either it was too 
broad to be of any use or eJ.se it tied the party down too closely. 
The best plan in his opinion 110uld be to wait for the Governor-
General to call on someone to f o:ra a Government and then for that 
person to gather his :t'riends, form a party and .formulate a 
policy; a policy which would be presented to the electorate. 2l. 
A few days l.ater F.S.llalan took it upon himself to declare 
in public that leading figures who expressed views on the future 
of political. parties under Union did so whol.ly on their own 
responsibility, and merely aired their own opinions. 
He went on to say that it was impossible to say how the different 
provincial parties 110uld arrange themselves22 Union. This in 
the light of future events was a significant speech. Mal.an 
at that time was nursing a grievance under the impression that 
his section of the Bond had been unf'airly treated at the 
National Convention. He had aided and abetted the 1dne farmers 
in their fight against the Excise and was now beginning to turn 
against Merriman. 
Jameson, . unaware of General Bot.ha 1 s real attitude towards 
Coalition, was Working hard for his 11Best Men" Government. 
He interviewed Steyn in the Orange Free State and Moor in Natal 
and hurried back to Cape Town to see Merriman before General 
Botha arrived. 23 He smr ».errim.an and Sauer but the former 
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was determined to fight Coalition and before General Botha 
&ITived made a speech at Carnarvon on January 22nd.-hich shattered 
any prospect of the South African Party being a party to Coalition. 
This speech was a long one, defending the record of the South 
African Party, describing its character and its attitude and as 
far as Coalition was concerned he said; " I will say at once-
I think I m.ay go as far as that- that to my mind all this talk 
abou t a coalition seem.a to me not only foolish, but positiveJ.y 
mischievous. To me it seems impossible.11 24 This spiked 
Jameson's guns, and on the eve of General Botha's visit to him 
. . 
in Cape Town he wrote, " I should sa;y he will go with his own 
people" and he now turned his mind to·the organisation of a 
good Opposition. 25 Three days J.ater General Botha, Fischer 
and Merriman met in Cape Town, the latter two being completely 
opposed to any idea of Coalition or a "Best Men•i Government. 26 
In Johannesburg General Smuts spoke of the need for a strong 
Opposition, thus aligning himself with the anti-Coalition forces.27 
Merriman 1s position and feelings at this time are revealed in a 
letter to Sir Somerset Nench. He stated that he had no great 
desire for office but it asked to form a Cabinet he would do so. 
If not he would stand aside rather than hold a subordinate 
position. He expressed grave misgivings as to the future of 
the country umer a Transvaal administration, due to the lack 
of experienced Parliamentarians, and the tendency towards 
extravagance. His main concern was for the fin.a.noes of the 
country and he emphasized the need for a stringent Audit Act. 28 
He was now extremely worried abOut the setting up of administrative 
machinery for Union and wrote to P. A.Molteno in London asking him 
to urge His Majesty's Government to send the new Governor-General, 
Sir Herbert Gladstone, out to South Africa as soon as possible. 29 
To follow up the assault made on Coalition at Carnarvon, 
Merriman now made another fighting speech at Worcester on the 
5th of Febr11ary. In it he made a Tiolent attack on the 
Progressives, calling a ·JJrogressive 11 am.an who has one eye on 
South Africa and the other eye cocked over the water o n the 
Stock Exchange in London. 11 He said that there was only room 
for one domi.lwnt party in Sou-t.h Africa and that would have to 
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be the South African Party. He also referred to the risk of 
chaos if there was delay in making arrangements for the 
administration of the Union. 30 For this speech De was assailed 
by Progressives throughout the country as etirring up racialism 
and confining himself to abuse of the Progressives.31 Even 
Sir Walter Hely-Hatcbinson chided him gently for the insinuation 
that Coalition was a capitalist-inspired scheme.32 He received 
support, however; from General Smuts who wrote approvingly of his 
speech,33 and in order to gain Steyn's aid he wrote to him giving 
him the full details of what had happened up to that date. 
He asked Steyn what was at the bottom of the Coalition movement, 
giving· his opinion that it was the money power, and outlining his 
ideas on just why Coalition was impossible am dangerous. 34 
He also wrote to Sir Somerset French in London agreein& that 
Hoi"meyr was an " almost incomparable loss at this moment. u35 
The next move was Jameson's, and realising that Coalition 
was dead, he now made a strong speech in Cape Town on the 11th 
ot Febru&rT. He described his talks with General Bo"tiha and 
said that although no definite agreement was reached they had 
been in sympathy with each other and perfectly candid. 
AB a result of his tour he had found that the Progressives were 
prepared for Coalition, but that General Botha could not answer 
for his partyo Jameson went on to say that Merriman by his 
speeches was keeping alive n the abominable racial question" 
and that the 11Best Men" Govermnent was the only policy which 
could avert the evils which would flow from Merriman' s schemes. 
However as Merri.man's policy was the only one which had been 
placed responsibly before the country by one of the four Prime 
Ministers, the Progressives must now prepare for the fight. 
The door, however, ,remained open for co-operation.36 
This speech Merriman replied to at Malmesbury on the 17th 
by ridiculing Jameson ts case and saying that the latter relied 
on abuse ot himself to bolster 1.t up. He warned the South African 
public to beware of catch-phrases such as "Best )(en" Government 
and once more hammered array at the danger of domination by the 
capital influence, sqing n the real object behind it all.•••• 
is to put the money power dominant in South Afrioa. 37 
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Support now arrived from Fischer, Steyn and General Smuts, all 
of whom wrote to Merriman attacking Jameson, assuring the former 
of their dislike of Coalition and re-assuring him of General 
Botha's soundness am fellow-feeling with them.38 In addition 
both General Hertzog ani Fischer made public speeches to the same 
effect, so Merriman definitely had the whole of the Ormge Free 
State with him. 39 In the Cape, however, Sauer and Malan had re-
mained non-conmittal, calling only for caution, patience and 
co-operation between the two races. ho 
In the next month, though, Sauer, together with De Waal, came 
out against CoaJ.i tion. Speaking at Aliwal North on the 9th of 
Karch, he defended the South African Party against the charge of 
racialism and said that he thought that Coalition hai never had a 
chance. Even if it had, the approach to it had been very bad, the 
Orange Free State leaders and Merriman having been ignored. He 
pointed out that there had been no wide public demam for Coaliticn 
and also warned against the danger of capitalistic domination. U 
De Waal in his speech at Petrlrsville on the 11th also denied the 
charges of racialism which had been levelled at the South African 
Party. He described Jameson as a 'Lorelei' luring the South 
.African public on with the promise of killing racialism, which in 
his opinion was aJ.req- dying and was now only a bogey used by the 
Progressives.42 
Merriman now began to have doubts about General Bot.ha' s in-
tentions. In a letter to his wife on the 15th March, he wrote 
"He is going to humbug us I'm quite sure." At the same time the 
rift in the Cape Cabinet lute began to appear, for when Merriman 
arrived back at Cape Town by ship from the East Coast, de Villiers 
Graat'f, who was at the Docks about to embark, lmrried on board his 
own ship without attempting to see his chief at a.ll. 43 Merriman' s 
suspicion or General Botha was strengthened by a statement by Sir 
Joseph Robinson in Johannesburg, who said, a.ft.er an interview "With 
' 
Smuts, that he was confident that there would be no Coalition 
ministry. Furthermore, he said that he knew pretty well who would 
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be in the Union cabinet;44 intormation which Merriman cer-
tainly did not have! A few. days later on the 22nd. of March 
General. Botha made a speech at the Het Volk Congress "Which was 
strictly on party lims. He appealed for co-operation on tl'e 
part of all sections of the people, warned Het Volk against 
destroying the good that had teen done, but made absolutely no 
reference to the future govermnent of t.he country. !6 This 
speech caused great disappointment throughout South .Africa. 
People everywhere were waiting i"or General Botha to mke bis 
position clear, Verrilllan not the least of them. 
Meanwhile a"t home Malan still remained unsympathetic. He 
bad, it is true, admitted that Coalition would be useless, sll>Je 
the present parties were provincial and a Coalition government 
would only split up into the old divisions. Nevertheless, he 
did not come forward with any definite support of Merriman but 
merely counselled patience until a Prime Minister had been select-
ed and then the formation of a party with a woad South African 
programme, which would attract the electors.46 This coolness of 
Kalan• s was reflected in the attitude of the Bond in its Congress 
at Beaufort West. In his opening speech on the 31st of March 
the President, H.C. van Heard.en M.L.A. called upon Bondsmen to 
make a success of Union by showing mutual. trust of other colonies 
and parties and to avoid anything which might give rise to sus-
picion or mistrust.47 
There was now a small interlude of purely danestic politics 
in the election of the Cape Senators for the Union Parliament. 
There had been some lobbying by certain members for nomination 
but no violent issues had arisen, am. the result was the election 
of six South .African Party men and two Progressives. 48 Some 
disappointment was telt in the Eastern Province in tlvlt only o:m 
representative of it.a interests was among the successful candi-
dates. 49 
A few d~ later Merriman spoke at Victoria West, where he 
de.t'ended bis administration to his constituents. He hit Coali-
tion a final blow and spoke wi. th some regret ot Janeson's attack 
on himself .So HatreVer, he expressed his true feelings in a letter 
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to his wife on the 19th of April, in 'Which he said that he 
wished the Progressives would get a new leader. He referred 
to Jameson as an •exotic' and said it was no use having such a 
weak pppo8itiOD.. In his annoyance over the ~est.ion of the 
premiership he compared the holrling of tie mob for General Botha,, 
when advocated by Jameson in the City Hall, with tie howling of 
' 51 
another mob for BarabbasJ 
The game was now obviously lost aid Merriman realised it,, 
although not without some misgivings as to the futtre belle.f'i t of 
the country. In a letter to Basil Williams on the lst. of Mq, 
he wrote, "The prospect of a Transvaal Government is not cheering 
w an economist like myself .... I am in rather an odd posi ti.on -
very like a man condemned to death, counting the days to the day 
or execution. ,,52 That day was not long coming. The Governor-
General, now Lord Gladstone, arrived on the 17th; on the 19th 
Sir Somerset French wrote sqing that a cablegram bad been re-
ceived in London announcing the appointment of Gemral. Botha and 
asking Merriman to re-ass'lll"8 him that ;twas not true • .5.3 The 
cablegram h-1 been premature but accurate. On t:te 19th Merriman 
had an audience rl th IDrd Gladstone who "talked with a most engaging 
absence ot knavrledge and even of information11 • 54 Two dqs later 
Merriman received a note frcm General Botha informing him of the 
latter's appointment as Prime Jlinister and afiting him to join 
the cabinet. He refused, giving as his mai.n reason the opinion 
that he 1t0uld do more good as an in1ependent cri-tic outside the 
cabinet.5.5 
When the nen becaml known llerriman received numerous letters 
expressing disappointment. and sympathy at, and in sane easesumer-
st.anding of his refusal. He, himself, felt th8 need to explain 
his action to Steyn who ba.durged him to take office. He poinl;ed 
out that his position in the cabinet would be intolerable as he 
would disagree with the other •mbers, be powerless to do good.; 
and be drawn into courses of which he disapproved until the inen-
tabla split came. FurtlBrmore, al though admiring General Botha 
as a man and a partisan leader, he had no respect for his political 
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knowl.edge. He referred to the •tortuous intrigue and cowardl.y-
silence• over the Coalition question and e:xpressed his dislike 
tor the Transvaal administration; its steam-roller tactics and 
political dishonestJ-. n56 To his old friend in Canada, Professor 
Gold."1!1-Smith, he wrote "Botha hilllsel.f' is a weak man read;r to make 
promises." 51 In the Orange Free State General Henzog agreed 
with his refusal, and admitted that it was impossible for him 
to take a subordinate position.58 llerriman•s refusal, hmrever, 
did not prevent him from encouraging his loyal subordinates, 
Sauer and Burton, to take office umer General Botha.59 
A few dqs after the announcement of the new cabinet the 
Progressive Party Conference opened in Bloemfontein. Here .iameson 
announced the formation of the Unionist Party of South Africa, 
with himself' as leader. Its programme was wide but its main 
purpose was to be to appose racialism and to Slpport Gemral Botha 
against the extremists in his own party. 60 By this means Jameson 
could attract v-oters aui at the same time show the Union Prime 
llinister that he was willing to "M>rk with him if ever tm need 
arose. 
The shouting and the tumult over the Praniership n0tr being 
over details began to come to hand of the intrigue that had been 
carried on against llerriman by two of his ministers, llalan aDd 
de Villiers Graaff. In bis letter to Steyn, gi. ving his reasons 
for refusing to join Gemral Botha's cabinet, 'Merriman tad also 
mentioned that he had been hurt to know that two of bis colleagues 
had not been true to him. aui that threats bad been bald out that 
61 
every effort would be made to keep him out of Parliament. A 
few days later he received. a letter from a constituent who gave 
him some information of 'Malan's activities in trying to induce 
his supporters in Victoria West to desert him. The writer also 
described Malan's attitude in regard U1 the Cabinet, which was 
that if asked to serve UDier Merriman he wanted a say in the matter 
and at least a majority in the Bond. However Merriman was assured. 
of the loyalty of Victoria West and advised that if he made a public 
1 
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statement to stand by the party the seat would be safe. 62 
Merriman had not been entirely unaware of what had been 
going on and said so in a.. letter to Rabie on the 31st. of May, 
when he wrote 11I knew months ago that they wre plotting md a 
.friend told me that the plan was to tur~ me out of Parliaaent. 1163 
This .friend was J.A.C.Graafr who ncnr wrote to :Merriman saying 
that he had been accused of accusing his brother D.P. de v. 
Graatf of conniving to keep :Merriman out of the Praniership. He 
assured Merriman that he had done his best for him but that the 
powers that be were responsible, and concluded by sa,ying that it 
would be wise to keep an eye on Victoria West.64 Merriman re-
plied assuring Graaf'f that he had not beEll responsible for divulg-
ing that Graarr had been his informer and pointing out that what 
had appeared in the periodical the 1 Cape' showed that it was 
coD111on lmowledge. 65 What had happened in the 'Gipe' was that 
the editor, G.D.Donovan, had been compelled to resi.gn due to his 
refusal to withdraw certain articles which he had published 
criticising the actions of Graaf! and Malan. 66 The cartoonist 
of the paper, D.C.Boonzaier was involved too siree vm der Horst 
the new editor had insisted on altering tte caption of a cartoon 
of Merriman and his constituency thus giving it an anti-Merriman 
bias. Boon!'aier, like Donovan, re-affirmed his loyalty to 
Merriman and thought that the stand the 'Cape' had taken Qiring 
the agitation aver the Premiership question had definitely influ-
enced the public in the Colony in favour of Merriman. 67 Another 
up-heaval in the Cape Town press was the resignation of Philipson-
Stowa, the editor of the South African News, because of the sub-
mission by the managing editor of articles hostile to :Merriman. 
These had made his position as editor intolerable, and had 
accounted in the change of tone towards Merriman in that paper 
in recent weeks.68 On the sixth or June Sauer wrote to Merriman 
from Pretoria to re-assure him or the safety of his Victoria West 
seat. 69 This turneQ. out in the end to be the case. Although 
it was an extremely bitter blow for Merriman, having done so much 
towards the creation of Union to go out practically into the 
loB. 
politic al desert, nevertheless he was returned unopposed by 
Victoria West aid entered the Union Parlianent in Noveni:>er 
"as a 'humb1e musket-bearer' in the Ministerial ranks. 11 70 
l. J X 11 
2. LO J 
3. SAN 




Kerriman to General Botha 5.1.09 
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6. S AN 
7. C T . 
8. L 0 H 
9. S TA 
10. J x JI 
ll. S AN 
12. C T 
13. L 0 H 
14. L O J 
15. 1 0 J 
19.6.09 11It would no doubt be to Mr. Merriman 
that the Governor-General would naturally 
turn as his first Prime Minister, f al' 
ainistrative e:xperieooe w:I.ll be of the 
utmost importame in the early years of 
Union. 11 





472/09 Ludwig w..&ner to Merriman JO. 1.09 "There 
is trouble brewing ahead, for the Transvaal 
means to boss the whole show, their whole 
talk and their actions al.l show that, un-





p.289 Jameson to S.Jameson 7 .12.09. 11It is a 
mixed problem, but I suppose it will end 
in the old two parties. If so we should 
have a very respectable opposition. Bot.ha 
writes to me that he is anxious to go on 
\?" . 
the lir.es .jf talked over in Scotland. I 
shall see him short:cy- and then will know 
how much to believe. 11 
16. L O M p.J14 
17. L 0 M p.Jl3 Merriman to Sir Somerset French. 11I aa 
afraid the position is still ioore complica-
ted by the amount of intrigue that is going 
on. 11 
18. J x 1l 617/09 
19. J X M 620/09 
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29. J x JI 14/10 
30. C T 7.2.10 
31. C T 8.2.10 
32. J X M 18/10 
33. J I M 19/10 
34. J X M 23/10 
no. 
General Botha to Merriman 29.12.09 
"You are aware 0£ my opinion with re-
gard to a Coalition Government." 
Graaf.f' to Merriman "Just received wire 
from Botha sqing that rUJIOurs coalition 
grouDiless. 11 
"The rumours of negotiations between 
General Botha and Jameson for the forma-
tion o.r a Coalition ministry are persis-
tent." 
Merriman to General Botha .5.1.10. 
Merriman to Sir Somerset French 31.1.10 
Published summaries of articles from the 
'Star', the 'Tim.es' of Natal aid the 
Bloemfontein 'Post', all criticising 
Merriman' s actions and declaring him to 
have shown himself unfit to be Prime 
Minister. 
Sir Walter Bely-Hutchinson to Merriman 
11I think you are quite mistaken about 
coalition being a Throgmorton Street 
id.a&." 
Ge~ral Smuts to Merriman 10.2.10. 
Merriman to Steyn 12.2.10. 110£ course 
such a project (Coalition) would at 
once split up our party and place us 
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"They say 1 give us the Best 1len 1 • Well 
we call ourselves the best men. There 
is only- one way of f iming out the best 
men. They aE'8 tte J'lSn who are put into 
power for the time being. n 
Fischer to Merriman 18.2.10 11I have no 
reason to think that Botha has any idea 
of joining in a coalition •••• 11 
Steyn to Merriman 22.2.10 11! am posi ti.ve 
Botha never gave J. to urrlerstand that he 
personally- is in favour of a coalition 
ministry. He mows too well that the 
moment he does that he strikes the death-
kmll of his party-. 11 
General Smuts to Merriman 22.2.10 "I 
myself have mver fer a moment considered 
Coalition possible. Botha has always been 
opposed to Coalition and has repelled the 
repeated advaroes from the other side. 11 
Speech by General Hertzog at Bethlehem 
on the 23rd. 
Report of Fischer's speech. 
Merriman to Mrs. Merriman 15.3.10 "! 
wonder what Graaf'£ tells his colleagues. 
It was very odd and not over poll te his 
bobbing off on board the steamer just as 
mine was coming in 'b:> anchor telliiig people 
fas had nothing to see me about. " 
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The Sens.tors were elected on the 8th of 
April. Theywere, P.J.Weeber, Dr. A.G. 
Viljoen, Dr. J.H. M. Beck, :Mr. c. Searle, 
H.J.H. Olaassens, J.A.C.Graatt, all South 
African Party men, and A. J. Fullsr and E. 
Powell, the two Progi-essives. 
P.W.llichau to :Merriman 2.5.10. 
Extract from the Gra.h.amstown 'Journal' 
11We think it will be admitted tba. t the 
Eastern peoples have been very unfairly 
treated, in fact, they are suffering the 
usual trea'b'nent of being flOuted and ig-
nored. 11 
llerriman to Mrs. Merriman 19.4.10 "l get 
angry when I think of old Jagger in the 
chair and those }J>OO fools hmding them-
selves hoarse when Jameson advocated Botha. 
Well another crowd preferred Barabbas which 
was a. good deal worse." 
:Merriman to Basil Williams 1.5.10. 
Sir Somerset French to :Merriman 19.5.10 
.. 
General Botha to Merriman 21.5.10 and his 
reply. 
JleITiman to Steyn 22.5.10 
:Merriman to Goldwyn-Smith 5.6.10 
General Hertzog to :Merriman 1.6.10 
Merriman to Steyn 22.5.10. 
J.D. de Ville to Merriman 30.5.10 "llr• 
Claussen ask ed. ne to go to your friend 
)Ir.Mal.an the pre'Vious night (the night be-
fore the annoumenent <:£ the ~pointment 
of General Botha as Prime Minister) and be 
63. J x 1l l95A/l0 
64. J x 1l 209/10 
65. J x 1l 219/10 
66. J x 1l 213/10 
67. J x 1l 106/10 
J x 1l 266/10 
68. J x 1l 188/10 
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gave the show •BY· Mr. Jlalan made 
no secret of it that he is against you. 
He pointed out that if you refused to 
join Botha what is Victoria West going to 
do." 
Merri.man to P.R.Rabie 31.5.10. 
J.A.C.Graa.f't to Merri.man 3.6.10. 
Merriman to Graa.tf 5. 6.10. "Some weeks 
ago you were good enough to tell me the 
whole scheme of which the c~ stroke 
was the attack on my seat in Parliament. 
You mentioned no nan.es but from the tenour 
of your convers8:tion. I could form no other 
conclusion that that yoUC' brother and 
Malan were the chief instigators. At 
that time I said nothing. Since then as 
events developed ani atter certain threats 
were held out to ·in:lu::e DB to join General 
Botha I certsi.~ did s 83' that such a plot 
was known to me and that you could give 
information on the sub~ ct. I also men-
tioned your brother's name and :Malan' s but 
I do not think that I conmcted you with 
that information. That .it is town talk 
-~i 
is clear from what has appeared in the 
'Cape'. Which certainly did not emanate 
t'ran •·" 
G.D.Donovan to Merriman 4.6.lO 
D.C. Boonza.ier to Kerri.man 20.5.10 
D.c. Boonzaier to :Merri.man 17.6.10 
Philipson-Stowe to Merriman 31.5.10. He 
enclosed a copy of his letter of resigna-
tion to the Boe.rd of Directors. 
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69. J x )( 223J10 Sauer to Merriman 6.6.10. "With re-
gards to your candidature r or 'V:IDtoria 
West you need fear no opposition from 
Malan now I think. He sees more than 
be did a little while back am ha.a rea-
lised the hold you have on the country." 
10. L 0 )( p.337 
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C H A P T E R. · VII ll.5. 
The period with which this thesis is concerned has, for the 
sake of coil'f'enience, been described in chapters, each of which 
dealt with some specitic and important aspect of Cape Politics 
in that period. Nevertheless although this has been necessary 
and indeed essential in order to deal with these various sspe..,ts fully 
and logically, it is also essential to view the per.iod as a whole 
in order to obtain a truly historical conception of it as apart 
from a aere narrative description. 
Possibly the most convenient starting point for this historical. 
analysis is to consider what factors governed the actions and 
policies of the various parties in the Cape during those very 
important two and a halt years. 
To begin with the Opposition Party, the Progressives, it is 
clear that from the star-t they were handicapped by the lack of 
reaJ.ly effective leadership. Jameson left for England on the 
15th of April 1908 and the leadership of the party devolved upon 
Dr. Smartt -who, al.though a competent parliamentarian, was not the 
type of man who could inspire a party and mould it into a really 
efficient political machine. The poor party dicipline and the 
con.tlicting interests of the large towns have already been mentioned, 
and it says much for what sol.idari1;7 the party did possess that it 
was able to put up such a good fight over the Light Wine Licences 
Acts and attract enough lloderates and Kinisterial.ists over to its 
side to reduce the majority of the Government to the low figures 
that it did. 
Jameson returned to South Africa in time to leai the Progressive 
section of the Cape delegation at the National Convention, and 
from this time until the final acceptance of the Constitution by 
the Cape Parliament dates the temporary a:L.Jiance between the 
Progressives and the Government. The most important men in the 
party had been in the delegation to the Convention and they returned 
determined to back up Merriman in his defence of it, and to help 
him in getting it accepted in the Cape. The Progressives had 
good reason to do this because the originaJ. Draft Act with its 
proportional representation and three-member constituencies meant 
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that the party would get a relative increase in power in ~he Cape 
Province after Union. When these were dropped in the revised 
Act it was nevertheless supported because it was felt that Union 
was the main objective and that delq in achieving it might be 
dangerous. Later, j,n l9W, when Union had become an accomplished 
fact, the Progressives fought hard tor Jameson's nBest Menn 
Government scheme. This was the logical policy tor them to follow. 
Their co-operative attitude durllig and immediately after the 
CollV9ntion had to a certain extent re-instated them in public 
opinion in the Cape, and by stressing the need for the "Convention 
Spirit" during the first difficult years of Union there was a chance 
that the South African public might be persuaded to let them share 
in the Government or the country during that time. This accounts 
for the violent attacks on Merriman when he made his stand for 
party government. As soon as he had done that the Progressives, 
with a show of reluctance, changed their tactics and saying that 
they had no choice in the matter, began to reform and co-ordinate 
their forces on a party line in order to build up as strong an 
opposition as possible in preparation for the first Union 
Parliament. 
Of the Independents not much need be said. Their number was 
too small for them to be or any great effect in the Cape Parliament. 
The sole exception amongst them was Schreiner, and his work will 
be dealt with later. In the South ~ican Party it is possible 
to distinguish between the Bond section am the Moderates, which 
to all intents and purposes mearus the English section or the party. 
This section comprised maiiUy of members representing constituencies 
either in the Eastern Province or of a mixed urban and rural nature. 
That is constituencies where an appeal to the electors based on 
the bad financial administration of the late Government, coupled 
with the assurance of sympathy with the landed interest, had been 
successful. It was this section that supported Merriman in his 
refusal to repeal the Excise; and opposed him in the fights over 
the Light Wine Acts. This was because their interests nre not 
those or the Wine Farmers nor identical with those of the Bond. 
They were for the main part opposed to 8Z1Y' relaxation in the 
res-t.rictions on the ·supply or liquor to the natives. They were 
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in a nut-shell, Merriman-men, and were completel:-;r s-tumied at t~ 
turn or events in Jlq 1910 when it becam apparent that Merriman 
was not going to be in the first Uniell Goverment. 1 
pi the last resort the only real, cohesive political force in 
the Colony was the BCl'nd. Here there was no doubt as to policy, 
and no l.ack or energetic, vociferous leaders to co-ordinate and 
direct that poller. Comprising two-thirds of the Government 
members, and having three representatives in the Cabinet, the 
Bond was in a position to crack the whip whenever it felt so inclined. 
That it did not do so more often can be attributed to Merriman•s gift 
of compromising when forced into a corner, the effect of the respon-
sibilitr of office on Kalan and the restraining influence of Hotmeyr. 
Nevertheless the strength of the Bond in the Cape Parliament is shown 
in the legislation of th e period, and it was only when its policies 
cl.ashed ~olentlr with Merriman' s principles as a financier that he 
was prepared and determiDed to resist them. 
From parties to personalities. Here again the scales were 
loaded in favour of the South African Pa:rty. The oll'.cy figure on 
the Progressive side who could claim nation-wide respect was 
Jameson. He, with his long absences in England, was of little 
value as a party man during this period. This had been fore-
shadowed during the elections, when his personal letters showed 
that he was tired of Cape politics and was looking forward to a 
rest in 1909. Also in the elections themselves his clear 
insight into the situation showed him that he did not have much 
hope of success, and a party leader without confidence is not a 
source of inspiration to the men he leads. When he did return 
from England. it was to support JleITiman in 'the work of the 
Convention, and in this he was a valuable ally. He had originall.T 
been in favour of federation, but was quickly" converted to 
unii"ication when he realised the strength of the movement for it 
at the Convention and the fact that it appeared to be a practical 
possibilitr and not a distant ideal. His "Best Ken" scheme .ror th• 
Union·G°"9rmaent was the natural line for a politician in his 
position to take. He 1f&8 out; therefore he must try to get in. 
When the scheme failed he was quick to organise his forces in 
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Opposition while still attempting to concilia"tAt Ge~ral_Both&. 
Although he paid lip-service to Rhodes' ideal ot equal rights tor 
all civilised men, it is to be doubted whether he bad_ any real 
feeling for the native franchise as a thing in itself. 
On the other side, the fact is that only in llerriman did 
the English section ot the South African Party have a real leader. 
Burton and Currey, though loyal subordinates, were just that; 
but llerriman was one of the giants. No other man could have held 
the party together as a whole. He was acceptable in the highest 
degree to the English section .ot the party, and was the only 
Englishman who would have been accepted by the Bond as a leader. 
AB it was, he had the greatest difficulty in restraining the Bond 
from pressing its demands too strongly on Parliament, in spite of 
the fact that he had been as lenient as possible to the landed 
interest in his financial administration, which was admittedly 
harsh. This it had to be, due to the situation in which the 
Colony was when he took office, and it says much for his strength 
of principle as a financier that he only reduced the Excise late 
in 1909. As far as the native policy was concerned, his pre-
occupation with financial matters blinded him to the importance 
of a really satisfactory long-term solution of it. To him the 
urgency of the need for Union was due to the possibility of 
conflict between the colonies over material considerations, 
such as customs tariffs and railway policies. His view of the 
native franchise as a mere safety valve, led him to believe at 
the Convention that the compromise over it was worth while for 
the accomplishment of Union. Later he had doubts as to the 
wisdom of that decision, and began to glimpse the real nature 
and importance of the problem. 
On the side of the Bond, the figures of Hofmeyr, Sauer and 
Malan stand out most prominently. Hofmeyr, a man in the true 
nvolksleier" tradition, was at all ti.mes a potent force in 
Cape politics. Of broad outlook, his main interest 
nevertheless was that or ensuring that the Dutch section of the 
population did not suffer any disadvantages as compared with the 
English. This naturally meant that he was more concerned with 
the welfare of the country districts than of the large towns• 
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Hence his insistence on the clear definition of the language 
equality clause, am his opposition to proportional representation 
and the one vote, one value principle. But although he was 
such a strong party man, he did not allow policy to blind him 
to .facts, as was shown by his attitude towards the Excise during 
the big demonstration in April 1909. With regard to the coloured 
and native franchise, he had rell feeling for the former, and a 
strictly practical outlook on the latter. He regarded it as a 
means of retaining the goodwill of the natives, lltlo outnumbered 
by so very much the European population of South Africa. 2 
Of Sauer it can be said that he was a very vaJ.uable asset 
to the 'Ministry. Not only was he a good Ad:ministrator, as his 
work as Commissioner showed, but aJ.so he was a skilled debater 
and a shrewd politician. He had had long Parliamentary 
experience, and had played a big part in engineering the defeat 
of the Jameson ministry. Throughout Merriman's term of office 
he proTed to be a loyal subordinate, and at the Convention he 
showed his genuine feeling for the non-Europeans when be spoke 
in favour of equal rights for all and opposed any form of 
differential franchise for black and white.3 Although compelled 
to submit to the general will of the Convention, and in spite ot 
the fact that he loyally- defended the Constitution later in the 
Colony, he nevertheless had misgivings lb out the colour problem. 
These misgivings later grew into grave fears, as was revealed in 
a letter he wrote while in France after the work of the delegation 
in England was done, in which be wondered if Union had not come 
too soon, but admitted that the Cape would have to make the best 
of it. 4 
With llalan the case is BJ.together different. Here was a 
man who had power, and knew it. It has been noted how he was 
. approached by the Governor of the Cape on the question of the 
premiership in 1908, and had chosen to stand aside in favour of 
Merriman. He had done this because he knew that if th• 
supremacy- of the Bond was too blatant the ColollY' would not 
stand for it, and also because in all probability- Kerr~ 
would have refused to serve in a subordinate capacity- under him. 
But he aJ.so knew that Merriman could not very well .form a 
120. 
Cabinet without him, and once in that Ga>inet, he was in a 
position to see that the wishes and needs of the Bond did not 
go unfulfilled. At the Convention he was a loyal delegate, 
~t in the Cape Parlialiient he was the unceasing advocate of the 
agricultural element, and the wine farming element in particular. 
This sympathy for the wine farmers, am his promises or help, 
showed that a was confident of being able to compel Merriman 
to give way to the pressure exerted on him. llerr:Lman himself 
had said of 1lalan " with all his faults the fellow must have a 
d 
. , 
goo heaxit, n an opinion 1'hich doubtless he changed in Jlay 1910. 
For Malan by that ti.me had realised the full extent of the power 
be had in the Bond. In the discussion of the Draft Act he had 
been able to counter-act the influence of Hotmeyr, he had been 
present at the Bond Congress at Dcmdrecht in Karch 1909, and 
had defended the Constitution during the Parliamentary session 
devoted to its discussion. Later in the year, however, he had 
championed the cause of the wine farmers, and had made it clear 
to Merriman that he expected something to be done to improve 
their lot. In the new year J4alan, knowing that he had the 
good ·opinion of Botha, made a bid-together with Graa£f- to 
keep Merriman out of the Union Government, and . even out of 
Parliament itself. In the latter he was unsuccessful due to 
the loyalty of Merri.man's Victoria West constituents, but it 
is possible that his intrigue influ~nced slightly the choice 
of General Botha as Prim Minister, by reveaJ.ing that :Merriman 
could not be sure of the individual support of even his own 
party in the Cape. 
The two remaining figures in the Cape at that ti.me were 
!Drd de Villiers and Schreiner. The former, being chief 
JUstice, could naturally take no part in domestic politics, 
but he could and did play an important role in the making 
of Union. It has been seen how he was in the full confidence 
ot Merriman and General Smuts, alld took part in the exchange of 
ideas which took place 'be:f'ore the Convention met. During the 
'Wt>rking of that body, he was able as chairman, due to the fairly 
elastic rule•~.of procedure, to speak, vote and in the event of 
an equality of votes, to have a casting vote. Thus he was able 
to make his influence felt, and he did this to such good e.f fect 
121. 
that " though the Convention could probdl 1y have finished the 
Draft Constitution at Durban, it adjourned to meet again later 
at Cape Town, very largely because its indispensable president 
showed signs of breaking down." 1 Probably his most important 
achievment during the Convention was that of ascertaining and 
.elucidating the attitude of the Imperial Govermnent on the 
native problem to the Convention. 8 M regards the latter, he 
himself had originally considered that it should be left fer the 
Union Pa:-liament to settle. or the compromise as it was finally 
adopted., h...;e expressed the conviction that it was necessary for 
Union, and that he be.lieved that the position of the Non-
Europeans would slowly.improve throughout South Africa due to 
the influence of the Cape's liberal tradition. 
This was just what Schreiner .fe~ed would not happen. The 
attitude he adopted towards the native problem, although it 
represented a change from what he had thought at an earlier stage, 
was nevertheless one of complete sincerity and utter conviction. 
The part he plqed in Cape politics apart .from the native question 
was not important. He had refused Jameson's overtures during the 
elections, and during the life of the last Pr liament criticised 
Merriman' s financial arrangements, and opposed any measure m ich 
seemed likely to relax the restrictions on the supply of liquor 
to the natives. But these were as nought compared to his fight 
for the fundamental rights of the non-Europeans. Unable, much 
to his disappointment, to be present at the Convention, he did 
his utmost to rectify what he considered to be faults in the 
Constitution. He opposed unification because he realised that 
only under a f'ed.eraJ. form of Union could the Cape 's liberal 
policy really be sa.t .... guarded for all time. He recognised the 
danger of the entrenched clauses operating not as a guarentee of 
the sa.tety of the political. rights of the non-Europeans, but as 
a means for them to be reduced still futher by the combined 
forces of prejudice and compromise. 
This period was a happier time for the Cape in its relations 
w1 th the other colonies than other more troublesome years had been.. 
The common desire for Union had made the approach to inter-




"Convention Spirit• wu much exaggerated, n evertheless it did 
·lead to a certain amount of give and take in the colonies 
dealinga. with each other. The solution of the Cape-Natal 
railway difficulty was welcomed in the Cape in spite of the 
il'ldignation felt ~ l»th colonies at the Transvaal's agreement 
with Portuga•se ~t Africa. 9 The fellow feeling between the 
Cape and the Orange River Colony about Transvaal domination of 
Union has been mentioned, and in general it can be said that 
inter-colonial relations were fairly harmonious during the last 
two years of separate existence. The one insurmountable 
barrier was the question of the n ative franchise. The other 
colonies were adamant in their refusal to consider the extension 
of this, and also the admission of non-Europeans to the Union 
Parlftment. There was no way ou.;t; of the impasse but the 
compromise effected in the Constitution, and this was acceptable 
to the majority of the European population of the Cape Colony. 
In the sphere of relations with the British Govermnent, 
llerriman, in spite of his abhorrence of Downing Street 
interference, was ·.able to work harmoniously with Sir Walter 
Rely-Hutchinson and the other servants of the Imperial Govern-
m ent in the Cape Colony. But he had a healthy distrust for 
Lord Selbourne, and he i.Jllagined that he discerned his influence 
behind any- movement 1tl ich seemed to favour the Progressive cause 
in South Africa. 
But !When all the aspects of Cape Poli tics in this pre-
Union period have been considered, the feature that stands 
out clearly as being of the greatest historical significance 
both for the Cape and for South Africa, is that of the integratio n 
of the Colony's identity into the wider one of Union, and the 
re-orientation of its :native policy in order to satisfy the 
demands of its neighbours. The latter was the outcome of several 
factors operating in the Colony itself. Important amongst these 
was the poor financial status of the Colony, which made it 
imperative for it to enter Union, and at the same time reduced 
its effective bargaining power at the Convention: Union was 
defini:t.ely essential for South Africa when looked at from the 
commercial and material point or view; that no one doubted in 
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the slightest. Too often had con.nicting interests led to inter-
colonial. quarrels and the threat of civil war. 
But the chief factor which led to the retrogressive action 
of the Convention was the lack of appreciation in the Cape i tsel..f 
of the real significance of the native franchise. Public opinion 
was proud of the liberal tradition of the Cape and pointed to the 
success of its native administration as proof of its effectiveness 
but was nevertheless deluded into thinking of the native franchise 
as a mere safety-valve serving to keep the non-European population 
contented with their l.ot. The folly of this interpretation, held 
as it was by practically all the leading men in the Cape, led to 
the compromise at the Convention and the widely expressed con-
viction that the safeguards contained in the Constitution were 
strong enough to preserve the political rights of the non-Europeans 
forall time. The introduction of the colour bar into Parlianent 
was only an extension of the aetual feeling in the Cape. Although 
there was no colour bar in the Cape Parliament, no non-European 
had ever been a member and to this Cape Colonists pointed with 
pride, as an example of the success of the 'safety valve• principle 
of the franchise. Most members would have been horrified if a 
non-European had attempted to enter Parliament and would have 
brought up the sane arguments as were later brought up against 
Schreiner during his appeal to the British Parlianent. Further-
more, in the Colony itself the native franchise was not looked 
upon favourably by the wb:>le European population. Maasd.orp 's 
speech at the Convention showed that the farmers were definitely 
opposed to it10 an:l there is no doubt that in tie Eastern Provime 
the prospect of a general native franchise was one which woo.ld 
never ha.Ve been entertained for a moment. 
Nevertheless the leaders and the makers of policy throughout 
South Africa did realise vaguely the real significance of the 
native problem, and, at the same time, the fact that they were well 
ahead of the South African public in their thinking. General. 
Smuts in 1906 had realised the ma.gni tude of the native problem11 
. 124. 
and even MeITiman him.5elf, when speaking of the draft Constitution 
had referred to the Cape as losing everything except in nere 
finance. 12 At the same time they felt that the accomplishment 
of Union made up for these misgivings and carried it out with the 
pious hope that all would go well in the future. Only Schreiner 
was prepared to stand up and tell the world that Union was not 
worth-while without a just and lasting solution of the problem.. 
Supported by a bBnd of liberal-minded fellow-thinkers and the al-
most universal approbation of the non-Europeans, he ma.de t:te attempt 
which ended in failure. "Easy is the descent to Avernus" he had 
cried, he might well have completed the quotation, 11but to return 
is hard and ard.uous 11 • It is easy to be wise after the event, but 
Schreiner himself had realised the possible solution to the problem. 
A federal union ensuring the efficient working of South Africa as 
an economic whole, but with a constitution which protected State 
rights and allowed the individual provinces to work out their 
destinies for them.selves would have allowed the Cape to retain and 
develop its policies along the lines of gradual and logical deve-
lopment until a harioonious and well integrated mixed society cou1d 
have been achieved. The whole story reveals the folly of saerift:-
cing moral principles for material benefits. The problem remains 
to-day and will be intensified in the future, for history is not 
static, man must progress or retrogress and it is upon the satis-
factory solution of this great problem that th! future of South 
Africa as a nation and a part of world civilization depends. 
-----oOo--
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NOTES TO CHAPrER vn -
1. J X M 170/10 
2. LO H p.629 
3. Walton p.126 
4. J X M 535/09 
5. J x ),{ 55/10 
6. J x 11 571/09 
7. L D V p.444 
8. Ibid pp 446,448 
PP 462,463 
9. v.d.Poel p.143 
10. Walton pp 14o,14l 
R.H.Lurrlie to Merriman 28.5.lO. "It 
is the universal feeling among our party 
here (Ui tenbkge) that at the moment they 
are stunned with the direction that 
matters political are taking; and feel 
the want of your guiding hand in the cir-
cumstances in which they find themselves. 
We will have no leader but you and we 
want you to give us some indication of 
your attitude towards the Union Govern-
ment u "that we ma.r support and follow 
you. 11 
Ho!meyr to the Coloured Peoples' Vigi-
lance Committee. 
Sauer to Merriman 21.8.09. "I am much 
relieved that our Bill is through the 
House of Commons though I sympathise 
strongly with those who made their voice 
heard against the preclusion of a man of 
colour from the Union Parlianent. It 
is a painful experience to feel that 
the bigotry of Natal and the ignorance 
of otmrs have dragged us in to this de-
gradation, and laid up possible, probab1e 
trouble for the future of our cotin.try. 11 
Merriman to Mrs.Merriman 15.3.10. 
F.S. Malan to Merriman 25.9.09. 
126. 
11. L O 1l p.232 General Smuts to Merriman, Karch 1906. 
"When I consider the political future 
of the natives in South .Africa I must 
say that I look into shadows md dark-
ness, and then I feel imlined to shift 
the intolerable burden of solving that 
sphinx problem to the ampler shoulders 
airl stronger brains of _the future." 









Collections of Documents 
Published Documents 
The Cape Times (C T) 




( S TA ) 
Votes and Proceedings of the Cape (V & P) 
Parliament 
. Appendices to t hit above 
The Statistica1 Register of the Colony 
of the Cape of Good Hope ( S R) 
The Union Year Book, Volume I 
Merriman Papers ( J X M ) 
Hofmeyr Papers 
Prinle Ministers 0.ffice. 
Eybers: Select Constitutional Documen.."l:'s 
illustrating South African Documents. 
Newton: Select Documnts relating to 
the Unification of South Africa. 
Note: The above sources formed the basic research material for 
this thesis. The Hansard for the Cape Parliament in the 
period up to 1910 was based on reports pul:il..ished in the 
Cape Times, so that paper pl41ed the dual role or supplying 
information on public opinion on the Pr~ressive side, 
am also details of speeches and debates in Parliament. 
Where 8ZIJ1' doubt arose as to the latter the offical deeu-
•nts were consulted. From the documenliar;y angle the 
Merriman papers were invaluable and supPlied the major 
part of the very important information to be derived !'?'om 
privat. ocrreapou!.enee. For statistical intomation the 
the Statistical Register was the main source., 
together with the AppeJXlices to the Votes and Pro-
ceedings, which also supplied the reports of select 
coD'lllittees on various important issues~ 
l 28. 
SECONDARY SOURCES : 
Biographies J.H.Hotmeyr Life of J.H. Hofmeyr ( L O H ) 
Sir P. Laurence: Life of J .x. Jlerriman ( L O M) 
I. D. Colvin Life of Jameson Vol.II (I.OJ-t 
E. Walker Lord de Villiers and his times ( L.D V) 
E. Walker W.P.Sehreiner. A South African ( W p S) 
B. Cloete Die Lewe van Senator F .s .Mal.an ( F S K) 
Other Secomary 
Works The Cambridge History of the Bri tidh 
WaJ.ker 
J.v.d.Poel 
Empire Volume VIII 
A History of South Africa (Walker) 
Railwa.Y and Customs Policies in 
South Africa (v.d.Poel) 
R. H. Brand The Union of South Africa. 




The Old Cape House. 
Education in South Africa (:U:alherbe) 
Note Of the above the biographies were the most directly help-
ful in supplying copies of certain letters and details of 
personal movements which otherwise would not have been 
available. It is impossible to select 8I'J3" particular 
work as being most helpful, but it can be said that the 
most authori.tative are those by Walker md Hofmeyr., while 
the worst offender as regards emotional colouring and 
lack of annotation is that dealing w.i. th the life of F.S. 
Kalan by Cloete. The other secon:iary works played a 
useful part in supplying additional factual int'orma.tion, 
and helping to grasp the atmosphere and feeling of the 
Note 
period uni.er review. 
The abbreviations used in annotation throughout the the~is 
are given in brackets behind the respective works. 
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